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Gould, R (On the Application Of) v Devon County Council (Rev1)

England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Jun 2, 2026
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerned a decision taken by Company A on 13 March 2024 to close the "North Devon Link Service" (the Service), a long-established drop-in service for adults with mental health difficulties located in three local centres (Town A, Town B and Town C). The Service was established in 1992, was managed by The Hospital, did not form part of Company A's statutory mandatory social care provision, and the majority of users did not have eligible needs under the Care Act 2014. Company A ran consultations in 2023 because of budgetary pressures (the Service cost £485,000 per year) and the development of alternative provision via Company B and primary care multi-agency teams. A report presented to Company A's Cabinet on 13 March 2024 recommended closure; the Cabinet resolved to close the Service and to support users' transition for at least three months.

On 24 May 2024 the Appellants applied for judicial review challenging the lawfulness of the Decision on the basis that Company A had failed to have regard to, or irrationally failed to consider, duties in sections 2, 3 and 5 of the Care Act 2014. On 24 January 2025 Judge Eyre dismissed the claim. The Appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal (hearing 12 March 2026). The Court of Appeal (Judges Bean, Phillips and Falk) delivered judgment dismissing the appeal on 2 June 2026.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Company A, in deciding to close the Service, failed to take into account mandatory relevant considerations by not having regard to the Care Act 2014 duties in sections 2, 3 and 5.
  2. Whether Company A's failure to have regard to those Care Act "target" duties (where they were not directly engaged or breached) rendered the Decision irrational because those duties were "obviously material".
  3. Whether the judge below erred in his treatment of the users' evidence as insufficient to displace Company A's factual account of the Service's role (in particular as to crisis prevention).
  4. Whether, even if the Care Act provisions should have been considered, the outcome would probably have been no different such that relief should be refused under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Service in practice operated to prevent users going into mental health crisis and thus engaged the Care Act duties (sections 2, 3 and 5) or made those duties obviously material to the Decision.
  • The judge below erred in preferring Company A's evidence over the evidence of service users; the users' witness evidence should have been treated as sufficient to show the Service's true role.
  • Authorities such as R (DAT) v West Berkshire Council supported the proposition that statutory duties relevant to the subject-matter of a decision must be brought to decision-makers' attention and so could be mandatory relevant considerations.

Respondent's Arguments (Company A)

  • The Decision was not the exercise of a function to which the Care Act duties applied; the Service did not meet eligible needs under the Care Act and the Care Act duties were therefore not engaged.
  • The judge below correctly preferred Company A's evidence on the Service's role; the users' evidence (non-expert, limited in number) did not rebut Company A's account.
  • By Respondent's Notice Company A further argued that (a) a target duty which is neither engaged nor breached cannot, save where a statute so provides, be treated as a mandatory relevant consideration; and (b) even if the Care Act provisions should have been considered, it is highly likely the outcome would not have been substantially different (s.31(2A)).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R (F) v Surrey County Council [2023] EWHC 980 (Admin), [2023] 4 WLR 45 Approach to determining disputes of fact in judicial review (burden on claimant to show decision-maker's factual understanding is wrong). The Court applied the R (F) test and concluded the judge below was entitled to prefer Company A's evidence unless the Appellants showed it "cannot be correct".
CREEDNZ Inc v Governor General [1981] NZLR 172 Categories of relevant considerations and the distinction between mandatory and obviously material considerations (category framework cited). Adopted as the conceptual framework (CREEDNZ categories) for distinguishing statutory mandatory considerations from those which, if "obviously material", may render a decision irrational.
R (Friends of the Earth) v Secretary of State for Transport [2020] UKSC 52 Endorsement of the CREEDNZ categorisation and the application of the Wednesbury irrationality test to obvious materiality. Used to restate the three categories of consideration and to confirm that obvious materiality is assessed by the Wednesbury standard.
R (Ahmad) v Newham LBC [2009] UKHL 14 Distinction between general/target duties owed to a population and duties owed to an individual. Relied on to caution against converting target duties into specific duties to individuals; informed the Court's assessment of Care Act "target" duties.
R (DAT) v West Berkshire Council [2016] EWHC 1876 (Admin) What constitutes "proper consideration" where a public body is required to have regard to a statutory provision; assistance required for decision-makers to address statutory language. The Court held that DAT explains how statutory duties should be considered where they are mandatory but does not establish that duties become mandatory absent clear statutory identification; DAT did not support the Appellants' broader proposition.
R v Somerset County Council, ex p Fewings [1995] 1 WLR 1037 Summary formulation of categories of consideration (adopted and summarised by later cases). Cited (via Friends of the Earth) to support the CREEDNZ/Fewings framework applied to decide whether the Care Act duties were mandatory considerations.
R (Khatun & others) v Newham LBC [2004] EWCA Civ 55, [2005] QB 37 Decision-maker determines manner and intensity of inquiry into relevant factors subject to Wednesbury review. Quoted to support that the court should respect the decision-maker's judgment on inquiry intensity and sufficiency of material, subject to rationality review.
R (SARCP) v Stoke County Council [2025] EWHC 18 (Admin), [2025] PTSR 1311 Example where a decision was held to have failed to take into account statutory factors, including duties under section 5 of the Care Act. The Court observed that SARCP did not support the Appellants' case that the Care Act provisions were mandatory relevant considerations in the present circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by reference to the judge below's findings and legal analysis. It accepted the judge's factual approach: there was a genuine factual dispute about the Service's role but, applying the R (F) approach, the Appellants bore the burden to show Company A's factual understanding was wrong; that burden was not discharged. The users' evidence (six non-expert statements) was insufficient to rebut the detailed account in the Report and Ms Forster's evidence about the Service's limited, non-clinical role.

On legal principle the Court endorsed the CREEDNZ/Friends of the Earth framework: (i) some considerations are clearly identified by statute as mandatory; (ii) others are excluded; (iii) others are discretionary but may be "obviously material" such that failure to consider them is irrational (Wednesbury standard). The Court accepted in principle that a broad "target" duty could, rarely, be either a mandatory relevant consideration (if the governing statute clearly so required) or an obviously material consideration, but emphasised that to be mandatory the consideration must be clearly identified by statute.

Applying those principles, the Court concluded the Care Act duties (sections 2, 3 and 5) were not mandatory relevant considerations for the Decision because Company A was not exercising a statutory function in respect of which the wording of the governing statute required regard to the Care Act provisions. The Appellants had not identified any governing statutory provision which expressly or impliedly obliged the decision-maker to have regard to the Care Act duties.

On obvious materiality the Court accepted it could not be excluded in principle, but concluded the Care Act duties were not obviously material here. The judge's assessment that the Service was not commissioned to meet eligible Care Act needs, that alternative provision existed (Company B, multi-agency teams and Trust urgent services), that closure aligned provision across the county, and that a breach of the general Care Act duties was unlikely, supported the view that the duties were not obviously material to the Decision. The judge was entitled to prefer Company A's evidence and to conclude no irrationality.

The Court further observed that, even if the Report had referred to the Care Act duties, it would have been open (and proper) for Company A's officer to advise the Cabinet that those duties were not engaged and would not be breached; the Appellants accepted that point, which further undercut their claim that omission of the duties was obviously material. The Respondent's Notice point that the outcome would probably have been the same (s.31(2A)) was noted but, given dismissal on the primary grounds, required no further determination.

Judges Falk and Bean agreed with the reasoning and conclusion.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Direct effect: the Decision of Company A to close the Service was upheld and the Appellants' claim for judicial review was dismissed. The Court did not treat the case as establishing a new principle that target duties are automatically mandatory relevant considerations; it affirmed that to be mandatory a consideration must be clearly identified by statute, and that obvious materiality is judged by the Wednesbury standard. No wider binding precedent altering that framework was created by this decision.