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Petition of Harper Macleod LLP for Directions (Court of Session)

Scottish Court of Session
May 29, 2026
Smart Summary (Beta)

Summary of Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion, delivered by Judge Tyre of the Extra Division, Inner House, concerns a petition by Company A (the petitioner), the holder and escrow agent of funds contributed by numerous investors toward a proposed renovation and leaseback development of a former nursing home ("The Property") in The City. Company B (the developer) intended investors to acquire individual rooms by staged payments, with half of each deposit placed into an Escrow Account administered by Company A under an unsigned but executed Declaration of Trust. Works were to be certified by a Project Manager's Notice before payments from the Escrow Account could be made.

After concerns about related companies (Company C and Company D) and the source of funds, Company A withdrew as main adviser but remained appointed as Escrow Agent. Company D and Company B entered insolvency/administration processes (administrators appointed by Company E and Company F respectively). The Property was sold by Company B's administrators to a third party on terms imposing no obligation to carry out the development. No Project Manager's Notice will be issued.

Company A was subject to a restraint order from The Northern Irish Court under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, later varied to permit discharge of escrow funds to the investors, with the precise terms of repayment to be determined by The Scottish Court of Session. Company A applied to the Scottish Court of Session for directions as to whether a resulting trust exists in favour of the investors, in what proportions, and when such a resulting trust arose.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in the circumstances described, the assets in the Escrow Account are held by Company A on resulting trust as a matter of law.
  2. If so:
    1. Whether the resulting trust operates in favour of the respective investors who contributed to the Escrow Account and in proportion to such contributions so as to make those investors the absolute owners of their respective proportions of the assets in the Escrow Account.
    2. When such a resulting trust operates as a matter of law: (i) upon formal disclaimer of interest by the administrators of Company D and Company B, (ii) upon formal winding up of Company D and Company B, or (iii) at some other point in time.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Scots law recognises resulting trusts arising by operation of law where trust purposes are either fulfilled or fail; the provider of funds retains a radical beneficial interest.
  • Where the trust deed is silent as to the application of funds on failure of purpose, the resulting trust arises in favour of the original contributors.
  • In this case the resulting trust arose on the date the Property was sold to a third party (23 August 2021), when fulfilment of the trust purposes became impossible; accordingly Questions 1 and 2(a) should be answered affirmatively and Question 2(b) answered as the date of sale.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Menzies, Trustees (2ndEdition, 1913) at paragraph 1044 "The truster has a radical beneficial interest in the trust estate. When the execution of all the practicable purposes of the trust fails to exhaust the estate, this radical beneficial interest comes into play, and a resulting trust in favour of the truster emerges." The court relied on Menzies to state the general principle that a resulting trust can arise where trust purposes fail or are fulfilled and that the provider retains a radical beneficial interest.
Menzies, Trustees, paragraph 1046 Principle that a resulting trust may arise where the trust purpose has failed. The court cited this passage to support that failure of the declared trust purpose can give rise to a resulting trust.
Menzies, Trustees, paragraph 1053 That the beneficiary of a resulting trust will normally be the truster or their legal representatives. The court applied this to identify the investors (providers of the funds) as the beneficiaries entitled to the radical beneficial interest.
abrdn (SLSPS) Pension Trustee Co Ltd, Petitioner [2023] CSIH 31; 2023 SLT 791 Example that a resulting trust commonly arises where the purpose of the trust has been fulfilled leaving a surplus. Used as an example of the common context in which resulting trusts arise (post-fulfilment surplus), distinguishing that a resulting trust may also arise on failure.
Connell v Ferguson (1857) 19D 482 Where parties subscribe for an objective and place money in hands of others to carry it out, the quasi trust is for carrying out the object or, if impossible, paying back the money. The court cited the case as an articulation of the principle that contributors are entitled to repayment when the purpose cannot be accomplished; noted distinction here that an express trust existed.
Murray's Trs v Murray (1901) 3F 820 Example that where the purposes of an instrument fail or are satisfied, the conveyed estate becomes the property of the conveyer. Referenced as another instance of the general principle that failure or satisfaction of purposes can result in reversion to the provider.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began from the established principle (as stated in Menzies) that a truster retains a radical beneficial interest and that a resulting trust emerges when trust purposes are either fulfilled or fail. The court observed that resulting trusts commonly arise on fulfillment leaving a surplus but may also arise on failure of purpose.

The court noted that an express Declaration of Trust existed directing the handling of deposits and requiring Project Manager's Notices for payments. The Declaration was silent as to the application of funds if the trust purposes failed. Because the deed did not provide for application of funds on failure, the court held the radical beneficial interest rested with the providers of the funds (the investors) and that a resulting trust therefore arose in their favour.

The court addressed the timing of the resulting trust: it accepted the petitioner's analysis that the trust purposes became impossible of fulfilment when Company B's administrators sold The Property to a third party under missives that imposed no obligation to carry out the development, and that this event (the date of sale) was the point at which the resulting trust arose.

On proportion and distribution, the court relied on the schedule lodged by Company A showing the sums attributable to each investor (50% of deposits held in the Escrow Account) and observed those sums remained intact and available for repayment (subject to expenses). Accordingly there was no competition of claims requiring an action of multiplepoinding.

The court concluded that legal ownership of the funds remained vested in Company A as trustee, but that investors had a radical beneficial interest in their respective proportions and were entitled to have those proportions made over to them. The petitioner was awarded its expenses of the petition to be paid from the Escrow Account.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: A resulting trust arose in favour of the investors when the trust purposes failed (on the date The Property was sold by Company B's administrators), and the investors are entitled to their respective proportional shares.

Direct consequences:

  • Legal title to the Escrow Account assets remains with Company A as trustee, but investors hold the radical beneficial interest in their respective proportions and are entitled to have those proportions made over.
  • The resulting trust arose when the trust purposes failed (sale of The Property without obligation to carry out the development), not only upon formal disclaimer or winding up of Company D or Company B.
  • No action of multiplepoinding was required because the schedule showed the contributors and amounts; distribution may proceed subject to the Northern Irish court's variation and this Scottish direction.
  • Company A is entitled to the expenses of the petition to be paid from the Escrow Account.

The opinion did not state any broader novel precedent beyond applying established principles of resulting trusts to the facts; its effect is to determine the parties' rights and permit distribution in accordance with that determination.