R (A Child: Leave to Oppose Adoption)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal application against an order of Judge Lopez (13 January 2026) refusing leave to oppose the making of an adoption order in respect of a little girl ("Child") born June 2023. The Child was placed with foster carers two days after birth and has lived with them since. On 24 October 2024 Judge Lopez made care orders and a placement order. In March 2025 the foster carers were approved as prospective adopters and an adoption application was filed in July 2025. The Appellant Mother applied for leave to oppose the adoption in September 2025. Judge Lopez refused leave at a hearing on 13 January 2026 and made the adoption order that day. The Appellant Mother sought permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal (Judge Jackson, Judge Baker and Judge Dove) heard the application and refused permission to appeal on 28 May 2026.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether permission to appeal should be granted against the refusal of leave under s.47 Adoption and Children Act 2002.
2. Whether Judge Lopez misdirected himself by equating acceptance of findings with "insight" or otherwise mis-stating the legal test for s.47(7) change of circumstances.
3. Whether the judge conflated the first-stage (change of circumstances) and second-stage (welfare evaluation) of the s.47(7) test.
4. Whether the judge's reasons were inadequate, including failure to conduct a child-specific analysis and to explain extrapolation of risk from older children to the Child.
5. Whether it was procedurally unfair to make an adoption order on the same day as refusing leave to oppose, contrary to the Practice Guidance (Adoption: Final Hearings) [2018] 1 WLR 2232.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant Mother's Arguments

• The judge wrongly equated (or treated acceptance of findings as equivalent to) insight, and lack of wholesale acceptance should not be fatal.
• The judge should have respected the two-stage s.47 process and should not have allowed welfare considerations to raise the threshold at stage one.
• The judge's reasons were insufficient to show why the stage‑one threshold had not been met.
• The judge failed to explain why risks to older children necessarily extrapolated to the Child.
• Making the adoption order on the same day breached Practice Guidance and was a compelling reason for allowing the appeal.
• The Appellant Mother sought reassessment to test whether the Child might be placed with the birth parents.

Respondent Local Authority's Arguments (Company A)

• The judge had a substantial factual baseline from prior lengthy hearings and was well placed to assess change.
• The Appellant Mother's courses and therapy had, at best, limited effect and there was little or no evidence of change by the Respondent Father.
• Uses of the word "significant" were inapt slips but the judge applied the correct "sufficient" test in substance.
• Although it would have been better practice to state an alternative second-stage conclusion, there was no legal requirement to do so.
• Making the adoption order the same day was inappropriate, but no substantive injustice arose because the appeal process had been available and used.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court of Appeal conducted a full review and concluded that permission to appeal should be refused because the appeal lacked a real prospect of success. The court's analysis proceeded as follows:

• The statutory framework under s.47 Adoption and Children Act 2002 requires a two-stage test: (1) whether there has been a change of circumstances since the placement order; (2) a broad welfare evaluation if the threshold is crossed. The court relied on established authority (In re P, In re B-S, In re M) for this approach.
• Judge Lopez had repeatedly used the word "significant" when describing required change. The Court of Appeal accepted this was inapt language (the statute contains no such intensifier) but held that, read as a whole, the judge applied the correct "sufficient" test: he expressly refused the application because "there is not sufficient change" and found the applicant's work had had no real effect on thinking or insight.
• The Appellant Mother's asserted change was limited and largely self-reported (courses and some therapy), with no comparable change shown by the Respondent Father. Given the judge's prior extensive fact-finding and familiarity with the parents, he was entitled to find that the claimed change did not amount to the required change of circumstances.
• The Court rejected the submission that the judge silently raised the first-stage threshold by reference to welfare considerations; the transcript and judgment showed the judge understood and applied the two-stage test.
• The judge should, as good practice, have stated as an alternative that, even assuming stage one were met, the application would have failed at stage two. The Court recommended that judges adopt that "belt and braces" approach where appropriate to assist clarity on appeal.
• The making of the adoption order on the same day was procedurally irregular and contrary to the Practice Guidance. Nonetheless, because permission to oppose had been correctly refused and the Appellant Mother had a full opportunity to present her case (including the present appeal), the Court concluded the irregularity did not produce substantive injustice in this case.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED: Permission to appeal was refused.

Direct consequences: the adoption order made on 13 January 2026 remains in force and the Appellant Mother's application for permission to appeal was refused. The Court gave permission for this decision to be cited for guidance.

Practical implications highlighted by the court (adopted as guidance in this judgment):

• When deciding s.47 applications, courts should correctly articulate the two-stage legal tests.
• If a court refuses leave at stage one because there has been no change, but also has a clear view that the application would fail at stage two, it should state that alternative basis and give brief reasons.
• An adoption order should not be made on the same occasion as an order refusing leave to oppose; the Practice Guidance (Adoption: Final Hearings) [2018] 1 WLR 2232 should be followed.