Summary of Judgment — High Court ([2026] IEHC 309)

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment, delivered by Judge Kennedy on 21 May 2026, concerns the Plaintiff's application for orders requiring the Defendants to vacate premises known as 18 Cadogan Road, Fairview, Dublin ("the Property"), which the Plaintiff says it acquired by compulsory purchase under the Derelict Sites Act 1990 ("the Act") via a vesting order dated 22 August 2024. The Property had been entered on the Derelict Sites Register in 2016, re-entered in 2022, and the Plaintiff commenced the CPO process in 2023. A group of individuals, including the Defendants, occupied the Property in 2023. Notices of the proposed CPO were affixed to the Property and advertised; objections were lodged by occupants including the third defendant. An Bord Pleanála inspected, recommended consent, and consented on 30 July 2024. The vesting order took effect on 22 August 2024. The Plaintiff instituted possession proceedings; only the third and sixth defendants contested at the substantive hearing. The Court heard evidence and reserved judgment; interim interlocutory steps were taken to address urgent safety concerns and the Defendants undertook to vacate pending the substantive determination.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Were the statutory notice requirements under s15 and s6 of the Derelict Sites Act 1990 met; in particular, were the Defendants "occupiers" entitled to individual notice and, if so, was notice duly given?
2. If notice requirements were not met, does that invalidate the CPO and the vesting order?
3. If the CPO process was valid, is the Plaintiff entitled to final orders requiring the Defendants to vacate, and would such orders be proportionate having regard to Article 8 ECHR and Article 40.5 of the Constitution?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The Plaintiff claimed title by virtue of the vesting order and sought possession to repair and refurbish the Property for social housing and to remedy dereliction.
• The Plaintiff contended that occupants were unlawful trespassers and thus not entitled to notification; in any event the occupants were in fact on notice (notice on the railings and newspaper notice) and participated in the CPO process, so they were not prejudiced.
• The Plaintiff submitted that any collateral challenge to the vesting order by defence in these proceedings was untimely and should have been pursued by judicial review; delay and participation precluded a belated collateral attack.
• The Plaintiff argued eviction would be lawful, necessary in the public interest and proportionate given statutory duties and housing priorities.

Defendants' Arguments

• The Defendants argued the CPO was void for failure to comply with statutory preconditions — specifically that s15/s6 required notice addressed to each occupier by name and that the notice posted to the railings addressed to "the occupants" was insufficient.
• The third defendant contended she was in possession at commencement of the CPO and therefore an occupier entitled to personal notice; the Defendants relied on possessory/possession principles as conferring rights in opposition to the Plaintiff's claim.
• They submitted any challenge to the vesting order was central (not collateral) to the Plaintiff's claim and that Article 8 ECHR and Article 40.5 constitutional protections of the home applied irrespective of the domestic legal title.
• They maintained eviction would be disproportionate given their vulnerability and lack of alternative accommodation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in distinct steps closely following the Act and the evidence.

1. Statutory notice requirements: s15(1)(b) requires service "on every owner, lessee and occupier" and s6 prescribes modes of service, including that notices must be addressed to the person and that where an occupier's name cannot be ascertained by reasonable inquiry s6(2) permits addressing "the occupier". The prescribed notice was affixed to the outside railing and addressed to "the occupants".
2. Definition of "occupier": the Court rejected reading a requirement of lawfulness into the term. The third defendant, though an unlawful occupant, fell within the inclusive statutory definition as "a person having, for the time being, control of the land", and therefore should have been notified personally under s6(1).
3. s6(2) and reasonable inquiry: the Plaintiff could not rely on s6(2) because there was no evidence of reasonable inquiry to ascertain occupiers' identities prior to posting the notice; the Plaintiff did not visit the Property to identify occupants nor invoke s29 to compel particulars.
4. Consequences of defective service: although service was defective in not addressing the third and other identifiable occupants by name, that defect did not automatically nullify the CPO. The third defendant was in fact on notice (she lodged objections and participated in the CPO process), suffered no prejudice, and by lodging objections and participating without reserving her rights she waived or was estopped from mounting a collateral challenge to the vesting order in these proceedings. Delay and failure to seek timely judicial review were additional bases to refuse to set aside the vesting order.
5. Substantive merits and dereliction: the Court accepted the Plaintiff's evidence (site inspections, An Bord Pleanála report) that the Property was derelict/dilapidated and that compulsory acquisition was justified; the Defendants' contrary factual assertions were not persuasive.
6. Proportionality (Article 8 ECHR and Article 40.5): applying McDonagh and related authorities, the Court held that unlawful occupants may nonetheless invoke Article 8/Article 40.5 but the extent of protection is attenuated. The Court undertook a proportionality analysis weighing: the Plaintiff's valid vesting title and statutory duties; the public interest in remedying dereliction and allocating social housing; the Defendants' vulnerability and housing needs; the Defendants' failure to join/maintain the social housing list; and the prejudice to others if unlawful occupation were permitted to stand. On balance the Court concluded eviction was necessary and proportionate.
7. Remedies and costs: the Court concluded the Plaintiff was entitled to the final reliefs sought and was presumptively entitled to party-and-party costs, subject to written submissions on costs within fourteen days.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court granted the Plaintiff's claims and ordered that the Plaintiff's title (by way of the 22 August 2024 vesting order) be given effect and that the Defendants vacate the Property.

Direct consequences: The Plaintiff was declared the legal and beneficial owner by virtue of the vesting order and is entitled to possession to carry out repairs, refurbishment and to include the Property in its social housing stock. The Defendants are bound by the CPO outcome and their belated, collateral challenge to the vesting order was dismissed on grounds of participation, lack of timely challenge and estoppel. The Plaintiff was presumptively entitled to costs; the Court permitted written submissions on costs.

This summary reflects the Court's decision and its immediate effect on the parties; the judgment applies established principles (service, estoppel, delay, and proportionality under Article 8/Article 40.5) and does not purport to announce a novel legal rule beyond applying those principles to the facts of this case.

Representation

The Plaintiff was represented by Attorney Mooney and Attorney Colgan. The third and sixth defendants represented themselves and were assisted by a McKenzie friend, Attorney Harris.