The Secretary of State for the Home Department v Ammori, R (on the application of)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns an application for an order under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 to postpone reporting of parts of these appellate proceedings until related criminal trials conclude. The underlying administrative decision involved the proscription of Entity A; that decision was challenged in the Divisional Court, which (in a judgment referred to below) ruled the proscription unlawful. The Appellant has appealed that Divisional Court decision to this court.

Three principal incidents were assessed by JTAC as involving acts of terrorism: an attack at Company A on 1 June 2022, an attack at Company B on 17 June 2024, and an attack at Company C on 6 August 2024. A fourth incident at another location was referred to by the Home Secretary but had not, on the evidence in the case, been assessed as to whether it was an act of terrorism.

Criminal proceedings arising from the Company C incident were prosecuted in The Court before Judge Johnson. Multiple defendants were indicted; the first trial of a subset of defendants concluded with convictions and acquittals, with further trials scheduled. Criminal proceedings arising from the Company B incident are being dealt with before Judge Cheema-Grubb; reporting restrictions of varying scope were made in the Crown Court.

In these judicial-review/appeal proceedings Chamberlain J had previously made an order imposing broad reporting restrictions. The Crown Court (Judge Johnson) made separate reporting-restriction orders, some of which were redacted. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) sought an extension of Chamberlain J's order to cover these appeal proceedings; the application was opposed by media representatives and others.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether this court should make an order under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 postponing publication of specified material in these appellate proceedings until the conclusion of the related criminal trials.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant (CPS / advanced on behalf of the Appellant)

• Sought an order under s.4(2) preventing reporting of: (a) information concerning planning, conduct or material discovered in police investigations into the Company C incident; (b) similar material relating to the Company B incident; and (c) any conclusion of any Minister, adviser or official that those incidents satisfied the statutory definition of "terrorism".
• Contended that material not placed before the jury in The Court could be prejudicial to the fairness of trials yet to take place and that a broad postponement was necessary to protect the administration of justice.

Defendants (those yet to be tried / submissions advanced by counsel for earlier-tried defendants)

• Submitted that substantial material obtained by the police had not been placed before the jury (for example, material relating to planning teams and weapons) and that publication of such material could prejudice future trials.
• Asked the court to extend Chamberlain J's order in these appellate proceedings for the protection of those still to be tried.

Media (Press Association / BBC)

• Argued that paragraph 1(c) of the proposed order (prohibiting reporting of any Ministerial or official conclusion that the incidents were "terrorism") was too widely drawn.
• Accepted that narrower restrictions on reporting of investigatory material might serve a proper purpose during active Crown Court proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Sarker [2018] EWCA Crim 1341	Sets out the proper approach to s.4(2) orders: (i) whether reporting would give rise to a substantial risk of prejudice; (ii) whether a s.4(2) order would eliminate that risk and whether less restrictive means suffice; (iii) balancing fair trial against freedom of expression/open justice.	The court applied the Sarker framework to conclude that a blanket postponement in these appellate proceedings was not justified; paragraph 1(c) in particular could not eliminate any risk given widespread public knowledge.
Ex p. Central Television Plc (1991) 92 Cr. App. R. 154; [1991] 1 W.L.R. 4	Principle that less restrictive measures should be preferred; an order should be necessary to achieve the objective.	The court rejected a broad ban where less restrictive or more focussed measures (including Crown Court consideration) were available.
Ex p. Telegraph Plc (1998) 94 Cr. App. R. 91; [1993] 1 W.L.R. 980	Guidance on balancing competing public interests (fair trial vs open justice) and that value judgments may be required.	The court undertook the balancing exercise and concluded that the public interest in open reporting of these appellate proceedings outweighed the asserted risk of prejudice.
Montgomery v HM Advocate [2003] 1 AC 641	Describes safeguards for trial fairness where prejudicial publicity exists: the trial process, jury discipline, judge's directions and the charge to the jury.	The court relied on these safeguards to support the conclusion that widely known facts (including the proscription and relevant conclusions) would not necessarily prejudice fair trials.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court applied the Sarker three-stage approach. It observed that the Crown Court judge (Judge Johnson) had managed reporting restrictions with conspicuous care and had made narrower orders than Chamberlain J. The Divisional Court's judgment on the underlying judicial-review claim had been published without reporting restrictions, and significant trial material had entered the public domain following the first Woolwich trial.

The court found Chamberlain J's order to be very broad: paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) (postponing publication of investigatory material about the Company C and Company B incidents) together with paragraph 2 would, absent comprehensive familiarity with jury evidence, effectively postpone reporting of almost anything about those incidents. The court noted that almost all facts about conduct and planning also appeared in the Divisional Court judgment and that none of the potentially prejudicial material identified had been referred to in these appellate proceedings or was likely to be included in this appellate judgment.

Applying the necessity and less-restrictive-means principles, the court concluded that (i) a s.4(2) order limited to these appellate proceedings would not eliminate the risk identified, and (ii) where particular prejudicial facts exist the proper forum to consider their postponement is the Crown Court. The court also held that prohibition of publication of the Home Secretary's conclusion that Entity A had been concerned in terrorism (paragraph 1(c)) was unnecessary because that conclusion and the facts underlying it were already widely known and set out in the Divisional Court's judgment; the trial safeguards (jury directions, etc.) were adequate to protect fair trials.

The court therefore discharged the relevant parts of Chamberlain J's order, refused to extend reporting restrictions to these appellate proceedings, and invited any party concerned about specific facts to make a focussed application to the Crown Court within a short time window.

Holding and Implications

APPLICATION REFUSED; RELEVANT PARTS OF CHAMBERLAIN J'S ORDER DISCHARGED

Direct effect: the court refused to make a s.4(2) order postponing publication of matters in the open part of these appellate proceedings; publication of the redacted appellate judgment was permitted. The court discharged the parts of the earlier High Court order that would have postponed reporting of investigatory material about the Company C and Company B incidents and the Home Secretary's conclusion that Entity A's activities satisfied the Terrorism Act definition.

Practical implications: (a) matters already in the public domain or contained in the Divisional Court judgment will not be postponed by this court; (b) if particular prejudicial facts are identified that have not been placed before juries, parties should apply to the Crown Court for targeted restrictions; any such application must be made within 48 hours of receipt of this judgment; (c) the court emphasised reliance on trial safeguards to protect the fairness of ongoing and future criminal trials.