Anonymised Summary of Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

In October 2019 the Respondent granted the Appellant an assured shorthold tenancy ("AST") of a dwelling ("the Property"). The Appellant paid a deposit of £775. The tenancy documentation stated that the deposit would be protected by an authorised tenancy deposit scheme and included "Prescribed Information". The deposit was transferred to a custodial scheme shortly after payment. The Respondent or her agents sent the Appellant a deposit certificate and Prescribed Information by email; those documents and the tenancy agreement contained a small number of inaccuracies (a wrong digit in a telephone number, an incorrect landlord address in one document, and an erroneous date of receipt of the deposit).

In April 2024 the Respondent's solicitors served a section 21 notice seeking possession. Possession proceedings were issued in June/July 2024. At the first-tier hearing on 5 August 2024 before a district judge the Appellant raised challenges to the validity of the section 21 notice based on alleged defects in the Prescribed Information and related statutory non-compliance. The district judge granted possession and costs on 5 August 2024.

The Appellant appealed to the circuit judge. The circuit judge (Judge Mitchell) struck out the appeal on papers on 6 November 2024 (concluding it had no real prospect of success) and lifted a stay of possession. The Appellant pursued various applications and interlocutory proceedings, including an application to the High Court which was held to be wrongly placed and finally determined by Judge Pepperall who held that the appropriate route was to the Court of Appeal. The Appellant sought permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal; by order of Judge Snowden the application was listed for an oral hearing and the possession order was stayed pending determination. At the hearing before this Court the Appellant appeared in person and the Respondent was represented by counsel (Attorney Hussain, instructed by Attorney Richards). After hearing full argument the Court granted permission to appeal but dismissed the appeal on the merits.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Appellant's appeal should be permitted (including whether permission should be extended out of time).
2. Whether defects in the "Prescribed Information" required by the Housing Act 2004 and the 2007 Order (errors in contact details, address, date entries and an unsigned certificate) invalidated the section 21 notice and thereby defeated the possession claim.
3. Whether any defects in the Prescribed Information were cured by subsequent correspondence from the Respondent's solicitors (letter of 12 April 2024) so as to permit service of a valid section 21 notice under section 215(2) of the 2004 Act.
4. Whether the procedure adopted below (including the district judge's manner of conducting the hearing and the circuit judge's decision to strike out the appeal notice rather than determining permission) produced unfairness or a materially flawed outcome.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The hearing before the district judge was procedurally unfair (listed on a non-duty day, insufficient time allocated, disadvantage from lack of court duty officer/support), which affected the Appellant's ability to present her case.
• Prescribed Information defects: incorrect landlord address in the Prescribed Information, incorrect telephone number in the tenancy agreement, incorrect date of deposit receipt and an unsigned certificate meant the statutory requirements were not strictly complied with.
• Strict compliance with the 2004 Act and the 2007 Order is required; substantial compliance is insufficient and any non-compliance precludes service of a valid section 21 notice.
• Failure to provide a UK address under section 48 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 precluded valid service of section 21 (advanced but later rejected by the Court as irrelevant to section 21 validity).

Respondent's Arguments

• The errors in the documents were minor, would be recognised by a reasonable recipient, caused no prejudice, and the information was "substantially to the same effect" as the prescribed form.
• The solicitors' letter dated 12 April 2024 effectively cured any earlier defects by referring to the tenancy agreement as containing the prescribed information, and thus compliance for the purposes of section 215(2) was achieved prior to service of the section 21 notice on 17 April 2024.
• The district judge's possession order was therefore lawful and the Appellant's proposed grounds of appeal had no real prospect of success.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Siddeeq v Alaian 2024	Cited by the Appellant regarding timing of provision of prescribed information relative to deposit payment.	Referenced as a first-instance authority relied on by the Appellant; the Court observed that in the present case prescribed information was provided within 30 days and so Siddeeq did not assist the Appellant's position.
Turner v Haworth Associates [2001] EWCA Civ 370	The court's power to strike out an appeal notice to safeguard proceedings and deal summarily with abusive or frivolous appeals.	Considered for the proposition that striking out may be appropriate in limited circumstances; Court distinguished that where permission has not yet been refused the preferred procedure is to deal with permission under CPR 52.3–52.7 rather than striking out under CPR 52.18.
Moses-Taiga v Oghenerume [2004] EWCA Civ 1399	Examples of post-permission strike-out where conduct after permission justified the exercise of CPR 52.18 powers.	Cited to show contexts in which strike-out under CPR 52.18 has been applied; the Court used it to support a narrow scope for strike-out prior to a permission decision.
Kanabar v Kanabar [2026] EWCA Civ 582	Family court strike-out under rules identical to CPR 52.18 where no legal personality could pursue the appeal—example of a compelling reason to strike out.	Used to illustrate situations where striking out was appropriate post-permission; Court drew a distinction between those exceptional cases and the present facts where striking out pre-permission was not the appropriate route.
Pease v Carter [2020] EWCA Civ 175	Interpretation of statutory notices: apply Mannai v Eagle; errors to be read as a reasonable recipient would understand them; possibility of substantial compliance fulfilling statutory purpose.	The Court applied Arnold LJ's summary from Pease to conclude that a reasonable recipient standard and consideration of statutory purpose support treating minor errors as not invalidating prescribed information where the purpose is met.
Mannai v Eagle [1997] AC 749	General principle that statutory notices are interpreted as a reasonable recipient would understand them in context.	Applied via Pease and Lowe to assess whether errors in prescribed information would be understood by a reasonable recipient and whether statutory purpose was achieved.
Lowe v Governors of Sutton's Hospital in Charterhouse [2025] EWCA Civ 857	Applied Mannai/Pease: where documents read together produce the statutory information and a reasonable recipient would appreciate minor errors, the requirements may be treated as "substantially to the same effect".	Relied upon for the proposition that unsigned certificate plus signed covering letter and other documents can achieve the statutory purpose; the Court followed Lowe in concluding that substantial compliance was met in context.
Ayannuga v Swindells [2012] EWCA Civ 1789	Contrast where a tenant must do independent research to discover required information (distinguishing lower quality compliance).	Distinguished: Court held the present case was unlike Ayannuga because the required information was contained within or readily apparent from the tenancy documentation and accompanying communications.
Hamer v Levy [2025] EWHC 3101 (KB)	High Court determination that the circuit judge's strike-out was a case management decision and the correct appellate route was to the Court of Appeal.	Referred to as part of the procedural history; the Court of Appeal accepted that conclusion as to appellate route and proceeded to determine permission and the substantive merits.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two stages: first to consider permission and timeliness, and second to decide the substantive validity of the section 21 notice.

On timeliness, the Court accepted that the Appellant's delay in bringing the appeal to the Court of Appeal was excusable given the unusual interlocutory orders below and extended time for filing the appeal notice.

On procedural complaints (grounds 1–6), the Court reviewed the transcript of the district judge's 30-minute hearing. The district judge acknowledged potential disadvantage to the Appellant from listing on a non-duty day and a shorter time allocation. The hearing was conversational, but the judge concluded the Appellant had had an opportunity to present her case. The Court found the procedure imperfect but not such as to have produced an erroneous or unjust outcome; even with a duty officer present and more time, the Court concluded the possession order would still have been made.

On the substantive statutory issue, the Court analysed the requirements of Chapter 4, Part 6 of the Housing Act 2004 and the 2007 Order concerning prescribed information and the effect of section 215(2) (which permits a section 21 notice to be given if the landlord subsequently complies with the prescribed-information requirement). The Court identified the specific defects in the documentation (one wrong digit in a telephone number in the tenancy agreement, wrong landlord address in the Prescribed Information emailed on 19 October 2019, incorrect reference to clause numbering for deposit amount, and an unsigned certification).

Applying the principles in Mannai as summarised in Pease and the Court's decision in Lowe, the Court asked whether a reasonable recipient reading the documents in context would understand the intended meaning and whether the statutory purpose (safeguarding deposits and facilitating dispute resolution) had been achieved. The Court concluded:

• The solicitor's letter of 12 April 2024, which expressly stated that the prescribed information was contained in the tenancy agreement, operated to cure earlier deficiencies for the purposes of section 215(2), notwithstanding that the tenancy agreement pre-dated the deposit payment.
• The typographical and minor errors were such that a reasonable recipient would recognize them and would not be misled; they caused no prejudice to the Appellant and did not frustrate the statutory purpose.
• The absence of a signed certificate did not defeat compliance when the information was provided in a form substantially to the same effect taken with the covering letter and other materials.

The Court therefore held that the section 21 notice served on 17 April 2024 was not invalidated by the defects identified and that the Appellant's substantive defence had no merit.

The Court also addressed the circuit judge's procedure of striking out the appeal notice: it concluded that striking out prior to determination of permission was not the appropriate course where the proposed appeal had no real prospect; instead the appropriate mechanism would be to refuse permission under the permission rules. The Court regarded the circuit judge's strike-out as procedurally flawed but nevertheless concluded the outcome (refusal of any successful appeal) would have been the same.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Permission to appeal was granted, but the appeal was DISMISSED.

Implications: The direct effect is that the possession order made by the district judge is upheld. The Court concluded that minor inaccuracies in prescribed information, when read in context and where the landlord or the landlord's agents took steps to correct or to refer to the tenancy documentation, do not necessarily invalidate a section 21 notice if the statutory purpose of deposit protection and information provision is satisfied; the Court applied existing authorities rather than creating a new legal principle. The Court also indicated procedural guidance that striking out an appeal notice before determination of permission is generally inappropriate; the proper route is to consider permission under the relevant CPR provisions. No novel binding precedent was created beyond the application of established principles.