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MKN Properties Ltd & Anor v Fingal County Council (Approved)
Summary of Judgment — Judge Humphreys
Factual and Procedural Background
The Applicants challenged the Respondent's adoption (22 February 2023) of a county development plan for the period 2023–2029 insofar as it (i) changed the zoning of parts of the Applicants' lands at Fosterstown from "RA - Residential Area" to "OS - Open Space" and (ii) adopted a map-based density objective (material amendment PA SH 8.5 / map-based objective no. 38) setting density at 110–115 dwellings per hectare. The lands lie within the Respondent's functional area. The Fosterstown masterplan had been made by the Respondent in May 2019 and contains green-infrastructure and built-form objectives, including a net density figure of 105–115 units/ha.
Draft CDP provisions proposing the zoning change and the map-based objective were published in February 2022. The Applicants made submissions seeking retention of residential zoning and later objected to the proposed material alteration PA SH 8.5. The chief executive recommended against the material alteration but the elected members resolved to adopt the material alteration and to make the plan incorporating both the zoning change and the map-based objective. The development plan took effect on 5 April 2023.
The Applicants obtained leave to apply for judicial review. Proceedings commenced 14 April 2023, litigation progressed through adjournments and interlocutory steps, and the substantive hearing was held on 22 April 2026. A draft judgment was circulated to parties on 28 April 2026. The court delivered judgment dismissing the proceedings on 8 May 2026.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Respondent's change of zoning from "RA - Residential Area" to "OS - Open Space" for parts of the Applicants' lands breached the Development Plans: Guidelines for Planning Authorities (June 2022) and sections 28(1A) and 28(1B) of the Planning and Development Act 2000 by failing to have regard to the guidelines or to state how they were implemented.
- Whether the adoption of map-based objective no. 38 (PA SH 8.5) adopting a density range of 110–115 dwellings/ha was inconsistent with ministerial guidelines (including the Sustainable Residential Development Guidelines and the Apartment Guidelines) and therefore unlawful under sections 28(1A)/(1B).
- Whether the adoption of the map-based objective (PA SH 8.5) involved a failure to consider the proper planning and sustainable development of the area (s.12(11)) or involved the taking into account of extraneous/non-planning considerations by elected members.
- Whether the map-based objective unlawfully discriminated against the Applicants or was irrational in applying different reasoning to factually similar situations.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicants' Arguments
- The change from RA to OS constituted unlawful "de‑zoning" contrary to ministerial guidance and the Respondent failed to comply with s.28(1A)/(1B) by not properly considering or explaining how the Development Plan Guidelines had been implemented in respect of land said to be "serviced and developable".
- The map-based objective imposing a density cap was inconsistent with relevant guidelines that support higher densities in accessible locations, and the Respondent failed to explain why those guidelines could not be implemented.
- The elected members took account of extraneous or non‑planning considerations during debate (citing particular remarks by an elected member) and applied inconsistent reasoning to similar cases, thereby acting irrationally and discriminatorily.
- Sought certiorari to quash the zoning change and the map-based objective and, if necessary, mandamus to require the plan to be made without those elements; alternatively declarations and costs.
Respondent's Arguments
- The Respondent had regard to and implemented the Ministerial Guidelines; Appendix 2 to the CDP sets out implementation and the development plan throughout reflects guideline policies, including open space provision and masterplan implementation.
- The term "de‑zoning" in the guidelines contemplates wholesale removal of residential zoning and does not apply to zoning refinements that secure open space within an overall residentially zoned site; the change here aligned the zoning with the Fosterstown masterplan.
- The duty in s.28(1A) is a "have regard to" duty; s.28(1B) was satisfied by the statement appended to the CDP and the wider record; the obligation did not require an exhaustive, site‑by‑site narrative of how every guideline sentence was applied.
- The map‑based objective was consistent with the masterplan and in substance was not less favourable to the Applicants; elected members' remarks cited by the Applicants were legitimate planning discourse and not extraneous considerations; no unlawful discrimination or irrationality was shown.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Killegland Estates Ltd. v. Meath County Council [2023] IESC 39 | Principles regarding elected members' power to adopt/change development plan provisions and the court's reluctance to interfere; de‑zoning and compensation implications. | Cited as binding authority that elected members may change zonings and courts should be slow to interfere; used as a primary legal benchmark for assessing Applicants' challenge. |
| McGarrell Reilly Homes Ltd & Anor. v. Meath County Council [2023] IESC 40 | Similar propositions to Killegland on development plan challenges and democratic decision‑making by elected members. | Applied alongside Killegland to underscore the limited role of the court in second‑guessing planmaking decisions of elected members. |
| O'Sullivan v. Health Service Executive [2023] IESC 11 | Procedure concerning draft judgments and limits on re‑argument in response to draft judgments. | Referenced for the court's approach to draft judgments and the limited scope for parties to reargue substance in response to a draft. |
| O'Sullivan v. Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2017] IESC 75, [2017] 3 I.R. 751 | Commentary on procedure and fairness; risk of treating administrative procedures as criminal‑style processes. | Quoted on the inappropriateness of treating all administrative procedures as if they require criminal‑trial style processes. |
| Attorney General v. Crosland (No. 2) [2021] UKSC 58 | Reasons for restricting publication of draft judgments in the interests of administration of justice. | Used to justify the court's direction restricting dissemination of the draft judgment circulated to parties. |
| Baigent v. Random House Group Ltd [2006] EWHC 1131 (Ch) | Confidentiality and publication considerations relating to draft documents (cited among authorities on draft judgments). | Referenced in the context of limiting circulation/publication of draft judgments; no separate substantive application to planning issues. |
| R. (Counsel General for Wales) v. Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy [2022] EWCA Civ 181 | Authority on restrictions and handling of draft judgments/publication. | Referenced for the same procedural point about draft judgments. |
| Public Institution for Social Security v. Banque Pictet & Cie SA and others [2022] EWCA Civ 368 | Referenced on similar procedural confidentiality issues. | Referenced in the court's discussion of draft judgment confidentiality. |
| Itkin v. Wood [2023] JRC 101 | Procedural authority cited regarding drafts and confidentiality. | Referenced for procedural support concerning draft judgments. |
| G.K. v. Minister for Justice [2001] IESC 205, [2002] 2 I.R. 418 | Principle on the nature of a "have regard to" duty and its evidential threshold. | Cited to support the proposition that the "have regard to" duty in s.28 is not a demanding standard. |
| Rana v. Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46 | Recent statement on the standard of "have regard to" duties. | Used to reinforce that the statutory duty to have regard to guidelines sets a limited bar for decision‑makers. |
| Tesco Stores Limited v. Dundee City Council [2012] UKSC 13 | On the reconciliation of competing development plan policies and the limited role of courts in challenging evaluative planning judgments. | Applied to explain how courts should approach conflicts in planning policy and the exercise of planning judgment by authorities. |
| ClientEarth v. Shell plc [2023] EWHC 1897 | Illustration that courts are ill‑equipped to micromanage complex balancing of competing policy factors. | Cited to emphasise limits on judicial interference in multi‑factor evaluative judgments. |
| Waltham Abbey/Pembroke Road Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 30 | On unworkable interpretations and the impracticability of exhaustive justificatory demands on authorities. | Relied upon to support the court's conclusion that exhaustive "how" explanations for every guideline provision are unworkable. |
| Heather Hill Management Company CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 43 | On practicality of statutory duties and the limits of judicially enforceable specificity. | Used to support the court's view on workability of requirements under s.28(1B). |
| Save Cork City Community Association CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 52 | Similar authority on interpretative limits and workability in plan justification. | Cited to reinforce reasoning on practicality of implementing detailed justification obligations. |
| M.R. (Bangladesh) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 41 | Decision should be read as valid if a valid reading is available. | Applied to read elected members' remarks and decisions in a manner that preserves validity where possible. |
| Mulloy v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 86 | Principle that decisions should be read as valid if a valid reading is available. | Invoked for the same interpretative rule when assessing elected members' statements. |
| O'Donnell v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 381 | Used in support of the interpretative approach favoring validity where possible. | Applied as part of the interpretative framework for reading council decisions and remarks. |
| Save Roscam Peninsula CLG v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 6) [2024] IEHC 335 | Interpretation and validity of administrative decisions. | Referential support for the court's approach to validating decisions where a lawful reading exists. |
| Moran v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 | Case law on reading decisions validly where possible. | Referenced among authorities supporting the court's interpretative approach. |
| E.M. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2024] IESC 3 | On treating "unhelpful" statements and preferring a valid reading of decisions. | Applied to avoid construing elected members' remarks as invalid where a valid reading exists. |
| Friends of Killymooney Lough v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 407 | Support for interpreting decisions to preserve validity. | Referentially applied in the court's interpretative reasoning. |
| Duffy v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 715 | On sub‑optimal wording not necessarily rendering a decision invalid. | Used to support the court's reluctance to quash plan provisions for sub‑optimal phrasing. |
| O'Meara v. Minister for Social Protection [2024] IESC 1 | Notion that incremental legislative or policy experimentation can be legitimate. | Invoked to support that differential or experimental planning approaches do not necessarily amount to unlawful discrimination. |
| daa plc v. Fingal County Council [2024] IEHC 589 | Distinguished on facts where decision‑making referenced specific actions of named owners. | Cited to distinguish the present case where elected members' remarks were not personal to the Applicants. |
| Grealish v. An Bord Pleanála [2006] IEHC 310, [2007] 2 I.R. 536 | On comparisons and discrimination between similar cases. | Referenced in relation to Applicant's discrimination argument and rejected on facts here. |
| Porter v. An Bord Pleanála [2017] IEHC 783 | Authority on comparing decision‑making between different sites. | Referenced to assess the Applicants' reliance on alleged inconsistent treatment; court found situations were not identical. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court structured its analysis under two broad headings: the zoning challenge and the map‑based objective challenge.
Zoning challenge (core ground 1)
- The court accepted that s.28(1A)/(1B) imposes a statutory obligation to have regard to ministerial guidelines and to append a statement. However, it emphasised that the duty to "have regard to" is not a demanding standard and that the statutory statement obligation must be workable in practice.
- Appendix 2 of the CDP contained a statement that the plan "implements the policies and objectives of these Guidelines throughout" and identified where the guidelines were addressed. The court held that given the scale and scope of ministerial guidance (many pages and multiple guidelines), an exhaustive, site‑by‑site narrative of "how" each guideline clause was implemented would be unworkable and that a process‑based explanation satisfied the statutory requirement.
- The court analysed the text of the Development Plan Guidelines and concluded that the term "de‑zoning" as used in the guidelines contemplates wholesale removal of residential zoning; it did not cover the present situation where green corridors/open‑space elements within an overall residential site were specifically zoned OS while the site remained principally residential. The zoning change was consistent with the Fosterstown masterplan's express green‑infrastructure objectives and with the CDP's provisions implementing masterplans.
- Accordingly, no breach of s.28(1A)/(1B) or unlawful de‑zoning was made out and certiorari would not lie to quash the zoning decision.
Map‑based objective challenge (core grounds 4–6)
- The court found Appendix 2 shows the relevant density and apartment guidance were considered; the "have regard to" obligation was discharged. The map‑based objective mirrored the masterplan density (masterplan net density 105–115 u/ha; map objective 110–115 u/ha) and was, if anything, slightly more favourable to the Applicants.
- The court considered that the Applicants had not identified any clear breach of the cited guidelines by the CDP. The guidelines themselves allow a range of densities in appropriate, accessible suburban locations and the adopted density fell within the policy bandwidth described in the guidelines and masterplan approach.
- On the allegation that elected members took extraneous considerations into account, the court applied the principle that a decision should be read as valid if a valid reading is available. The remarks of the elected member were read as legitimate planning discourse about developer behaviour generally and the need to secure plan‑led outcomes; they did not constitute impermissible personalization or extraneous matters centrally undermining the decision.
- The discrimination/irrationality complaint failed because the situations relied upon were not shown to be factually identical; moreover the amendment effectively made explicit on the map what the plan already committed to via masterplan implementation.
The court repeatedly emphasised the limited role of the judiciary in assessing planning judgments that involve evaluative balancing of competing policy objectives and practical constraints. Where the decision‑making record and plan text demonstrate consideration of guidelines and a coherent planning rationale tied to an adopted masterplan, judicial intervention was inappropriate.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: It is ordered that the proceedings be DISMISSED.
Implications:
- The court dismissed the Applicants' claim for certiorari and related relief regarding both the zoning change and the map‑based objective.
- The court directed that the order include a recital confirming that the development plan incorporates masterplan densities and that the impugned map‑based objective is not less favourable to the Applicants than the density that would otherwise apply by virtue of the masterplan.
- The decision confirms the court's reluctance to substitute its own planning judgment for that of elected members where (i) the statutory "have regard to" duty has been discharged, (ii) the decision reflects an adopted masterplan, and (iii) no clear legal error, illegality or relevant non‑planning consideration central to the decision has been shown. The judgment does not purport to establish novel legal principles beyond application of existing authorities and the statutory framework; its immediate practical effect is to leave the CDP provisions in place as adopted.
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