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Drake, Application for Judicial Review
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from an inquest into the death of the Deceased, found dead at the Royal Victoria Hospital on 27 September 2018. The Appellant is the next of kin. The coroner (the Coroner) issued two written rulings (2 May 2025 and 12 May 2025) requiring the Appellant to produce an expert report obtained by the Appellant (Expert C) pursuant to section 17A of the Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959. The Coroner refused the Appellant's request to revoke that notice. The Appellant sought judicial review; at first instance Judge McLaughlin dismissed the review. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, a panel (Judge Keegan, Judge Colton and Judge Humphreys) heard argument and delivered the judgment dated 24 April 2026 allowing the appeal, quashing the Coroner's decision refusing to revoke the notice and remitting the matter to the Coroner for reconsideration.
Procedural timeline (selected): Agency A instructed Expert A (consultant psychiatrist) in November 2022; Expert A reported in February 2023 (with an April 2023 addendum). Company A (the Trust) later instructed Expert B (consultant psychiatrist) whose report was produced in December 2023. The Appellant obtained Expert C and, in April 2025, informed the Coroner she would not produce Expert C's report. The Coroner served a production notice on 2 May 2025 requiring production by 8 May 2025; the Appellant applied to revoke and the Coroner refused on 12 May 2025. Judicial review proceeded; leave was granted on 24 June 2025 and remitted for full hearing before Judge McLaughlin. The Court of Appeal allowed the Appellant's appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a properly interested person (PIP) may lawfully withhold an expert report obtained for the purposes of an inquest after the decision in Ketcher and Mitchell [2020] NICA 31.
- Whether the Coroner applied the correct legal test under section 17A(4)/(5) of the Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959 when deciding whether to revoke or vary a notice requiring production of documents.
- Whether the Coroner misapplied the guidance in Ketcher and Mitchell and whether the Coroner's decision refusing revocation was irrational in the circumstances.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Coroner misunderstood the section 17A(4) process by over-emphasising that initial disclosure is to the Coroner only.
- The Coroner misapplied persuasive obiter guidance in Ketcher and Mitchell, particularly the approach to the public interest balancing exercise.
- The Coroner's decision was irrational, having failed to recognise the significance of the Coroner already having two expert reports on the delirium issue.
Coroner's Position (as set out in the rulings)
- The Coroner concluded Expert C's report related to a matter relevant to the inquest and that section 17A(2)(b) empowered the Coroner to require production.
- The Coroner relied on the two-stage disclosure approach discussed in Worcestershire County Council v HM Coroner for Worcestershire and stated she would first receive the report and then conduct a further balancing exercise to decide onward disclosure to PIPs.
- The Coroner distinguished Ketcher and Mitchell on the basis that Expert C's report may add materially to the Coroner's understanding in this case.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Re Jordan's Application [2016] NI 107 | Practice that a coroner (through counsel) may assist the court in appeals of this nature. | The court adopted the established practice and heard coroner's counsel to assist without the Coroner entering merits-based advocacy. |
| R (On the application of Maguire) v HM Senior Coroner for Blackpool and Fylde [2025] AC 63 | Guidance that counsel for a coroner should act neutrally and, where appropriate, as amicus curiae to ensure the court has the full factual picture. | The court relied on the Supreme Court's discussion to justify hearing coroner's counsel to assist the Court's understanding of coronial matters. |
| Ketcher and Mitchell [2020] NICA 31 | Obiter guidance on when a next of kin's expert report obtained for an inquest might be required to be produced: factors weighing against compulsory production, including family interests and likely modest importance of the report in some cases. | The court analysed Ketcher and Mitchell, treated its para [37] guidance as persuasive but not binding, and assessed whether the Coroner had misapplied that guidance. |
| Re L [1997] AC 16 | Authority holding an expert report obtained in care proceedings had to be produced to the police in a related criminal investigation (limits on withholding reports). | The Court of Appeal in Ketcher and Mitchell (and this court) regarded Re L as a binding authority relevant to disclosure tensions. |
| Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No.6) [2004] UKHL 48; [2005]4 All ER 948; [2005] 1 AC 610 | Lord Carswell's obiter formulation of the conditions for litigation privilege (a)-(c): litigation in progress/anticipated; communications for sole dominant purpose of that litigation; adversarial, not inquisitorial. | The court cited these conditions when discussing whether litigation privilege can protect an expert report obtained for inquest-related purposes. |
| R v HM Coroner for North Humberside and Scunthorpe ex parte Jamieson [1995] QB 1 | Principle that a coroner must "ensure that the relevant facts are fully, fairly and fearlessly investigated." | The Coroner cited this authority; the court acknowledged it as a correct statement of the inquisitorial purpose of coronial proceedings. |
| Worcestershire County Council v HM Coroner for Worcestershire [2013] EWHC 1711 | Discussion of a two-stage disclosure process: first disclosure to the coroner alone to determine scope, then the coroner decides onward disclosure to interested persons; public interest in a full inquest may outweigh non-disclosure claims. | The Coroner relied on this case to justify initial production to the Coroner and a later assessment for disclosure to PIPs; the court considered the distinction between that factual context and the present case. |
| Re Secretary of State and Robert Clarke's Applications [2026] NICA 10 | Recent Court of Appeal approach to statutory interpretation. | The court followed the interpretive approach summarised in that decision when construing the Coroners Act provisions. |
| R (O) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 32 | Authority on statutory interpretation principles cited for the proposition that meaning is ascertained in light of context and purpose. | Used with other authorities to frame the court's statutory interpretation of sections 17A/17B. |
| R (PACCAR Inc and others) v Competition Appeal Tribunal and others [2023] 1 WLR 2594 | Statutory interpretation principles regarding meaning, context and purpose. | Relied upon as part of the doctrinal approach to interpreting the Coroners Act provisions. |
| For Women Scotland v Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16 | Statutory interpretation principles (meaning in light of context and purpose). | Also cited in support of the court's interpretive methodology. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court approached the matter by: (a) confirming the practice of hearing coroner's counsel to assist the appellate court; (b) identifying the narrow core issue — whether a PIP can lawfully withhold an expert report obtained for an inquest post Ketcher and Mitchell; and (c) conducting a statutory interpretation of sections 17A and 17B of the 1959 Act using established principles (meaning in light of context and purpose).
The court set out the relevant statutory framework: section 17A(1)/(2) (power to require production), section 17A(4)/(5) (grounds to object and the mandatory public interest consideration), and section 17B(2)/(3) (limits where civil-court compulsion would not apply and application of public interest immunity rules).
The court analysed the Coroner's two decisions. It accepted that Expert C's report was, in a broad sense, relevant to the inquest. The Coroner had concluded she could use section 17A(2)(b) to require production and stated she would perform a subsequent balancing exercise after reviewing the report to decide onward disclosure to PIPs.
The court found error in the Coroner's approach: when the Appellant applied to revoke the notice the Coroner should have undertaken a full predictive balancing exercise under section 17A(4)/(5) (weighing the public interest in obtaining the information for the inquest having regard to its likely importance) before ordering production, rather than deferring that balancing until after production. The court held that the Coroner's commitment to a post-production balancing exercise was unnecessary and misleading in the circumstances because public interest immunity had not been asserted and scope had been determined.
The court also concluded that the first-instance judge (Judge McLaughlin) erred by not identifying this misdirection and by placing weight on public interest immunity authorities that were not directly in point, thereby over-complicating the assessment. The Court of Appeal therefore allowed the appeal on the ground that the Coroner had applied the wrong test in relation to production under section 17A(5).
In reaching its decision the court reiterated the tension between inquisitorial inquest proceedings, litigation privilege and duties of candour, and emphasised that the statutory test under section 17A(4)/(5) requires a case-specific balancing of competing interests focused on the reasonableness of requiring production to the Coroner.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; CORONER'S DECISION QUASHED.
Direct effect: The Court quashed the Coroner's decision refusing to revoke the production notice and remitted the matter to the Coroner for reconsideration applying the correct test under section 17A(4)/(5) — namely a predictive balancing of the public interest in obtaining the information for the purposes of the inquest, having regard to its likely importance, before requiring production.
Broader implications: The court issued a summary of applicable legal principles for coronial production and disclosure but did not purport to lay down a categorical rule displacing the case-by-case balancing required by section 17A(5). No wider binding change of principle beyond the Court's analysis was imposed.
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