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Application for leave to appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 by Krzysztof Romanik against The Lord Advocate for the Polish Judicial Authority (High Court of Justiciary)
Summary of Opinion — High Court of Justiciary (Appeal Court)
Factual and Procedural Background
Opinion delivered by Judge Matthews concerning an application for leave to appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 by the Appellant against the Respondent. On 16 October 2025 the sheriff ordered the extradition of the Appellant, a Polish national, to Poland to serve a cumulative custodial sentence of 4 years imposed on 7 August 2020, of which 3 years, 6 months and 28 days remained outstanding. The sentence combined earlier convictions from 2004, 2008 and 2019 (the 2019 convictions related to thefts in 2005). An earlier European Arrest Warrant (EAW) in 2014 led to the Appellant's surrender to Poland in 2018 for other proceedings; that EAW did not seek enforcement of the earlier convictions.
The Appellant has lived in the United Kingdom since about 2006, has three children (aged 15, 9 and 8), and a former partner ("Person A") who has a diagnosed schizoaffective disorder and was hospitalised from February to July 2024. The Appellant gave evidence that he visits and provides some assistance to Person A; Person A's evidence described a less frequent level of assistance and confirmed other available supports. A psychiatric report dated 19 April 2025 recorded drug and alcohol dependency, mild anxiety and occasional suicidal thoughts, but no major mental disorder. On 16 October 2025 the sheriff refused discharge; the Appellant sought leave to appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether extradition would be disproportionate under section 21A of the Extradition Act 2003 having regard to the Appellant's caring responsibilities for Person A.
- Whether the Appellant's mental or physical condition is such that extradition would be unjust or oppressive under section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003.
- Whether extradition would be incompatible with the Appellant's rights under Article 8 ECHR (private and family life).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Long residence in the UK (about 17–18 years), settled life and permanent accommodation in the UK.
- Caring responsibilities for Person A, who has serious mental health problems and was recently hospitalised.
- Passage of time since offences (some offences many years ago); unfairness in extradition given delay.
- Poor mental health and history of suicide attempts; ongoing treatment and support in the UK (psychiatric nurse, social work supervision).
- Inability to envisage returning to life in Poland; social supports in the UK (friends, dog).
Respondent's Arguments
- The sheriff correctly assessed Article 8 proportionality and gave appropriate weight to the public interest in extradition; high threshold for displacing that public interest.
- Section 21A applies only to persons wanted for prosecution (not to those wanted to serve sentences), so it does not assist the Appellant.
- Section 25 requires a high, fact-specific threshold; psychiatric evidence did not show a major disorder or that extradition would be unjust or oppressive.
- There was no factual basis presented to show that medical or psychiatric needs would not be met by the requesting state.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779 | Passage of time and exceptional circumstances required to bar extradition. | Referenced for the proposition that delay may render extradition oppressive only in exceptional circumstances; no such circumstances found. |
| Norris v Government of the United States of America (No 2) [2010] UKSC 9 2010 2 AC487 | High threshold for Article 8 discharge; interference must be exceptionally serious to outweigh public interest. | Used to emphasise the weighty public interest in extradition and the high bar for an Article 8 defence to succeed. |
| H(H) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic [2012] UKSC 25 [2013] 1 AC 338 | Methodology for balancing private/family life against public interest in extradition. | Applied as authority for careful proportionality assessment and the weight of public interest. |
| Polish Judicial Authority v Celinski [2015] EWHC 1274 (admin) [2016] 1 WLR 551 | Approach to Article 8 proportionality in extradition contexts. | Relied upon for the required approach of listing factors for and against and weighing them. |
| V v Lord Advocate on behalf of the Government of Romania [2020] HCJAC 33 2020 SLT 1161 | Illustration of proportionality assessment in Scottish extradition cases. | Referenced as supporting authority for the sheriff's approach to proportionality. |
| W v Spanish Authority [2020] EWHC 2278 (admin) | Rebuttable presumption that medical issues will be dealt with appropriately in requesting state. | Used to support the view that medical/psychiatric issues do not automatically bar extradition absent strong evidence. |
| Dewani v Government of the Republic of South Africa [2012] EWHC 842 (Admin) | Extradition of seriously ill persons may be unfair or oppressive; stress/hardship alone insufficient. | Quoted for the proposition that serious illness can make extradition unfair, but threshold is high; applied to reject oppression argument here. |
| McKinnon v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWHC 2021 (Admin) | Serious illness may engage Article 3 where extradition exacerbates condition. | Referenced to note that extreme cases could engage Article 3, but not applicable on the facts. |
| Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1 | Article 3 considerations relating to health and state obligations. | Referred to in context of thresholds for human-rights-based bars to extradition. |
| Gavenaite v Lord Advocate [2025] HCJAC 48 2024 SCCR 418 | High threshold for section 25 and Article 3; illustrative exposition. | Cited to reinforce the high bar required to succeed under section 25. |
| Jantos v Lord Advocate [2015] HCJAC 32 | Onus on appellant; assumption that requesting state's prison system will provide necessary treatment. | Applied to note appellant's burden and the general presumption of adequate care in requesting state. |
| Howes v HM Advocate [2010] HCJAC 123 2011 SCL 306 | Authority on interpretation of "unjust or oppressive" and context of extradition. | Used as supporting authority for the high, fact-specific test under section 25. |
| Wlodarczyk v Lord Advocate 2012 SCCR 490 | Authority on medical/mental-health thresholds in extradition. | Referred to in support of the general approach to health-based defences. |
| Maziarski v Lord Advocate [2012] HCJAC 33 2012 SLT 553 | Example where extreme circumstances met the threshold to bar extradition on health grounds. | Distinguished: present facts not as extreme as in Maziarski. |
| Lebbink v Netherlands 2005 40 EHRR 18 | Assessment of existence of de facto family life under Article 8. | Applied to the factual inquiry whether Appellant and Person A had de facto family ties; court found they did not. |
| Keegan v Ireland (1994) 18 EHRR 342 | Elements indicating de facto family life (cohabitation, stability, etc.). | Used to identify factors necessary to establish family life; court found those factors lacking here. |
| Tsiklauri v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] CSIH 31 2020 SC 495 | Further authority on de facto family ties and Article 8. | Relied upon to assess whether relationship amounted to family life; court concluded it did not. |
| Babar Ahmad and Others v United Kingdom (2010) 51 EHRR SE97 | Example of the rarity of Article 8 succeeding against extradition interests. | Referenced to underscore that only exceptional circumstances will outweigh extradition's legitimate aim. |
| Lagunionek v Lord Advocate 2015 JC 300 [2015] HCJAC 53 | Passage of time and effect on extradition assessments. | Cited regarding exceptional circumstances required where the appellant had been a fugitive; court found none here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in stages. First, it held that section 21A is inapplicable because it addresses persons wanted for prosecution, not those sought to serve sentences; section 21A therefore did not assist the Appellant.
On section 25 (mental and physical condition) the court applied the high, fact-specific threshold established in authority: the judge must be satisfied that extradition would be unjust or oppressive because of physical or mental condition. The psychiatric report (19 April 2025) recorded mild anxiety and substance dependency but did not evidence a major mental disorder. The court relied on the rebuttable presumption that the requesting state can provide necessary treatment and concluded the evidence did not meet the high test in section 25; extradition was not unjust or oppressive on these grounds.
On Article 8 the court set out the established proportionality framework (including the high bar in Norris and the balancing approach in H(H)). The court examined factual findings of the sheriff concerning the Appellant's relationships and contacts. Regarding the Appellant's children, the court concluded there was no material dependence or interference with telephone contact; public interest in extradition outweighed any Article 8 claim. Regarding the relationship with Person A the court analysed whether "family life" existed (applying Lebbink, Keegan and related authority). The sheriff's findings—former romantic relationship, now ended, limited and variable assistance described as "regular" or "sometimes"—did not establish de facto family life. Even if family life existed, the consequences of extradition were not shown to be exceptionally severe, and the public interest outweighed private/family rights. The court also noted that the Appellant had been a fugitive and there was no undue procedural delay; passage of time did not give rise to exceptional circumstances.
Accordingly, none of the Appellant's grounds met the required legal thresholds and the sheriff did not err in law or fact in his assessments.
Holding and Implications
LEAVE TO APPEAL REFUSED
Direct effect: the sheriff's order for extradition stands and the Appellant's application for leave to appeal is refused. The court did not establish or announce any new legal precedent; it applied existing authority and confirmed that the thresholds for section 25 and Article 8 relief in extradition cases remain high.
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