- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Twigg & Anor, R. v
Factual and Procedural Background
On 27 July 2025, the First Applicant and the Second Applicant were convicted at the Crown Court at The City of the offence of being in charge of a dog which caused injury while dangerously out of control, contrary to section 3(1) and (4) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. Both were acquitted of manslaughter. Sentences were imposed on 10 October 2025: the First Applicant received 2 years and 8 months' imprisonment and the Second Applicant received 3 years and 6 months' imprisonment. Applications for leave to appeal (the First Applicant against conviction; the Second Applicant against sentence) were referred to the Full Court.
The facts as found at trial were that the applicants, their three young children (the youngest aged 3), and three dogs were living at a property on a farm owned by the Owner of the Farm. Two substantial dogs ("Dog A" and "Dog B") were kept in a pen secured with a carabiner clip adjacent to the living accommodation. Various professionals (an RSPCA officer, social workers, a veterinary expert and an animal behaviour expert) had expressed concerns about the dogs' behaviour and the condition of the pen. On 15 May 2022 the child was fatally attacked in the pen by Dog A (and/or Dog B). Expert evidence described multiple puncture wounds consistent with a prolonged, ferocious attack and concluded the dogs displayed territorial/guarding and predatory/aggressive behaviour. The indictment contained count 1 (gross negligence manslaughter) and count 2 (being in charge of a dog which caused injury while dangerously out of control). The prosecution case on count 2 was that both applicants were, for the time being, in charge of the dogs when the dogs were dangerously out of control.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial judge was wrong to dismiss the First Applicant's submission of no case to answer on count 2 (i.e. whether there was sufficient evidence that the First Applicant was for the time being in charge of the dog when it became dangerously out of control).
- Whether the jury directions on the meaning and application of "the person for the time being in charge of the dog" under section 3(1) of the 1991 Act were legally wrong or inadequate, in particular whether the jury should have been directed that if the Second Applicant was in charge when the First Applicant was absent, the First Applicant could not also be in charge.
- Whether the jury's verdicts were inconsistent (if the jury found the Second Applicant was in charge, could they properly convict the First Applicant as well?).
Arguments of the Parties
First Applicant's Arguments
- The judge should have upheld the no case submission: section 3(1) cannot extend to a person who had left the property several hours earlier and left another person responsible; charge for the time being passed when he left to go to work.
- The phrase "the person for the time being in charge of a dog" should be confined to those with immediate physical control; it does not contemplate multiple, geographically separate persons each being "in charge" on different factual bases.
- The jury directions were legally wrong because they failed to instruct that if the Second Applicant was or may have been in charge when the First Applicant was absent, that was a complete answer for the First Applicant.
- The jury verdicts were inconsistent: a finding that the Second Applicant was in charge should have precluded conviction of the First Applicant.
Prosecution's Arguments
- The jury should determine whether one or both applicants were for the time being in charge; more than one person can be in charge and a person can be in charge without being physically present.
- The First Applicant retained ongoing responsibility for security arrangements and therefore the attack resulted from acts or omissions of both applicants (failure to secure the gate and/or prevent the child entering the pen).
- The judge's directions correctly reflected the law and the factual issues for the jury.
Second Applicant's Sentencing Arguments
- The Second Applicant accepted classification under the guideline but argued the culpability was reflected recklessness rather than deliberate harm and that an upward adjustment to near the top of the category B range was not justified; a suspended sentence should have been possible after mitigation.
- Mitigation included lack of prior convictions, pregnancy, remorse, psychiatric injury (PTSD and prolonged grief disorder), ongoing childcare responsibilities and some deafness.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Robinson-Pierre [2014] 1 WLR 2638 | Requires some causal connection between having charge of the dog and the prohibited state of affairs; prosecution must show an act or omission of the defendant that to some (more than minimal) degree caused or permitted the dog to be dangerously out of control. | The court relied on Pitchford LJ's analysis as the starting point for the necessity of a causal connection even in a strict liability offence under s.3(1). |
| R v Rawlings [1994] Crim LR 433 | Establishes that whether a person is in charge of a dog is a matter of fact for the jury; presence or absence is not determinative. | Cited to show that absence from the scene does not automatically remove charge and that the issue is for the jury to decide on the facts. |
| L v CPS [2010] EWCA 341 (Admin) | Confirms that a person may remain in charge despite transfer of physical control and that more than one person can be in charge at the relevant time. | Used to support the proposition that the jury may find a defendant remained in charge despite handing over physical control; reinforced that factual context matters. |
| R v Virdee [2023] EWCA Crim 786 | Referenced among authorities confirming factual and degree analysis of being in charge and possibility of multiple persons being in charge. | Reviewed as part of the body of authority establishing legal principles applied to the facts. |
| DPP v Watkins [1989] 89 Cr App R 112 | Discussed in relation to analogy with being in charge of a vehicle and circumstances in which charge may be relinquished. | Considered but the court concluded the vehicle case did not alter the factual approach to being in charge of a dog under s.3(1). |
| R v Bezzina [1994] 1 WLR 1057 | Previously held section 3(1) created strict liability; considered in Robinson-Pierre's analysis. | Placed in context of Robinson-Pierre's clarification that strict liability still requires causal connection where a third party's acts may be wholly responsible. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began from the statutory text of section 3(1) and the Robinson-Pierre formulation that even a strict liability offence under s.3(1) requires a causal connection between the defendant's having charge and the prohibited state of affairs (the dog being dangerously out of control). The court reviewed authorities (including Rawlings, L v CPS and Virdee) and distilled agreed propositions: (i) whether a person is in charge is normally a question of fact and degree for the jury; (ii) a person can be in charge without physical presence; (iii) more than one person can be in charge at the same time; (iv) ceding physical control does not necessarily end being in charge; and (v) inadequate security arrangements can amount to an omission that caused or permitted the prohibited state of affairs.
Applying those principles to the prosecution evidence, the court concluded there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the First Applicant retained responsibility for security of the dogs and was aware the child could gain entry to the pen despite the carabiner clip. Thus, even though the First Applicant had left for work and the Second Applicant was physically present, the prosecution had adduced evidence that the attack resulted from acts or omissions of both applicants (failure to secure the gate and/or prevent the child entering). Accordingly the trial judge was correct to reject the no case submission and to leave the question of who was for the time being in charge to the jury. On sentence, the court accepted the trial judge's application of the offence-specific guideline, concluding count 2 was category B with a 4-year starting point and that the judge was entitled to uplift within the category range to reflect multiple medium culpability factors; mitigation was adequately reflected by discounting from that adjusted starting point.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The applications for leave to appeal were refused. The application by the First Applicant against conviction (no case and directions) was refused; the Second Applicant's application against sentence was refused.
Implications: The court affirmed that (a) determination of who is "for the time being in charge" under s.3(1) is normally a question of fact and degree for the jury; (b) more than one person can be in charge at the same time and physical absence does not automatically negate charge; and (c) inadequate security arrangements can constitute the relevant act or omission. The decision upheld the trial judge's directions and sentence in the factual circumstances of this case. The court did not purport to create a new legal test beyond the principles drawn from existing authority.
Alert