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Wilson, R. v
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant brought a reference under s.36 Criminal Justice Act 1988 challenging sentence imposed on the Respondent for a single count of Controlling or Coercive Behaviour. The prosecution case at its highest alleged persistent and serious controlling and coercive behaviour between 2016 and 2019 while the Respondent and the Victim were in an intimate family relationship; the Victim was 17 at the start of the relationship and the Respondent about ten years older. The Victim first made a statement in June 2019. Proceedings were begun years later; the Respondent first appeared in the Crown Court on 14 August 2024 and trial began on 23 September 2025. The jury acquitted the Respondent of three counts of rape (one count dismissed at half-time) and convicted him of the controlling/coercive behaviour offence. At sentence in late November 2025, Judge Mooney imposed 18 months' custody suspended for 18 months, with 150 hours unpaid work and up to 35 rehabilitation activity requirement days. The Solicitor General sought leave to refer the sentence as unduly lenient; leave was granted.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sentence was unduly lenient because the judge did not uplift the starting point to reflect multiple factors of higher culpability and greater harm.
- Whether the judge allowed an excessive reduction to the sentence for delay and for the Respondent's borderline personality disorder.
- Whether the judge was wrong to suspend the sentence without proper application of the Imposition Guideline, such that appropriate punishment required immediate custody.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Attorney Hole on behalf of the Appellant)
- The case was category A1 (SP 2 years 6 months; range 1–4 years) and multiple factors indicative of higher culpability (maximising fear/distress, persistence, multiple methods, intended humiliation/degradation) justified an upward adjustment from the starting point.
- The judge allowed an excessive overall reduction (about 1 year/40%) for delay and the Respondent's borderline personality disorder without evidential basis that the disorder reduced culpability.
- The judge failed to apply the Imposition Guideline properly and suspended the sentence when appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate custody.
Respondent's Arguments (Attorney Elliott)
- The judge made no express factual findings and the jury's not-guilty verdicts on other counts left uncertainty about what conduct was relied on for sentence; the judge's sentencing remarks were inadequate.
- The Victim's reliability was challenged and the judge did not indicate which parts (if any) of her account he accepted; that uncertainty could justify the sentence imposed.
- The judge did not obviously apply the Imposition Guideline; given the inadequate explanation, the suspended sentence could not be characterised as unduly lenient.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Barrett [2025] EWCA Crim 840 | Definition of the kind of detrimental effect from delay that justifies reduction (psychological/physical harm or putting life on hold) (at [25]). | The court applied Barrett to assess whether the Respondent suffered the sort of detrimental effect contemplated by the guideline and concluded he had not suffered that harm, but that delay had enabled rehabilitation which merited mitigation. |
| R v Timpson [2023] EWCA Crim 453 | Observation that reduction for delay would be unlikely to be as great as 25% for serious offences, though some reduction would follow. | The court referenced Timpson when considering the scale of any reduction for delay and concluded that the reduction allowed by the judge was at or beyond the outer reaches of proper discretion. |
| R v Hussain [2019] EWCA Crim 1542 | Guidance that even if a judge considers immediate custody necessary for appropriate punishment, there remains a discretion to suspend if sufficient factors support suspension (at [21]). | The court relied on Hussain to recognise that suspension remained open to the sentencing court despite the potential for immediate custody, and to inform its balancing exercise on suspension. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court emphasised that the principal difficulty in resolving the Reference arose from the inadequacy of the judge's sentencing remarks. Because the jury's verdict was not fact-specific and multiple factual outcomes were possible, it was essential that the sentencing judge identify the factual basis on which he was sentencing; Judge Mooney did not do so. The judge also failed to address the Imposition Guideline when contemplating suspension.
The court accepted that the case properly fell within culpability category A1 with an A1 starting point of 2 years 6 months and category range 1–4 years, but found it impossible to determine with confidence whether the judge should have made an upward adjustment from the starting point because he did not record which aggravating facts he treated as proved. The single identified aggravating feature (historic youth convictions) was of marginal relevance.
On mitigation, the court found limited evidential basis that the Respondent's borderline personality disorder reduced culpability; the PSR's discussion was speculative. The court concluded the maximum proper allowance for borderline personality disorder, the long delay, and the Respondent's positive rehabilitation was about nine months. The court calculated that it could not be confident the judge should have imposed a sentence in excess of two years.
Addressing suspension afresh under the Imposition Guideline, the court identified factors favouring suspension: realistic prospect of rehabilitation in the community (PSR and probation evidence), demonstrable rehabilitation during the delay, and significant harmful impact of immediate custody on the Respondent's partner and children. Factors against suspension (risk to present/future partners and the seriousness of the offence) were considered but, in the court's view, outweighed. The court concluded a custodial term of about 21–24 months would be commensurate with seriousness but, on balance, suspension was justified given the particular history and rehabilitation evidence.
Although the court regarded the sentence as lenient and the reduction from 2 years 6 months to 18 months as at or beyond the outer reaches of discretion, it could not be confident that a sentence in excess of two years was required; accordingly, and despite criticism of the judge's failure to explain his reasoning, the court declined to interfere.
Holding and Implications
The sentence imposed by Judge Mooney is not interfered with.
Direct effect: the Respondent's sentence of 18 months' custody suspended for 18 months with 150 hours unpaid work and up to 35 rehabilitation activity requirement days remains in force. The court emphasised that this decision does not establish precedent and is driven by the particular and unfortunate procedural history and facts of the case.
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