Williamson, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal to the Court of Appeal Criminal Division against sentence imposed by the Crown Court at The City. The Appellant pleaded guilty on 24 March 2024 to ten counts of blackmail contrary to section 21(1) of the Theft Act 1968. Sentence was imposed on 20 November 2025 at which the Appellant received concurrent terms of seven years and four months' imprisonment on each count. The delay between plea and sentence was largely attributed to a co-accused awaiting trial. The co-accused, the Appellant's partner, pleaded guilty at a late stage to three counts on which she had been jointly charged. The offending occurred between September 2023 and January 2024 and involved threats (principally by WhatsApp and telephone) to disclose use of sexual services and threats of violence to secure money; a tenth offence, committed while the Appellant was on bail, concerned threats to a tradesperson. Ten complainants were targeted; the total amount demanded was £1,420, of which £610 was paid. The Appellant appealed his sentence with leave of a single judge.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge applied an incorrect starting point under the Sentencing Council Guideline on Blackmail (specifically whether the offences were miscategorised as A2 rather than B2).
2. Whether the overall sentence was manifestly excessive, including whether insufficient weight was given to mitigation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The sentencing judge referred to the wrong starting point for an A2 offence (six years in remarks) and thereby misapplied the Guideline.
• The offences were miscategorised (the Appellant submitted culpability at most Category B), and the overall sentence was manifestly excessive because insufficient weight was given to mitigation.

Prosecution's Arguments

• The prosecution's sentencing note submitted culpability as Category A on the basis of repeated conduct and "sophisticated planning" and assessed harm as Category 2 due to substantial distress to victims.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed (1) the alleged wrong starting point, (2) categorisation under the Guideline, (3) aggravating and mitigating features, and (4) totality.

1. The court accepted that the sentencing judge had made a slip in oral sentencing remarks by referring to a six-year starting point for A2 but concluded the judge had the correct starting point in mind when determining sentence.
2. On categorisation, the court accepted harm was properly Level 2 but concluded culpability for each individual offence was Category B rather than Category A. The court reasoned that the Category A factor of repetition or prolongment "over a substantial period of time" did not apply to individual offences (they were generally over a day or two), and the prosecution's assertion of "sophisticated planning" was not established (the use of multiple numbers and accounts did not equate to sophisticated planning or an orchestrated trap).
3. The court placed each offence in B2 (threatened rather than used violence), giving a B2 starting point of two years' imprisonment and a range of one to five years. The court nonetheless identified significant aggravating features: the Appellant's leading role in joint offences, use of children's telephones, conduct intended to maximise distress/humiliation (e.g., 4:30 am calls, sending complainants' photographs), and that count 10 was committed while on bail for similar offending. Mitigation recognised by the sentencing judge and accepted on appeal included the Appellant's progress in custody, remorse, good character, caring responsibilities, job offer, and evidence of constructive prison activity (peer mentoring).
4. Applying the Guideline and the principle of totality, the court found that although each offence was best categorised as B2, features of repetition and planning increased culpability such that an individual sentence in the region of three years could be justified for a single offence after trial. Given ten offences forming a sustained campaign, an overall notional sentence after trial of eleven years was not open to valid criticism. The sentencing judge applied the correct approach to aggravating and mitigating factors and gave full credit for the guilty plea when reducing the notional sentence to the concurrent terms imposed.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Direct effect: The sentence of seven years and four months' imprisonment (concurrent on each count) imposed by the Crown Court was upheld. The decision does not purport to establish a new precedent beyond its application of the Guideline and the totality principle.