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Welsh, R. v
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant pleaded guilty on 15 July 2025 to driving whilst disqualified. On 17 October 2025, three days before a scheduled trial, the Appellant changed pleas to guilty on: (i) controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship contrary to section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (lead offence); and (ii) dangerous driving. Three other counts were ordered to lie on the file (threatening with a bladed article in a private place, assault by beating and criminal damage). The prosecution offered no evidence on an allegation of kidnapping.
The sentencing judge (Judge Rippon) sentenced the Appellant on 27 November 2025 to a total of 42 months' imprisonment (41 months on the section 76 offence, consecutive 1 month for driving whilst disqualified, concurrent 14 months for dangerous driving). Disqualification periods were imposed under the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 with extensions under s 35A and s 35B. The Appellant obtained leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts relied on at sentencing: the parties began a relationship in May 2025 which deteriorated within weeks. The Victim described incidents including a knife being held to her throat, verbal abuse, physical assault, monitoring/tracking, and an episode on 14 June 2025 in which the Appellant followed the Victim, damaged her vehicle, drove at high speed in a manner intended to terrify her (lasting about 30–60 minutes), after which the Victim escaped, hid under a van and later sought refuge and contacted the police. The Victim described significant psychological harm, relocation from her home and loss of earnings. The Appellant had an extensive antecedent record including multiple prior convictions for dangerous driving and for driving whilst disqualified.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sentencing judge erred in taking too high a starting point for the section 76 offence (culpability and category placement).
- Whether the sentencing judge gave insufficient credit for the late guilty pleas to the section 76 and dangerous driving offences.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The relationship was of very short duration (about four weeks) and the constituent incidents were, in substance, equivalent to a small number of summary offences; the judge therefore erred in treating the section 76 offending as falling in the highest culpability category (A1) and imposed too high a starting point.
- The judge gave only about 12% credit for the guilty pleas to counts 2 and 7; the Appellant should have received 15% credit given the discussions to resolve the case and the prosecution's decision not to proceed on other counts.
Prosecution's Position
- The prosecution accepted the Appellant's written basis of plea; no Newton hearing was necessary. The prosecution had offered no evidence on the kidnapping allegation and accepted the factual basis relied on for the pleas.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Tarang Katira [2020] EWCA Crim 89 | Interpretation of the category A factor "persistent action over a prolonged period" for section 76 offending; need to give effect to language requiring persistence and prolonged duration. | The Court relied on Tarang Katira to explain that the duration factor is distinct and that the sentencing judge here did not rely on that particular factor but on other category A factors (intensity, effect and multiple methods of control), so Tarang Katira did not require interference with the judge's categorisation. |
| R v Plaku [2021] EWCA Crim 568; [2021] 4 WLR 82 | Principles in relation to the Definitive Guideline on Guilty Pleas and assessment of credit for late pleas. | The Court applied the principles in Plaku and the Definitive Guideline to uphold the sentencing judge's reduction for plea (finding the credit given was appropriate where pleas were entered at the "door of the court"). |
| R v Needham [2016] EWCA Crim 416; [2016] 1 WLR 4449 | Principles governing the form and expression of driving disqualification orders. | The Court applied Needham when determining and explaining the precise form of the disqualification orders and when quashing the redundant requirement for disqualification "until an extended driving test is passed" because that requirement already existed from an earlier order. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court (Judge Holgate delivering judgment) addressed the categorical placement and the plea-credit issue sequentially.
On culpability and harm: the Court accepted the sentencing judge's finding that harm fell into category 1 given serious alarm, distress and ongoing adverse effects to the Victim's life and mental well‑being. The Court emphasised that section 76 sentencing is fact‑sensitive and that the judge had relied on three separate category A factors—conduct intended to maximise fear or distress, humiliating/degrading treatment, and multiple methods of control—rather than on a prolonged duration factor. The Court rejected the Appellant's submission that the offending amounted merely to a small number of summary incidents, noting those incidents formed part of a broader pattern of domestic abuse and that dangerous driving was correctly treated as part of the controlling/coercive behaviour. Taking account of intensity, impact, aggravating antecedents and totality, the Court found the pre‑credit aggregate sentence (46 months) was not manifestly excessive.
On plea credit: the Court applied the Definitive Guideline on Guilty Pleas and R v Plaku. It found the pleas were entered very late ("virtually at the door of the court") and there was no earlier written offer of a basis of plea; accordingly the judge's allowance (about 12% on counts 2 and 7) was appropriate and not an error.
On disqualification: applying R v Needham principles, the Court set out the precise discretionary disqualification periods, extensions under s 35A and uplift under s 35B, and quashed a redundant order requiring disqualification until an extended test was passed, producing a total disqualification period as stated in the judgment.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED
Holding: The Court dismissed the Appellant's appeal against sentence. The sentence of 42 months' imprisonment (41 months on the section 76 offence, consecutive 1 month for driving whilst disqualified, concurrent 14 months for dangerous driving) was upheld. The disqualification order was reformulated in accordance with the judgment (total disqualification period expressed as 68 months and 30 days as set out by the Court, with the redundant requirement to pass an extended driving test quashed).
Implications: The direct effect is that the original sentence and the re-expressed period of disqualification remain in force. The Court treated the matter as an application of established guidelines and case law; no new legal principle was established beyond application of existing authorities to the facts of this case.
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