Johnson, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application by the Attorney General, under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, for leave to refer to the Court of Appeal a sentence considered to be unduly lenient. The Defendant, aged 38, pleaded guilty to two offences of stalking involving serious alarm or distress at a Crown Court in The City and was sentenced on 19 December 2025 to concurrent conditional discharges for one year on each count.

The offending arose from a relationship from April 2024 to about June 2024. After separation, the Defendant persistently called and messaged the Victim. Between 3 and 26 November 2024 he repeatedly contacted and approached the Victim, including following her, damaging her car door, attending her address, and being found hiding in a wardrobe. He was arrested and charged. The Defendant later changed his plea to guilty in October 2025 for the first set of offences and pleaded guilty at the first opportunity to a second stalking offence in October 2025. He was remanded in custody from 18 October 2025 until sentence on 19 December 2025. The judge concluded the equivalent of about 20 weeks' custody had been served (including curfew days) and imposed conditional discharges, noting a victim personal statement in which the Victim said she wanted to get back with the Defendant and did not want a restraining order.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentence imposed was unduly lenient within the meaning of section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
2. Whether the sentencing judge erred by placing undue weight on the Victim's personal statement in deciding not to impose immediate custody.
3. How the time already spent in custody and on a qualifying curfew should affect the appropriate sentence.
4. Application of overarching domestic abuse sentencing principles that victim wishes should not determine sentence.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney Newcombe's Arguments

• The judge placed too much reliance on the Victim personal statement and the time served in custody to reduce what should have been a custodial sentence to conditional discharges.
• Domestic abuse overarching principles require sentence be determined by seriousness of the offence, not by victim wishes.
• Judgments of the Court of Appeal about the effect of time spent in custody supported the contention that immediate custody was required in comparable cases.

Attorney Marsh's Arguments

• There was substantial mitigation for the Defendant, including mental health issues and positive work record.
• The judge was entitled to take into account time already served and the benefits the Defendant had derived from custody.
• The sentence was appropriate; if lenient it was not unduly lenient and should not involve the Defendant returning to custody.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court summarized principles applicable to Attorney General references: the trial judge is well placed to weigh factors; a sentence is only unduly lenient if outside the reasonable range; leave to refer should be granted only in exceptional cases; section 36 addresses gross error; and the appellate court has discretion even if a sentence is unduly lenient.

The Court emphasised Sentencing Council overarching domestic abuse principles that sentencing should be determined by offence seriousness, not by victims' wishes, and noted the offence-specific guideline requires consideration of time on tagged curfew at the final step when assessing credit for time served.

Factually, the Court accepted that the offences crossed the custodial threshold (category C2: starting point 12 weeks; range high-level community order to 35 weeks) and that there were aggravating factors (offending on police and court bail; domestic context; victim vulnerability). Mitigation included the Defendant's mental health issues, employment, willingness to engage, and apparent progress in custody. The judge had calculated the Defendant had effectively served about 20 weeks (nine weeks custody plus curfew equivalence) before sentence.

The Court concluded the judge erred in suggesting the Victim's second personal statement might be determinative of whether custody should be imposed; sentencing is for the court and victims' views do not determine sentence. For that reason leave to refer was granted to emphasise the point. However, taking into account the starting point, range, aggravating and mitigating factors, and the substantial period already served, the Court could not say the sentence was outside the range of reasonable outcomes. Many judges might have imposed a high-level community order with unpaid work, but that did not render the conditional discharges unduly lenient. The Court therefore exercised its discretion to dismiss the Reference.

Holding and Implications

LEAVE GRANTED; REFERENCE DISMISSED

Holding: The Court granted leave for the Reference to emphasize that victims' personal statements should not determine sentencing decisions in domestic-context offences, but dismissed the Reference on the basis that the sentence imposed was not unduly lenient.

Implications: The direct effect is that the sentence imposed by the lower court (concurrent conditional discharges for one year on each count) remains in force. The decision reinforces the principle that sentencing is for the court and victims' wishes must not determine the outcome; no new legal principle or binding precedent was established.