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Field v R.
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant was convicted at trial in 2019 of the murder of the deceased who was found dead at home on 26 October 2015. Two co-defendants were tried with the Appellant and acquitted. The Criminal Cases Review Commission ("CCRC") referred the conviction to the Court of Appeal by reference dated 28 August 2025, the CCRC identifying that the jury may have been misdirected on causation. There were two earlier Court of Appeal judgments in the matter (an appeal dismissed in 2021 and a refusal to re-open in 2022). The present reference focuses on parts of the trial judge's summing up and the judge's response to a jury question about causation, in particular whether the jury were properly directed about whether the deceased's voluntary consumption of alcohol and/or drugs could break the chain of causation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the judge and the earlier Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the undisclosed homicidal intention of the person with whom the deceased drank could, in law, render the deceased's decision to drink involuntary for the purposes of the "free, deliberate and informed" rule explained in R v Kennedy (No 2).
- If the undisclosed intention could so render the decision involuntary, whether that was a factual matter for the jury and whether the judge's directions properly left that factual issue to them.
- Whether, in any event, the judge's directions were adequate, given the way alternative causes (alcohol, Dalmane, smothering) were presented and linked by "and/or".
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The CCRC and the Appellant urged that the jury were misdirected on causation; counsel argued a new strand of argument analogising to decisions on consent procured by deception in sexual-offence law and sought reconsideration under section 13(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995.
- The Appellant submitted the jury should have been told to decide whether the Appellant's deception caused the deceased to drink (i.e. but for the deception the deceased would not have drunk), and that the judge's formula "even if he agreed to drink it" improperly withdrew that factual issue from the jury.
Respondent's Arguments
- The Respondent relied on R v Kennedy (No 2) and the FDI (free, deliberate and informed) principle, submitting that an informed adult's voluntary act normally breaks the chain of causation and that the Appellant's covert intention did not, as a matter of law, render the deceased's act involuntary absent evidence that the Appellant "administered" the substance.
- The Respondent submitted the factual context and established principles of causation required careful application and that the route to verdict and directions should be assessed against those established principles.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Papadimitropoulos v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 249 | Early authority on deception and its consequences in criminal contexts. | Referenced to show the historical lineage of deception-related arguments. |
| R v Linekar [1995] Q.B. 250 | Authority on deception and related criminal liability principles. | Placed in sequence of authorities canvassed by counsel; noted as preceding earlier CACD decisions. |
| Assange v Sweden [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin) | Considered in the chain of authorities concerning deception and consent. | Mentioned among precedents counsel invited the court to follow on deception issues. |
| R (Monica) v DPP [2019] Q.B. 1019 | Recent authority on deception/consent themes. | Noted as part of the body of authorities on deception. |
| R v Lawrance [2020] 1 W.L.R. 5025 | Authority in the field preceding the earlier CACD judgments. | Referenced among prior cases relevant to deception and consent arguments. |
| R v Hayes (Tom) and R v Palombo (Carlo) [2024] EWCA Crim 304; [2024] 2 Cr. App. R. 6 | Review of rules of precedent as applied in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division. | Used to summarise stare decisis principles and exceptions applicable in CACD. |
| [2025] UKSC 29; [2025] 2 Cr. App. R. 21 | Supreme Court reversal referenced in relation to Hayes & Palombo. | Noted that the Supreme Court reversed the decision on other grounds but did not comment on the passage cited. |
| R. v Taylor (1950) 34 Cr. App. R. 138; [1950] 2 K.B. 368 | Authority on residual discretion to depart from precedent in criminal cases affecting liberty. | Cited in the court's exposition of exceptions to stare decisis in CACD. |
| R. v Gould (1968) 52 Cr. App. R. 152; [1968] 2 Q.B. 65 | Authority on precedent exceptions and residual discretion. | Quoted in enumerating principles of precedent in CACD. |
| R. v Spencer (1985) 80 Cr. App. R. 264; [1984] 1 Q.B. 771 | Stare decisis guidance for CACD. | Used to support the existence of binding precedent subject to exceptions. |
| R. v Simpson [2003] 2 Cr. App. R. 36; [2004] Q.B. 118 | Discussion of residual discretion and caution in departing from precedent. | Quoted for principles on when CACD may depart from prior decisions. |
| R. v Magro [2010] 2 Cr. App. R. 25; [2011] Q.B. 398 | Principles limiting residual discretion and importance of certainty in law. | Cited to emphasise circumspection in departing from prior CACD decisions. |
| R. v Barton [2020] 2 Cr. App. R. 7; [2021] Q.B. 685 | Authority on when Supreme Court instructions may preclude following CACD decisions. | Used to illustrate an exception where a higher court's obiter effectively instructs not to follow a prior decision. |
| R. v Bermingham and Palombo [2021] 1 Cr. App. R. 24; [2021] 4 W.L.R. 113 | Application of residual discretion in criminal appeals. | Referred to in the court's review of precedent rules. |
| R. v Layden [2023] EWCA Crim 1207; [2024] 1 Cr. App. R. 6 | Recent CACD authority on precedent principles. | Included in the list of authorities from which principles were derived. |
| Young v Bristol Aeroplane Ltd [1944] K.B. 718 | Classic statement of exceptions to binding precedent in appellate courts. | Applied by the court to explain exceptions to stare decisis in CACD. |
| R. v Cotterell [2008] 1 Cr. App. R. 7 | Principles on changes in law and extensions of time for out-of-time appeals. | Referred to in discussing limits on relief where conviction was in accordance with law at time. |
| R v Kennedy (No 2) [2007] UKHL 38; [2008] 1 AC 269 | Principle that an act by the deceased breaks causation only if it is free, deliberate and informed (FDI). | Centrally analysed: court examined whether Kennedy required quashing of conviction and whether FDI applied to the facts. |
| R. v Hughes [2013] UKSC 56; [2014] 1 Cr. App. R. 6 | Observation that causation is context-specific and that different legal rules of causation may apply. | Relied upon to support context-specific analysis of causation issues. |
| R. v Wallace [2018] EWCA Crim 690; [2018] 2 Cr. App. R. 22 | Decision dealing with causation issues and criticised in academic commentary. | Referenced as part of the body of cases affecting the scope of Kennedy (No 2). |
| R v Rebelo [2021] EWCA Crim 306; [2021] 2 Cr App R 3 | Decision relevant to the development of causation principles post-Kennedy. | Mentioned among cases raising issues for Supreme Court consideration. |
| R v Latif [1996] 1 WLR 104 | Support for principle discussed in Kennedy on autonomy and voluntariness. | Cited in the Kennedy discussion as approving statements about autonomy. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by accepting the CCRC reference under section 13(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 and explained that on such a reference it is not bound by the earlier CACD decision; the court therefore assessed the conviction afresh while paying due regard to the earlier judgment. It reviewed the CACD precedent rules and the limited exceptions to stare decisis, and concluded that CCRC references under s.13(2) justify the court considering the merits even where a prior CACD decision exists.
On causation, the court analysed the FDI principle from R v Kennedy (No 2): an intervening act of the victim breaks the chain of causation only if it is free, deliberate and informed. The court examined whether the Appellant's undisclosed homicidal intention meant that the deceased's decision to drink was not FDI. The court found that Kennedy contemplates strong protection for autonomy and that, absent evidence that the Appellant "administered" the substance, the ordinary FDI rule applied. The court concluded that CACD Judgment 1 erred in law by expanding the FDI concept without adequate basis and by treating the Appellant's undisclosed intention as automatically rendering the drinking involuntary in law.
The court also analysed whether the factual question (whether the deception changed the nature of the deceased's act) was properly left to the jury. It concluded the judge's written directions (notably the phrase "even if he agreed to drink it") and subsequent oral answer to the jury question failed to require the jury to decide the crucial factual question in the specific terms necessary: whether the Appellant's deception was the cause of the deceased's decision to drink or whether the Appellant had in law "administered" the drug. The directions furthermore used an "and/or" formula linking different alleged methods (alcohol, Dalmane, suffocation) such that the jury could have convicted on a cause for which there was insufficient evidence or without being directed to make separate factual findings (for example as to covert administration of Dalmane).
On those bases the court concluded the conviction was unsafe: (i) CACD Judgment 1's legal approach to Kennedy was wrong; (ii) the jury were not properly directed to resolve the central factual issues bearing on voluntariness under Kennedy; and (iii) the route to verdict and answer to the jury note left the jury open to convict on inconsistent or insufficiently evidenced bases.
Holding and Implications
The Court quashed the Appellant's conviction for murder.
Implications: The court directed a re-trial; it certified that a point of law of general public importance arises and granted leave to the Respondent to appeal to the Supreme Court on that point (specifically questions about the correctness of the trial directions and the scope of R v Kennedy (No 2)). The Appellant was remanded in custody pending appeal and re-trial; the Crown Court was directed to correct the warrant to reflect sentencing remarks. The court did not purport to create a definitive new precedent itself but instead invited the Supreme Court to resolve the identified point of law.
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