Summary of Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant was convicted after a jury trial that concluded on 19 March 2024 of four counts of fraud by false representation contrary to sections 1 and 2 of the Fraud Act 2006. The Appellant purchased a traditional commercial boatyard in 2011 (hereinafter "Company A") and undertook development without planning permission. The Local Authority issued enforcement notices; a Planning Inspector's decision of 28 May 2014 required the site to be used only for boatyard purposes and specifically precluded residential mooring. The prosecution alleged that between 2012 and 2021 the Appellant defrauded members of the public by selling houseboats as accompanied by permanent residential mooring rights (counts 1, 2 and 3) or commercial mooring rights (count 5), despite knowing planning permission for such use did not and would not exist. Substantial sums were paid by purchasers: count 1 £550,000; count 2 £1,250,000; count 3 £884,000; count 5 £400,000. At sentencing on 27 March 2024 in the Crown Court at The City (Judge Barklem), the Appellant received a total of 12 years' imprisonment (count 2: 9 years as lead; counts 1 and 3: concurrent 6 years; count 5: consecutive 3 years). The Appellant sought leave to appeal against conviction and sentence; leave was refused by the Single Judge on 30 June 2025. The Appellant renewed both applications but abandoned the conviction appeal on 27 February 2026, leaving a renewed non-counsel application for leave to appeal against sentence before the Court.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge wrongly applied the Sentencing Council guidelines for Fraud, including assessment of loss, harm and culpability.
2. Whether the period of delay awaiting trial (approximately nine years) mitigated sentence.
3. Whether the Appellant's age and medical conditions warranted a reduction in sentence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The judge misapplied the sentencing guidelines because (the Appellant contended) he had delivered goods under contract, the complainants were using the houseboats and the boats had increased in value, so the complainants had obtained value in excess of what they paid.
• The lengthy delay (nine years) before trial caused severe distress and anxiety and should mitigate sentence.
• The Appellant's age and medical conditions should reduce the sentence.
• At trial the defence case was that no residential or commercial mooring rights were offered or granted; only historic or ancillary rights were said to exist.

Respondent's / Prosecution's Arguments and Sentencing Judge's Findings

• The prosecution case was that the Appellant knowingly represented that purchasers would obtain permanent residential (or commercial) mooring rights despite the site lacking planning permission for that use and with no prospect of permission being granted.
• The sentencing judge found high culpability (level A) due to sustained, sophisticated planning and extensive duration; harm was assessed by reference to loss and victim impact under the Fraud guideline.
• The sentencing judge rejected the Appellant's value argument, noting parallel High Court civil findings that the misrepresentations were fundamental and that, for at least two victims, the boats had negligible market value for residential use; credit for value was not appropriate.
• The sentencing judge considered delay and concluded it did not mitigate because the Appellant had used the time to continue harassment and vendetta against the victims; the court also noted the Appellant's conduct contributed to the timing of trials.
• The sentencing judge considered age and medical complaints but found no medical evidence warranting mitigation; a prosecution psychiatric report did not afford mitigation.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court (Judge Spencer delivering the approved judgment) proceeded by reviewing the sentencing exercise undertaken by the sentencing judge. The sentencing judge, having heard the lengthy trial, was held to be well placed to assess culpability and harm. For each count the judge applied the Sentencing Council Fraud guideline:

• Culpability was assessed as level A high culpability for each offence because of sustained conduct and sophistication.
• Harm was assessed by reference to loss and victim impact: counts 1, 3 and 5 fell within category 2 (£100,000–£500,000) but count 1 was elevated to category 1 due to very grave victim harm; count 2 involved a loss of £1.25 million with high-impact additional harm, justifying a sentence above the guideline range.
• The judge identified aggravating factors including the Appellant's relevant previous conviction (managing a company while disqualified) and his blaming of victims.
• Count 5 was committed while the Appellant was on bail; that justified a consecutive sentence, though reduced for totality from 6½ to 3 years to reflect the overall criminality and avoid excessive cumulative punishment, producing an aggregate of 12 years.
• The Court considered the Appellant's renewed grounds for leave: the value-increase argument was rejected in light of civil findings and factual assessment of the boats' impracticable relocation and negligible residential value; delay did not mitigate because the Appellant used the period to continue offending and harassment; age and medical conditions lacked supporting medical evidence or mitigating psychiatric material.
• The Court reviewed additional material served by the Appellant in September 2025 and January 2026 (including chapters addressing sentence) but concluded those materials did not establish an arguable ground of appeal against sentence.

Holding and Implications

LEAVE TO APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE REFUSED

Direct effect: the Appellant's renewed non-counsel application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused and the aggregate sentence of 12 years stands. The opinion records no broader legal implications or new precedent; the decision addresses the application of the Fraud guideline and the sentencing exercise in these facts and concludes there is no arguable basis for appellate intervention.

Anonymization note: All personal and entity identifiers in this summary have been replaced with standardized placeholders drawn from the provided opinion.