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Ali, R. v

England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
Apr 22, 2026
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Crown charged the Appellant and two co-accused with burglary (count 1) and theft (count 2) arising from a residential burglary on 8 December 2023 in which car keys and a BMW were taken. CCTV, ANPR and cell-site evidence, material found in a silver Honda, a video recovered from a co-accused's phone and a guilty plea by one co-accused formed the prosecution case. The Appellant (aged 26) failed to attend two pre-trial reviews while on bail; a bench warrant issued on 3 July 2025. The trial commenced on 22 July 2025 at the Crown Court. With the defence unopposed, the trial proceeded in the Appellant's absence. The Appellant was arrested on the morning of 24 July 2025 pursuant to the outstanding warrant but was initially taken to the wrong court. The jury retired and later returned unanimous guilty verdicts against the Appellant and one co-accused on 24 July. The Appellant was produced later that day, admitted a separate offence of failing to surrender, and was remanded. On 27 August 2025 the Appellant was sentenced. By leave of a single judge the Appellant appealed against conviction on counts 1 and 2. The appeal concerns only the handling of the trial after the Appellant's arrest on 24 July and whether the trial should have been halted or the jury discharged as to the Appellant.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial judge erred by failing to re-exercise the discretion to continue the trial in the Appellant's absence once it became known that the Appellant had been arrested on 24 July 2025.
  2. Whether, in the circumstances, the judge should have discharged the jury (or adjourned/suspended their deliberations) so that the Appellant could participate and, if necessary, give evidence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Attorney Hugheston-Roberts)

  • The Appellant's arrest on 24 July meant his absence ceased to be voluntary; the judge therefore had an obligation to reassess fairness before allowing the jury to return verdicts.
  • Had the Appellant been produced, he could have chosen to give evidence and the jury should have had the opportunity to assess his credibility.
  • The judge rejected the reasonable alternative of discharging the jury solely in relation to the Appellant; a short adjournment would have preserved procedural integrity.

Respondent's Arguments (Attorney Webb)

  • The Crown sought to uphold the judge's decision and pointed out there was no witness statement from the Appellant explaining his absence or expressing a wish to attend the trial.
  • The Appellant's absence was the result of an outstanding bench warrant; he had not presented himself voluntarily or contacted legal representatives to indicate a wish to attend.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R v Hayward [2001] EWCA Crim 168; [2001] QB 862 Set out principles for trial judges deciding whether to hold or continue a trial in the absence of the accused. The Court relied on these principles as the framework for assessing whether the trial judge had properly exercised discretion.
R v Jones [2002] UKHL 5; [2003] 1 AC 1 Endorsed the Hayward principles (subject to observations not material here). The Court noted the endorsement and applied the established approach when reviewing the judge's exercise of discretion.
R v Amrouchi [2007] EWCA Crim 3019 Cited by appellant's counsel in submissions relating to trials in absence. The Court considered the citation in context but proceeded to apply the Hayward/Jones framework to the facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reviewed the established principles governing trials in the absence of an accused (Hayward; Jones) and emphasised that the discretion must be exercised with great caution and with primary regard to fairness to the defence, while also considering fairness to co-defendants and the prosecution. It observed that the Appellant had been present when the trial was fixed, had been granted bail, had failed to attend pre-trial reviews, and that a bench warrant issued on 3 July 2025 remained outstanding.

The trial judge, with no opposition from the defence, had concluded the Appellant's absence at the trial outset was deliberate and voluntary and that the Appellant had waived the right to appear. When it became known on 24 July that the Appellant had been arrested that morning, the jury had already retired to deliberate. Defence counsel did not at that time seek suspension of the jury's deliberations to obtain instructions, and expressly said he was not asking for suspension because the Appellant was not expected to be produced until later. The judge refused a late application to discharge the jury as premature, noting lack of instructions, uncertainty as to the Appellant's arrival time and that the Appellant had not put forward any contemporaneous explanation for absence.

The Court noted the absence of any witness statement from the Appellant explaining why he failed to attend or what occurred on arrest, and that there was no evidence he had told police he wished to attend the trial. The Court accepted that counsel had concluded it would not have been practical or lawful to re-open the defence once the jury had begun deliberations and that the circumstances did not fall within exceptional cases permitting further evidence after deliberations began. Applying the legal framework to these facts, the Court found no error in the judge's exercise of discretion and no unfairness warranting intervention.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Holding: The Court dismissed the Appellant's appeal against conviction, concluding the trial judge did not err in declining to discharge the jury or otherwise halt the trial when it became known the Appellant had been arrested on the morning the jury deliberated.

Implications: The convictions were upheld and the decision has the direct effect of affirming the trial outcome as to these defendants; the opinion does not purport to establish any new legal principle beyond the application of established authority on trials in absence.