Ronan, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Attorney General applied for leave to refer a sentence under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 as unduly lenient. The Respondent (aged 27 at sentence) changed his plea to guilty to robbery on 22 February 2024 after an earlier plea and trial preparation hearing. A co‑defendant was tried and convicted after a trial concluding on 25 July 2025. Following a Newton hearing on 3 December 2025 the Respondent was sentenced to 38 months' imprisonment.

The agreed facts are that on 3 April 2022 (the Respondent's 24th birthday) the Respondent, together with three others including a co‑defendant, planned and carried out a robbery of a director of Company A (the Victim) at his rural home in The City. The Victim had collected cash from trade‑stand sales (estimated at £40,000–£60,000). Three masked individuals approached across fields; one was seen on CCTV holding a handgun, another held a bottle containing liquid, and a third carried a black holdall. The Victim threw a camouflage bag containing the cash over a fence and escaped. CCTV and ANPR linked the vehicle used to the co‑defendant and incorrect plates were recovered. DNA from a cigarette in the lay‑by linked to the Respondent; phone data showed frequent contact between the Respondent and the co‑defendant shortly before the robbery. A camouflage bag was later found in relation to the co‑defendant's property and no cash was recovered. At interview the Respondent initially denied culpability but the PTPH form contained some acceptance of acting as driver.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether leave should be granted under s.36 Criminal Justice Act 1988 to refer the sentence as unduly lenient.
2. Whether the sentencing judge erred in categorising the Respondent's culpability (category B versus category A under the Sentencing Council guideline for domestic robbery).
3. Whether the appropriate guilty plea discount was applied given the late change of plea and the Newton hearing.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney General's Arguments (Attorney Brocklehurst)

• The judge miscategorised culpability as B rather than A: the Respondent had significant involvement in planning, knew a real or imitation handgun would be used, and took a share of proceeds.
• There were elements of significant planning and organisation (knowledge of the Victim's address and routine, obtaining a handgun, changing number plates, reconnaissance, use of fields and parking to observe arrival, and dispersal of items afterwards), making the driver's role significant.
• Harm could have been uplifted within category 2 given the high sums involved; the correct starting point was A2 (eight years, range six to ten years).
• The judge erred in the plea discount: the Respondent entered not guilty at the PTPH and only pleaded guilty shortly before trial; the guilty plea discount should have been reduced so that the appropriate discount was no more than 15%.

Respondent's Arguments (Attorney Gray)

• The sentencing judge was best placed to assess culpability after presiding over the co‑defendant's trial and conducting the Newton hearing.
• The Respondent did not conceive the plan, did not conduct reconnaissance, and did not obtain or hold the weapon; he joined a plan conceived by others and his role was closer to driver than active participant.
• Extensive mitigation (previous good character, remorse, positive references, changed circumstances, caring responsibilities) supported the sentence imposed and made it not unduly lenient.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court accepted the sentencing judge had properly conducted the Newton hearing and made findings (the Respondent played a significant part in planning, knew a weapon would be used and took a share of proceeds). The court concluded, however, that the sentencing judge erred in her culpability categorisation. Given the findings—planning involvement and knowledge that a handgun (real or imitation) would be used to threaten and take a large sum—the court held the offence and the Respondent's role fell squarely within category A culpability. The court accepted harm as category 2 as agreed by counsel.

Applying the guideline, the correct starting point was eight years (A2, range six to ten years). The court allowed a modest downward adjustment because the Respondent was the driver rather than an active confrontational participant, and balanced limited aggravating features against significant mitigation (good character, remorse, references, delay). The court determined a notional sentence before discount could not properly be below 66 months (5 years 6 months).

The court found the sentencing judge had erred in assessing the plea discount: the Respondent had pleaded not guilty at the PTPH, so a 20% reduction for a late guilty plea was the maximum before reduction for the Newton hearing; reducing that by 5% for the mixed Newton outcome produced a 15% discount. Applying 15% to the 66‑month notional sentence produced 56 months.

The court considered its discretion whether to leave the sentence but concluded it should exercise the power to increase the sentence on these facts.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSED OF: Leave to refer granted; the sentence of 38 months' imprisonment quashed and substituted with a sentence of 56 months' imprisonment.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Respondent's sentence is increased to 56 months. The court noted this change affects release provisions (the Respondent will be subject to the two‑thirds release provisions applicable to sentences over four years rather than the half‑term that would have applied to 38 months). The court also ordered the correction of the statutory surcharge record to £190. No new legal principle was created beyond application of the established s.36 principles to the facts of this case.