March, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) considered two applications arising from the sentencing of the Defendant on 31 October 2025 at the Central Criminal Court by Judge Murray. The Solicitor General sought leave under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for a reference that the sentence was unduly lenient. The Defendant sought leave to appeal the sentence as manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.

The sentence under challenge was a life sentence for the murder of the Victim on 22 July 2024, with a minimum term of 42 years specified under section 321 of the Sentencing Act 2020. No days on remand were ordered to count against that minimum term because the period between arrest and sentence was served following recall under an earlier life sentence imposed for a previous murder. The earlier life sentence dated to a murder committed in 2000. The Victim's young child was present at the time of the killing; the Victim was also several weeks pregnant and the unborn child died as a result of the attack. The Defendant pleaded guilty to murder late in the trial after earlier contesting liability and advancing alternative pleas/defences.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentence imposed (life with a minimum term of 42 years) was unduly lenient such that the Solicitor General's reference under s.36 Criminal Justice Act 1988 should be allowed and the minimum term increased.
2. Whether the sentencing judge erred in principle or imposed a manifestly excessive sentence such that the Defendant should be granted leave to appeal.
3. Whether, applying Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020 and relevant authorities, the appropriate starting point in this case was a whole life order and, if so, whether mitigation justified departure to a minimum term.

Arguments of the Parties

Solicitor General's Arguments (Attorney Little and Attorney Oakley)

• The judge failed properly to apply Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020 and the guidance in R v Stewart and others [2022] EWCA Crim 1063; [2022] 4 WLR 86.
• The facts and aggravating features of the case required a whole life order; a lesser sentence was therefore unduly lenient.

Defendant's Arguments (Attorney Patel)

• The sentencing judge was entitled to give substantial weight to mitigation including the Defendant's mental health and neuro-cognitive impairment following a traumatic brain injury, and to apply the Sentencing Council guideline on offenders with mental disorders/developmental or neurological impairments.
• Weight should have been given to the guilty plea (entered at the close of the prosecution case), and those factors justified a shorter minimum term than 42 years or the refusal of a whole life order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court set out the statutory framework: sections 321–322 Sentencing Act 2020 and Schedule 21, which requires first deciding whether the murder's seriousness is "exceptionally high" (making a whole life order the appropriate starting point) and then assessing aggravating and mitigating factors. The court concluded the case plainly falls within Paragraph 2(2)(e) of Schedule 21 (a murder by an offender previously convicted of murder), so the starting point is a whole life order.

The court identified and weighed aggravating factors: previous conviction for murder (which establishes the Paragraph 2 starting point and must not be double counted), the death of the unborn child, prolonged and severe violence (including a wound directed at where the unborn child was), coercive and controlling behaviour in the relationship (now expressly enumerated in the Schedule), the presence of the Victim's young child, use of a knife, and disposal of evidence. Parliament's amendment to Paragraph 9 to include controlling/coercive behaviour was noted as emphasising that factor's weight.

Mitigation consisted mainly of evidence of a traumatic brain injury and cognitive deficits and an established personality disorder. The court accepted the brain injury was not the principal cause of offending: medical evidence attributed offending principally to an anti‑social/personality disorder with elevated impulsivity, irritability and aggressiveness. The absence of premeditation was held to be a limited mitigating factor given antecedent conduct in the earlier murder and the prolonged abusive context of the instant offence. The guilty plea attracted little or no weight: it was entered late and only once expert evidence ruled out diminished responsibility, such that it was tendered when no realistic alternative remained.

The court found that the sentencing judge erred in procedure by effectively deciding against a whole life order before conducting the structured assessment required by Schedule 21. Having applied the correct structure and balancing the factors, the court concluded aggravation far outweighed mitigation.

Holding and Implications

Sentence quashed and substituted with a whole life order.

Direct consequences: the Solicitor General was granted leave to refer; the Defendant's application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused; the minimum term order of 42 years was quashed and replaced by a whole life order meaning the Defendant will not be released. The opinion does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond the application of existing statutory provisions and authority (notably Stewart); it applies those authorities to the facts and alters the sentence accordingly.