Relton, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Applicant pleaded guilty at the Crown Court at Bristol on 12 December 2023 to one count of stalking involving serious alarm or distress contrary to section 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 in respect of Complainant A and was sentenced to a suspended sentence order of 15 weeks' imprisonment (suspended for 15 months as recorded earlier in the papers; the Single Judge's summary later refers to suspension for 18 months). During the period of that suspended sentence the Applicant committed further offences concerning Complainant B and Complainant C. On 16 July 2024 he pleaded guilty to: (a) stalking involving serious alarm or distress (section 4A(1)) and (b) stalking without serious alarm or distress (section 2A). He was committed for sentence to the Crown Court at Basildon and, in November 2024, Judge Bacon imposed sentences described in the judgment as 10 months' imprisonment on the more serious count and 4 months' imprisonment concurrent on the other count (the judgment records that that made a total of 14 months), and activated part of the earlier suspended sentence with a consecutive term of 3 months; the judgment thereafter records a stated total sentence of 13 months' imprisonment. A restraining order was imposed after the first conviction and its duration was amended after the second proceedings to a term of 10 years.

The factual pattern was common to all offences: the Applicant used a dating application ("the Dating App") to form short intimate relationships with each complainant; following the end of each relationship he persisted in sending numerous messages (including by creating new accounts after being blocked), made repeated phone calls and voicemails, and on occasions attended near complainants' homes and took other physical steps (including standing in front of a complainant's car and leaving a phone through a letterbox). The conduct caused substantial distress to each complainant. The Applicant had earlier, similar convictions dating from 2014.

The Applicant brought three renewed applications in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): (1) permission to appeal against conviction, (2) an extension of time (seeking an extension of 394 days), and (3) permission to appeal sentence. All three applications had previously been refused by the Single Judge and were again refused by the court sitting in March 2026 (panel: Judge Fraser, Judge Cheema-Grubb and Judge Leonard). The applications had been drafted by the Applicant in person; the Applicant provided a waiver permitting review of his trial counsel's advice.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether permission to appeal the conviction should be granted on grounds that the Applicant received incorrect legal advice and/or was pressured by the judge into pleading guilty.
2. Whether an extension of time of 394 days should be granted to advance an appeal.
3. Whether permission to appeal sentence should be granted on grounds including alleged mis-categorisation of offending, insufficient regard to mitigation, that the Applicant was overcharged, procedural flaws in sentencing, and that the restraining order was disproportionate.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• The Applicant alleged he was not properly advised by trial counsel as to the availability of an alternative verdict and that the legal test for serious alarm or distress had not been explained correctly.
• The Applicant alleged that the sentencing judge pressured him to plead guilty at a PTPH hearing.
• The Applicant challenged sentence categorisation (asserting a lower category), mitigation assessment, charging, sentencing procedure, and the length of the restraining order.
• The Applicant sought a 394‑day extension of time to bring an appeal.

Trial Counsel's / Prosecution Response

• Trial counsel expressly denied pressuring the Applicant and produced emails and correspondence showing the advice given, asserting the advice was proper and explained that early plea credit was available but the choice was the Applicant's.
• Prosecution (the CPS) was said to have been unwilling to accept a plea to the lesser charge in the manner discussed by the Applicant; counsel advised the Applicant of that position.
• The Single Judge and this court treated counsel's written response and the contemporaneous emails as demonstrating correct legal advice and absence of improper pressure.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the papers, the Applicant's submissions (including an 11‑page email listing authorities), the Single Judge's detailed written reasons and the contemporaneous emails from trial counsel. The court accepted the Single Judge's analysis that the emails displayed proper, professional advice: counsel made clear that early guilty plea credit was available but that the decision was the Applicant's to take. The court agreed with the Single Judge that discussions about an inappropriate "plea deal" with the Prosecution were not evidence of coercion and that the Prosecution's stance was properly explained by counsel.

As to the allegation of pressure by the sentencing judge at the PTPH hearing, the court reviewed the transcript and concluded the judge's remarks merely emphasised the benefits of early resolution and the need for the Applicant to consider his position and were not impermissible pressure. The court accepted the Single Judge's conclusion that the Applicant's grounds were not reasonably arguable.

On sentence, the court adopted the Single Judge's reasoning in detail: the sentencing judge's categorisation of the lead offence (towards the bottom of category B1/top of B2) was justified by the evidence and the judge could take the totality of offending into account; aggravating factors (previous similar convictions, offending while on bail and in breach of a suspended sentence) were legitimately weighed against limited mitigation; the concurrent sentence selection and overall total were not arguably manifestly excessive; and the length of the restraining order was not plainly disproportionate given repeat offending and the availability of application to vary or discharge under s5(4).

The court also emphasised the significant length of the extension of time sought (394 days), noting that such delay required very good reasons which were not provided. On that basis, and because the substantive applications lacked merit, the court concluded the applications should be refused.

Holding and Implications

All three applications were refused.

Direct effect: the Applicant's renewed application for permission to appeal conviction, application for an extension of time (394 days), and application for permission to appeal sentence were all refused for the reasons given by the Single Judge and endorsed by the court. The restraining order and the sentences imposed at first instance remain in place; the court recorded that no arguable basis for interference or extension was shown and did not establish any new legal principle.