- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Ocean One Hundred Ltd, R (On the Application Of) v New Forest National Park Authority
Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Summary of Judgment
Factual and Procedural Background
This judgment, delivered by Judge Holgate with Judges Stuart-Smith and King concurring, concerns an application made in 2007 by an individual ("Applicant") for a certificate of lawfulness of existing use or development ("CLEUD") under s.191 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The Respondent granted a CLEUD in 2008 in broader terms than the Applicant's apparent stated case, certifying most of a 2.57 ha site as a "caravan site" and a part as caravan storage. Documents relating to the original application were incomplete or lost.
Subsequent owners (Company A and later the Appellant) undertook redevelopment activity; enforcement investigations followed. In November 2020 an objector (Objector A) asked the Respondent to revoke the CLEUD under s.193(7). After investigation Officer A produced a report and the Respondent's board resolved to revoke the CLEUD on 7 November 2023. Company B (the Appellant) sought judicial review of the revocation; the High Court (Judge Jay) dismissed the appellant's remaining challenges. The Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on ground 5 (appearance of bias in respect of Officer A's conduct and the effect on the officer's report and the Board's decision).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Respondent could properly be satisfied under s.193(7) TCPA 1990 that, "on the application for the certificate", a materially false statement was made or material information was withheld.
- Whether the Respondent's procedure in handling the revocation (including disclosure of materials and interaction between enforcement and CLEUD teams) was unfair or procedurally defective.
- Whether legal errors in the officer's report and the reasons for revocation rendered the decision unlawful.
- Whether the Respondent's handling of materials and meetings caused substantial prejudice to the Appellant.
- Whether Officer A's conduct gave rise to apparent bias such that the Board's decision was tainted.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The CLEUD had been granted in terms broader than the scope of the Applicant's form; therefore the Respondent had no reliable evidence that materially false statements were made or material information withheld (Ground 1).
- The Respondent acted unfairly by withholding relevant information from the Appellant and from Board members (Ground 2).
- The officer's report contained legal errors and failed to identify the correct extent of the caravan site use certificated (Ground 3).
- The process of revocation was unfair and unlawful (Ground 4).
- Officer A's conduct gave rise to an appearance of bias which rendered the revocation unlawful (Ground 5).
Respondent's Arguments
- The onus remained on the Applicant/Appellant to demonstrate lawfulness; the Respondent had material (including local statements and officer notes) upon which it could be satisfied under s.193(7).
- There was no evidence that CLEUD officers knew enforcement-team material; the Respondent contended that enforcement officers routinely stood back when a regularising application was made.
- The Respondent did not contest the High Court's finding that, had Officer A been the ultimate decision-maker, apparent bias would have been made out, and relied upon the Board's independent decision-making.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Wyre Forest District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1990] 2 AC 557 | Meaning of "caravan site" for planning purposes. | Used to explain that "caravan site" refers to land where caravans are stationed for human habitation (as contrasted with mere storage). |
| R (Ocado Retail Limited) v Islington London Borough Council [2021] EWHC 1509 (Admin); [2021] PTSR 1833 | Legal analysis of CLEUD applications and revocation. | Adopted for principles on onus of proof, the objective tests in s.193(7), and approach to materiality and revocation. |
| R v New Forest Park National Authority ex p Ocean One Hundred Ltd [2025] EWHC 953 (Admin) | High Court decision under appeal (factual and legal findings). | Referred to and analysed; certain findings (e.g. on apparent bias) were accepted as not challenged by Respondent. |
| R (CPRE Kent) v Dover District Council [2017] UKSC 79; [2018] 1 WLR 108 | Duty to give adequate reasons. | Applied to require that the authority deal with the main issues in dispute when revoking a CLEUD. |
| Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67; [2002] 2 AC 357 | Test for apparent bias ("fair-minded and informed observer"). | Applied as the central test for apparent bias in assessing Officer A's conduct and its effect on the Board. |
| R (Buckinghamshire County Council) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3; [2014] 1 WLR 324 | Contextual application of the bias test and relevance of constitutional position. | Used to note that the test is applied in the statutory context of the decision-maker. |
| R (Legard) v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council [2018] EWHC 32 (Admin); [2018] PTSR 1415 | Statutory duties affecting apparent bias analysis. | Distinguished on its facts as not directly applicable to this revocation context. |
| London Historic Parks and Garden Trust v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government [2020] EWHC 2580 (Admin); [2021] JPL 580 | Statutory safeguards affecting appearance of bias (functional separation). | Noted as example where statute imposed stricter safeguards; distinguished from present statutory scheme. |
| R (Lewis) v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council [2008] EWCA Civ 746; [2009] 1 WLR 83 | Predetermination and members' decision-making in planning contexts. | Explained limits of comparison: revocation under s.193(7) is not analogous to normal planning determinations. |
| R (Alconbury Developments Ltd and others) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] UKHL 23; [2003] 2 AC 295 | Democratic nature of planning decision-makers. | Cited for context about member decision-making and the role of officer reports. |
| R v Mendip District Council ex parte Fabre (2000) 80 P & CR 500 | Purpose of officers' reports to committees. | Applied to explain that officer reports should inform but not overload members; reports must be fair and balanced. |
| R (Mansell v Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council) [2017] EWCA Civ 1314; [2019] PTSR 1452 | When an officer's report may mislead members on a material issue. | Cited to show courts will intervene if a report significantly misleads members on a material issue. |
| R (Whitley Parish Council) v North Yorkshire County Council [2023] EWCA Civ 92; [2023] JPL 1081 | Similar principle on officers' reports and member reliance. | Used to reinforce standards for officer reporting to decision-makers. |
| South Bucks District Council v Porter (No. 2) [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 1 WLR 1953 | Requirements for reasons where members adopt officer reasoning. | Applied: where members endorse officer reasoning the report must meet South Bucks tests. |
| R (Friends of the Earth Limited) v Heathrow Airport Limited [2020] UKSC 52; [2021] PTSR 190 | Obligation to consider obviously material considerations. | Relied upon to state that obvious material matters must be addressed by the decision-maker. |
| Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No.2) [2013] UKSC 39; [2014] AC 700 | Procedural fairness beyond statutory requirements. | Cited to note that general procedural rules do not exhaust public law fairness requirements. |
| Hopkins Developments Limited v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2014] EWCA Civ 470; [2014] PTSR 1145 | Standards for procedural fairness in planning decisions. | Applied in discussion of fairness and prejudice tests. |
| Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 1578 | Requirement of substantial prejudice for relief for procedural unfairness. | Applied to reject challenges where no substantial prejudice shown. |
| George v Secretary of State for the Environment (1979) 77 LGR 689 | Similar principle on procedural prejudice. | Used with Malloch to assess prejudice from procedural defects. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court set out the statutory framework (s.171A/B, s.191, s.193(7), s.194 and relevant procedural orders) and applied established authority (notably Ocado) to identify how revocation under s.193(7) operates: the tests in s.193(7) are objective (false statement or withholding of material information "on the application for the certificate") and, if engaged, a separate discretionary stage follows where planning merits may be considered. The court emphasised the duty to give adequate reasons and that officer reports must enable members to address the main issues.
Applying those principles to the facts, the court identified a set of "main issues" the Board needed to determine: the proper scope of the 2007 CLEUD application; what the enforcement team knew and what the CLEUD team knew or should have known (including Officer B's site visit in August 2007); the nature and sufficiency of evidence provided by the Applicant; and the effect of missing or destroyed documents. The officer's report prepared by Officer A (and presented to the Board) failed to identify or properly analyse those issues, treated contested matters perfunctorily, and contained statements (not supported by positive evidence) implying that enforcement-team information had not been shared with the CLEUD team.
The court accepted the High Court's unchallenged findings that Officer A's conduct contained features giving rise to an appearance of bias (private meetings with objectors, selective disclosure and circulation of drafts, deletion of emails, confidential exchanges with the pro-revocation side). Given Officer A had authored the report which the Board relied upon, the court analysed whether the report was fair and balanced and whether it enabled the Board to reach an independent decision untainted by that appearance of bias. The court concluded it was not: key issues were omitted or inadequately addressed; the report invited the Board to accept conclusions not supported by identified evidence; the Board did not receive documents (including the full 2007 application form and officer notes) necessary to assess competing readings of the application; and the process thereby substantially prejudiced the Appellant.
The court further examined the Appellant's other grounds. It rejected complaints that missing documents alone meant there was no evidential basis for revocation (ground 1) and rejected grounds 2, 3 and 4 on the basis they either added nothing material or did not show substantial prejudice independent of the appearance of bias analysis. The court held that the officer's report's deficiencies, when combined with the appearance of bias, meant the Board's decision was unlawfully taken.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED (GROUND 5)
Holding: The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on ground 5, concluding that Officer A's conduct gave rise to an appearance of bias which tainted the officer's report and thereby the Board's decision to revoke the CLEUD. The officer's report was not fair, balanced or legally adequate on the main issues the Board needed to determine.
Implications: The direct consequence identified in the judgment is that the process leading to revocation was unfair and substantially prejudiced the Appellant. The court rejected the other grounds of appeal (1, 2, 3 and 4) except insofar as they intersected with the prejudice caused by the appearance of bias. The judgment emphasises (i) the objective nature of s.193(7) tests, (ii) the duty to give adequate reasons and (iii) the requirement that officer reports enabling member decision-making be fair and balanced. The opinion does not state a broader novel precedent beyond its application of those principles to the facts of this unusual case.
Alert