Minter, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

On 17 October 2025 at The Court the Appellant pleaded guilty on re-arraignment to offences of affray, making a threat to kill and non-fatal strangulation. On 27 November 2025 Judge Sawyer sentenced the Appellant to consecutive terms: 3 months' imprisonment (affray), 9 months' imprisonment (threat to kill) and 2 years' imprisonment (strangulation), totalling 3 years. The Appellant obtained leave to appeal against sentence from the Single Judge.

The underlying facts (17 February 2024) were that the Appellant was involved in an initial assault on an unknown male (affray). Later, when a lone attending officer (Officer 1) attempted to restrain the Appellant, the Appellant was present while his stepson, Individual A (then 17), put Officer 1 in a chokehold; body-worn video recorded the Appellant threatening that he had a pen and would end the officer's life. The Appellant and Individual A fled but were located shortly afterwards. The Appellant later struggled with a second officer (Officer 2), wrapped his arms around Officer 2's neck in a chokehold and struck him; other officers intervened, PAVA pepper spray was used and the Appellant was arrested. Both officers provided victim personal statements describing psychological and physical effects. The Appellant made admissions in interview and apologised.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the total sentence of 3 years was manifestly excessive.
2. Whether the sentencing judge was wrong to impose consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences.
3. Whether the sentences relating to the police offences should have been concurrent.
4. Whether the sentencing category and starting point for the threat-to-kill offence (count 4) were too high.
5. Whether insufficient credit was given for time on a non-qualifying curfew (electronic tag).
6. Whether insufficient consideration was given to the principle of totality.
7. Whether the sentences should have been suspended.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The overall sentence of 3 years was manifestly excessive.
• All sentences should run concurrently because they stemmed from the same initial affray.
• Alternatively, the two offences against police (threat to kill and strangulation) should run concurrently.
• The starting point adopted for the threat-to-kill offence was too high.
• Insufficient credit was given for the period subject to a non-qualifying electronic curfew.
• The sentencing judge did not sufficiently apply the principle of totality.
• The sentences should have been suspended.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any opposing submissions in the appeal transcript beyond the judge's and appellate court's consideration of the grounds and available material.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed each offence by reference to sentencing category, culpability and harm as identified by the sentencing judge:

• Count 1 (affray) was common ground as category 3B: sustained punching but no evidence of further culpability A factors or injury and no victim personal statement from the assaulted male. The starting point range was identified as high-level community order to 36 weeks' imprisonment; 3 months was not challenged.
• Count 4 (threat to kill) was assessed by the sentencing judge as category 2B, but the appellate court concluded the judge adopted the wrong category and that the offence was properly category 3B: the threat was an empty threat in the circumstances, there was no evidence Officer 1 heard or comprehended it, and the officer's distress arose from the prior chokehold by Individual A. The appellate court concluded the appropriate pre-credit term was 6 months (reduced to 5 months after guilty-plea credit).
• Count 6 (non-fatal strangulation) was category 2B. The appellate court accepted the seriousness due to the victim being a uniformed police officer and the Appellant being under the influence of alcohol and cocaine, but balanced that against significant mitigation (remorse, primary carer for dependent children, stable employment). The appellate court set an appropriate pre-credit term of 18 months, reduced to 16 months after guilty-plea credit, and ultimately substituted 13 months given the totality and other adjustments.
• On concurrency versus consecutivity, the appellate court agreed with the sentencing judge that consecutive sentences were permissible because the subsequent incidents were distinct in time, place and circumstance and involved different victims.
• Regarding non-qualifying curfew credit, the appellate court accepted the sentencing judge's careful application of Rice and found no error in granting a 3‑month reduction on count 6 to reflect the non-qualifying curfew conditions.
• On totality and suspension, the appellate court recalculated substituted terms (3 months on count 1, 5 months on count 4, 13 months on count 6 to run consecutively = 21 months) and, having considered mitigation and the lack of reoffending risk, concluded that the sentence should be suspended. The court identified factors favouring suspension: realistic prospect of rehabilitation, absence of recent relevant convictions, low assessed risk of reoffending, strong personal mitigation and the severe impact of custody on dependent children. The court recognised the general seriousness of assaults on police officers but found the particular circumstances supported suspension.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED IN PART

Holding:

• The appellate court substituted sentences: count 1 — 3 months (unchanged); count 4 — 5 months; count 6 — 13 months. All sentences to run consecutively, totalling 21 months.
• The court suspended the substituted 21-month sentence for a period of 2 years from the date of original sentencing (27 November 2025) and attached a Rehabilitation Activity Requirement of 20 days as a condition of suspension.

Implications:

• The Appellant is eligible for immediate release and must report to a probation officer and comply with the suspension conditions; breach or reoffending during the 2-year suspension period may result in activation of the custodial term.
• The decision adjusts the sentencing levels for the offences against police and confirms the sentencing judge's discretionary approach to credit for non-qualifying curfew under R v Rice was permissible; no new legal principle beyond application of established guidance was created.