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Webster and Anor v Meenacloghspar [Wind] Ltd, Shorten and Anor v Meenacloghspar [Wind] Ltd [No. 4] (Approved)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiffs sued the Defendant (Company A) alleging that wind turbine noise (WTN) from one of the Defendant's turbines (T2) caused a private nuisance. The proceedings were heard in a modular format. In Module 1 the court (Judge Egan) found that T2 caused a nuisance during night hours and quiet waking hours. In Module 2 the court granted an injunction restricting the operation of T2 during specified times to abate the nuisance. In Module 3 the court awarded ongoing general damages and capital reduction ("stigma") damages to the Plaintiffs (specified sums in the judgment). The Defendant applied for a stay pending its intended appeal of the module 1–3 judgments. The Defendant undertook to pay interest on the damages should its appeal fail. The court stayed the payment of damages and the order for costs but refused to stay the injunction affecting T2.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Defendant has established arguable/stateable grounds of appeal sufficient to justify a stay pending appeal (applying the Okunade test).
- Whether damages would be an adequate remedy for (a) the Defendant if a stay is refused and the Defendant later succeeds on appeal, and (b) the Plaintiffs if a stay is granted and the appeal is unsuccessful.
- Where the greatest risk of injustice lies in granting or refusing a stay (balance of convenience/balance of justice), having regard to factors such as the Defendant's conduct, mitigation efforts, delay, length of nuisance, and relative strength of the parties' cases.
- Whether, as a matter of law, planning permission/condition 15 (the fixed noise limits) is a "wholly reliable indicator" or provides a decibel threshold that precludes a finding of nuisance.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- The Defendant contends it has arguable/stateable grounds of appeal on numerous factual and legal findings from Modules 1–3 (identifying multiple specific grounds in its affidavit and submissions).
- The Defendant asserts that the issues are complex and novel (first private WTN nuisance trial in the jurisdiction) and that its expert evidence was preferred at trial should have led to a different outcome.
- The Defendant relies on potential irrecoverable financial loss and risk of breach of loan covenants if a stay is refused; therefore damages would be inadequate for the Defendant.
- The Defendant argues that the court misapplied principles concerning the weight to be given to planning conditions (Condition 15) and that planning compliance/decibel thresholds can be dispositive as a legal matter.
- The Defendant offered an undertaking to pay interest on damages should its appeal fail and sought a stay of payment of damages and costs (and, broadly, of the orders) pending appeal.
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The Plaintiffs argued the Defendant has not demonstrated arguable grounds of appeal with sufficient particularity and that many grounds are formulaic or lacking real substance.
- The Plaintiffs submitted that damages are not an adequate remedy for the principal resident Plaintiff (serious ongoing intrusion into home life) and that the injunction should not be stayed.
- The Plaintiffs relied on the Defendant's conduct (characterised as unneighbourly), poor engagement with mitigation, and delay as factors weighing strongly against a stay.
- The Plaintiffs accepted the Defendant's undertaking as to interest on damages but maintained that this did not address the non-compensable harm of ongoing nuisance to the resident Plaintiff.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Okunade v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] 3 IR 152 | The test and principles for the grant or refusal of a stay or interlocutory injunction (arguability, where greatest risk of injustice lies, adequacy of damages, weight to strength/weakness of the case). | The court applied Okunade as the governing test for the stay application and adopted its structured approach (arguability then balance of injustice), while recognising differences in private nuisance litigation. |
| Krikke v. Barranafaddock Sustainability Electricity Ltd [2020] IESC 42 | Guidance on applying Okunade in private as well as public law contexts and on weight to give to trial court judgments and public interest factors in stay applications. | The court considered Krikke's discussion of public law features, assessed its relevance, and distinguished aspects of Krikke from the present private nuisance case while drawing upon its principles on weighing injustice. |
| CC v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2016] 2 IR 680 | Confirmation that Okunade principles apply to all forms of temporary orders pending full hearing. | The court noted CC to support applying Okunade principles to the stay pending appeal in private litigation. |
| Hay v. O'Grady [1992] 1 IR 210 | Limits on revisiting trial facts on appeal (the basis on which facts found at trial may be revisited). | The court referenced Hay when considering how much weight to place on the strength of the intended appeal and the limited scope for overturning factual findings. |
| Redmond v. Ireland and the Attorney General [1992] 2 IR 362 | Permits consideration on stay applications of whether intended appellant raised an argument that trial findings are unsupported by credible evidence. | The court cited Redmond in assessing whether the Defendant challenged the credibility or sufficiency of evidence supporting the trial findings. |
| Smyth v. Railway Procurement Agency and anor [2010] IEHC 291 | Consideration of planning/statutory process (Line B orders) and when planning measures can be treated as indicative of acceptability/non-nuisance. | The Defendant relied on Smyth to argue Condition 15 should be equated to a planning-derived indicator; the court analysed factual differences in planning processes and concluded Smyth was not on all fours. |
| Donegal Investment Group Plc v Danbywiske [2017] IESC 14; [2017] 2 ILRM 1 | Assessment of expert testimony, importance of demeanour and oral hearing in evaluating experts. | The court relied on Donegal Investment to support its assessment of the expert evidence and its advantage from observing experts at trial. |
| James Elliot Construction Ltd v. Irish Asphalt Ltd [2011] IEHC 269 | Importance of expert's ability to consider opposing views and relevance of demeanour in assessing expert evidence. | The court cited this authority when explaining why trial assessment of experts (including demeanour) limits appellate interference. |
| Duffy v. McGee [2022] IECA 254 | Appellate deference to trial judge findings where expert is found to be partisan and exclusion of partisan expert evidence. | The court referenced Duffy to underline deference to trial judge findings regarding expert partisanship and weight to be given to such assessments. |
| Byrne and Moorhead v. ABO [2025] IEHC 330 | Authority on granting permanent injunctions for WTN nuisance and that assessment of WTN is not limited to loudness alone. | The court treated Byrne and Moorhead as supportive of its remedial conclusions in Module 2 and for the proposition that multiple noise characteristics are relevant. |
| Fearn v. Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery [2023] UKSC 4 | Concept of reciprocity/reciprocal neighbourliness in considering whether damages rather than injunction ought to be permitted. | The court cited Fearn regarding the relevance of neighbourliness/reciprocity when weighing whether an injunction should be stayed or replaced by damages. |
| Hunter v. Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655 | General nuisance authority (cited by the Defendant in submissions on locus/related issues). | The court noted Hunter as one of the authorities the Defendant intended to rely upon in challenging locus and other legal points. |
| Lanigan & ors v. Barry & ors [2008] IEHC 29 | Authority referenced in relation to character of the locality and nuisance analysis. | The court recorded the Defendant's intention to rely on Lanigan but found the Defendant did not explain how it was misapplied. |
| Colls v. Home and Colonial Store Ltd [1904] AC 179 | Historic authority relevant to assessing whether a defendant has acted in a neighbourly spirit when damages are offered instead of injunction. | Referenced in the context of the neighbourliness/reciprocity principle when weighing the balance of justice. |
| Lawrence & Anor v Fen Tigers Ltd & Ors [2014] 2 AER 622 | Authority cited on the court's power to consider defendant's conduct in nuisance cases and whether damages suffice in lieu of injunction. | Used to support the proposition that a court may consider defendant conduct when deciding on staying an injunction. |
| Star Elm Frames Limited v. Fitzpatrick [2016] IECA 234 | Noted in relation to whether a successful appeal would be practically meaningful. | Referenced to support consideration of practical consequences of granting/refusing a stay. |
| B & S Ltd v. Irish Auto Trader Ltd [1995] 2 IR 142 | Presumption to preserve the status quo where matters are equally balanced. | The court noted the status-quo principle but gave it limited weight in the present context. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court applied the Okunade framework (arguability then balancing where greatest risk of injustice lies), having regard to authority such as Krikke and CC which confirm the test applies across contexts. The court analysed:
- Arguability/stateability: The Defendant had identified many grounds but provided formulaic pleadings and limited focused argument; the threshold for arguability is low and the court found arguable (albeit not strong) grounds, with core points concentrated on whether planning Condition 15 is a "wholly reliable indicator" or sets a decibel threshold and on expert evidence disputes.
- Adequacy of damages for the Defendant: The court accepted the Defendant would suffer irrecoverable financial loss (estimated reduction in revenue) and that damages could not fully compensate that loss, but also balanced the risk of the Defendant accruing windfall profits if a stay were granted and the appeal later failed.
- Adequacy of damages for the Plaintiffs: The court found damages inadequate for the principal resident Plaintiff (serious ongoing intrusion into home life and progressive worsening), so an injunction cannot be substituted by damages for that Plaintiff.
- Balance factors: The court gave weight to Defendant's conduct (described as unneighbourly), poor engagement with mitigation (trialled only one ineffective modification), delay and lack of clarity in prosecuting the appeal, the long duration of the nuisance, and the modest strength of the Defendant's appeal. These factors collectively indicated greater risk of injustice if the injunction were stayed.
- Remedial calibration: To minimise injustice, the court stayed payment of damages and the costs order (with interest undertaking from Defendant) but refused to stay the injunction, leaving the injunctive remedy operational pending appeal.
Holding and Implications
STAY GRANTED IN PART; PAYMENT OF DAMAGES AND COSTS STAYED; INJUNCTION REMAINS IN FORCE (NO STAY)
Direct effects:
- The Defendant's application for a stay was granted only insofar as payment of the awarded damages to the Plaintiffs and the court's order for costs are stayed pending appeal, on the Defendant's undertaking to pay interest on the awards should its appeal fail.
- The court refused to stay the injunction restraining operation of turbine T2; the injunction remains in effect pending the appeal.
Implications:
- The principal resident Plaintiff remains protected by the injunction (the court found damages inadequate for that Plaintiff), so ongoing nuisance must be abated during the appeal.
- The Defendant avoids immediate payment of damages/costs subject to the interest undertaking, but faces continued operational restrictions and the risk that an appellate court may alter findings; the court found the Defendant's grounds arguable but not strong.
- The decision is narrowly tailored to the facts and balance of injustice in this case; the court did not purport to set a general new precedent beyond applying established principles (Okunade, Krikke, etc.).
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