Van Buuren v Cambridgeshire Constabulary & Ors

Factual and Procedural Background

On 28 August 2013 the Plaintiff was seriously injured after falling or being knocked off his bicycle in The Town. He lost consciousness for over 30 minutes and later underwent a splenectomy. Two police officers (Officer A and Officer B) from Company A attended the scene. A subsequent collision report prepared by Officer A concluded that the Plaintiff had fallen from his bicycle and that no one had witnessed the accident, despite the presence of six persons at the scene after the accident.

Of those present, one (Witness A) later told the Plaintiff (in January 2017) that she and at least one of her children had seen the accident, that the car behind the Plaintiff had "clipped" him causing the fall, that she had told the police at the scene what she had seen (including upon returning later), and that the police had not taken a witness statement from her.

Before meeting Witness A the Plaintiff had received: (i) a letter dated 15 October 2013 from the Process and Collisions Unit (on behalf of Company A, Company B and Company C) stating that "[a]ll of the available evidence" had been reviewed and no further police action would be taken; (ii) the rejection of a complaint to the predecessor of Company D, with an upheld appeal against that rejection; and (iii) redacted collision reports including an unsigned witness statement purportedly from Witness B (the driver immediately behind the Plaintiff), which attributed the accident to loose gravel and stated that Witness A "did not witness the accident".

The Plaintiff alleged that Company A deliberately falsified the record to conceal a collision between the car and his bicycle and that subsequent actions by Company A, Company B, Company C and Company D knowingly continued to conceal the truth. Proceedings were struck out in part by the first-instance judge; the Plaintiff appealed. Company A also appealed against the refusal to strike out the entire claim against it. At the hearing Company A (and the other constabularies) conceded part of the Plaintiff's appeal, consenting to the reinstatement of most claims so they can be tried; Company D also agreed to reinstatement. The Court of Appeal addressed, in particular, whether summary judgment or strike-out of the defence should be granted and the future conduct of the litigation.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Why none of the defendants contacted Witness A to obtain her account: (a) immediately after the accident, (b) during the Plaintiff's complaint under the Police Reform Act, (c) on appeal to Company D, or (d) after the Plaintiff informed them that Witness A had witnessed the car clip him.
2. What substantive defences the defendants have to the tort of misfeasance in public office (in particular, whether the defendants can rebut allegations of deliberate falsification and/or untargeted malice).
3. Why the defendants produced exiguous and redacted documentation and whether further documentation should be admitted for the appeals and trial.
4. Whether summary judgment should be granted in favour of the Plaintiff and whether the defence of the Constabularies should be struck out.
5. Whether the limitation defence under section 11 and the discretion in section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 affects the viability of the Plaintiff's claims.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The failure to take statements from available witnesses (in particular Witness A) and the apparent falsification of records (including the unsigned statement attributed to Witness B) demonstrate deliberate concealment amounting at least to untargeted malice and misfeasance in public office.
• Because the defendants have offered no substantive explanation over 13 years, it is now too late for a fair investigation and trial; summary judgment for damages assessed should have been granted.
• The defendants' conduct caused or exacerbated his psychiatric injury and PTSD (submitted without medical evidence).

Defendants' Position

• The three Constabularies provided a high-level explanation of the investigative process and otherwise denied the claim; their pleaded defence was described as exiguous but constituted a denial rather than an improper position.
• Company D filed no defence prior to the hearing and did not explain why it had not taken further witness evidence on appeal.
• At the hearing Company A (and the partner constabularies) withdrew their separate appeal and consented to the reinstatement of most of the Plaintiff's claims so that all issues can be tried; they did not, however, concede the Plaintiff's summary judgment or strike-out applications.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the matter against the established elements of misfeasance in public office. It identified triable issues: the absence of witness inquiries (notably to Witness A) despite records suggesting her presence; the reliance on an unsigned, potentially self‑serving statement attributed to Witness B; and the defendants' failure to provide first‑hand evidence or fuller disclosure.

The court emphasised three principal strands of analysis relevant to whether summary judgment or strike out was appropriate: (i) limitation and the section 33 discretion of the Limitation Act 1980—requiring evidence about delay and prejudice to both sides; (ii) the malice question—whether deliberate falsification and a subsequent cover‑up (untargeted malice) could be established once disclosure and witness evidence were obtained; and (iii) causation of the Plaintiff's psychiatric injury—which the court noted would likely require medical evidence.

The court concluded that, on the material before it, there were real triable issues that could not properly be resolved on summary judgment or strike out. Although the defendants' pleadings were sparse, they were not so deficient as to have "no real prospect" of defence. The court therefore refused to grant summary judgment or to strike out the defence, observing that disclosure and witness evidence might provide reasonable explanations for the investigative steps taken.

Procedurally, given the history of delay, the court directed expedited case management: pleadings should be clarified and amended after disclosure, Company D must serve a defence, and the case should be listed before a High Court judge for detailed directions within 28 days with an express wish for trial, if possible, before the end of 2026.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is partly allowed by consent and partly dismissed. The court accepted the defendants' concessions to withdraw their appeal and consent to reinstatement of most of the Plaintiff's claims so that all issues can be tried; it reversed the first-instance costs order against the Plaintiff. The court dismissed the Plaintiff's remaining appeal points seeking summary judgment and strike-out of the defence of the first three defendants.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Plaintiff's claims (including the central misfeasance allegation against Company A and related claims against Company B, Company C and Company D) will proceed to trial. No summary determination of liability or damages was made, no defence was struck out, and no new precedent was established by this procedural ruling. The court ordered expedited case management steps (disclosure, amended pleadings, service of defence by Company D, and a hearing before a High Court judge within 28 days) and expressed a wish that the trial take place, if practicable, before the end of 2026.