McGreal v Concannon and Anor, McGreal v Court Service Executive and Ors [No. 2] (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment, delivered by Judge Cregan on 11 March 2026, is the second in two related sets of proceedings brought by the Plaintiff. The first set (record no. 2024/6852P) (the "Concannon proceedings") is against the First Defendant and the Second Defendant. The second set (record no. 2024/6645P) (the "Courts Service proceedings") is against various Courts Service staff, the Commissioner of the police force and individual police officers.

The dispute began when Central Office officials refused to issue plenary summonses without payment of stamp duty. The Plaintiff protested, attended the Central Office on multiple dates, and on 14 October 2024 attended with approximately 25–30 supporters and was refused entry; police attended. The Plaintiff issued both sets of proceedings, argued ex parte for issuance without stamp duty (an October 2024 ex parte order was made subject to defendants' later challenge), and subsequently issued plenary summonses in each set. The Court previously determined that stamp duty was payable for the first set but not for the second set. The current judgment addresses the Plaintiff's challenges to appearances entered on behalf of defendants in both sets and applications to strike out the proceedings as an abuse of process or for lack of jurisdiction.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether appearances entered on behalf of defendants in both sets of proceedings were lawfully entered under Order 12 of the Rules of the Superior Courts.
2. Whether the defendants were entitled to state-funded legal representation (including representation by the Chief State Solicitor's Office or a firm acting for the Courts Service) where the alleged wrongdoing was said by the Plaintiff to be outside the scope of statutory duties.
3. Whether the first set of proceedings should be struck out for lack of jurisdiction as effectively amounting to an appeal from a County Registrar's decision.
4. Whether the first and/or second sets of proceedings should be struck out as an abuse of process, given the Plaintiff's conduct and pattern of litigation.
5. Whether a firm organised as an LLP may lawfully enter an appearance (i.e. whether a firm name suffices under Order 12).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The appearances entered on behalf of various defendants were unlawful because those defendants were acting outside the scope of their statutory duties, and therefore not entitled to state-funded representation.
• The Chief State Solicitor's Office (Company A) lacked power to enter appearances for the First and Second Defendants when alleged actions fell outside statutory duties.
• A law firm organised as an LLP (Company B) could not validly enter an appearance because the name of an individual solicitor, not a firm or LLP, must appear under Order 12 rule 3.
• The Plaintiff sought orders removing state-funded representation and directing Company A and Company B to cease representing specified defendants, asserting Article 11 of the Constitution precluded funding in the alleged circumstances.

Defendants' Arguments

• Defendants (and their legal representatives) submitted that the appearances were lawfully entered in accordance with Order 12 and associated rules; a memorandum of appearance may record the name of the firm and the firm (including an LLP) may validly enter an appearance.
• Defendants asserted the alleged acts complained of were within the scope of employment; vicarious liability principles applied and the appropriate defendant in many cases was Company C (the Courts Service) or the Commissioner entity.
• Company C and the Commissioner confirmed vicarious liability and, where appropriate, offered substitution of the institutional defendant for individual employees.
• Defendants relied upon prior authorities and statutory interpretation (Order 125, Interpretation Act 2005, Solicitors Act provisions) to show singular/plural drafting and definition of "solicitor" permit firm names on appearances.
• Defendants relied on affidavit evidence describing the Plaintiff's conduct at Central Office attendances and social media posts to oppose the Plaintiff's applications and to support findings of abusive conduct.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the validity of appearances by reference to Order 12 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (rules 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 10) and the interpretation provisions (Order 125, Interpretation Act 2005). The court emphasised that an appearance may be entered by a defendant's solicitor and the memorandum must contain the name of the defendant's solicitor; the court interpreted "solicitor" to include firms and plural forms under the relevant interpretation rules and statutory definitions (Solicitors Act). The court relied on Killeen v. Higgins to confirm that a firm or LLP may be recorded as the defendant's solicitor and may validly enter an appearance.

The court examined the Plaintiff's pleadings and affidavits to determine whether the alleged acts fell within the course of employment. On the face of the Plaintiff's own pleadings, acts complained of in the first set arose from functions performed by the First Defendant as County Registrar and acts by the Second Defendant in her role with Company A; those acts were within the scope of employment. In the second set, the court accepted affidavit evidence that the Courts Service employees' and police officers' actions arose in the ordinary course of employment and that Company C and the Commissioner accepted vicarious liability and offered substitution where appropriate.

The court rejected the Plaintiff's argument that Company A lacked power to enter appearances and rejected the contention that Company B (an LLP) could not enter an appearance. The court found those arguments legally unsustainable.

On procedural competence and jurisdiction, the court analysed the history of the Circuit Court Election Civil Bill and the Plaintiff's failure to appeal a County Registrar decision by the correct route. Applying Promontoria (Field) DAC v. Brendan Mahon, the court concluded the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain proceedings that were in substance a collateral appeal from a County Registrar's order.

The court evaluated the Plaintiff's conduct (social media postings, assembling supporters, threats to arrest officials and attempts to arrest judicial officers and solicitors) and affidavit evidence describing disruption at Central Office. The court found a pattern of repetitive and abusive litigation, intimidation and interference with administration of justice. On that basis, the court concluded that the second set of proceedings constituted an abuse of process and were not bona fide.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING:

• The court held that the appearances entered on behalf of the defendants in both sets of proceedings were lawful and properly entered.
• The court held that the First Defendant and Second Defendant in the first set were acting within the scope of their employment and were entitled to representation by Company A.
• The court held that the Courts Service defendants, the police defendants and the Commissioner were acting within the course of their employment and were entitled to state-funded legal representation (by Company A or Company B as appointed by Company C).
• The court ordered that the Plaintiff's first set of proceedings be struck out for lack of jurisdiction and as an abuse of process (being, in substance, a collateral attack on a County Registrar's order).
• The court determined that the Plaintiff's second set of proceedings should be struck out as an abuse of process.

Implications: The direct effect is that the appearances challenged are validated and the two sets of proceedings brought by the Plaintiff will be struck out on the grounds stated. The court indicated it will consider further orders: (i) a restraining order preventing the Plaintiff from threatening or attempting to arrest Court officials or solicitors; (ii) an Isaac Wunder (litigation restriction) order limiting the Plaintiff's ability to institute further proceedings against Company C and the police without prior leave; (iii) referrals to regulatory or prosecutorial bodies concerning the Plaintiff's activities as a purported legal adviser and private prosecutor. The court adjourned for two weeks to permit steps (including applications from Company C and affidavits) and stated that final striking-out orders and costs orders will follow once those matters are resolved.