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Munemo v City of Wolverhampton Council
Factual and Procedural Background
In 2011 the Appellant was granted a sole secure tenancy of Flat [Number] in The City. In January 2020, while still tenant of Flat [Number], the Appellant applied to Company A for homelessness assistance but omitted to disclose that tenancy and declared (incorrectly) that she had never been a council tenant. Company A subsequently granted the Appellant an introductory tenancy of a house at [Number] Thompson Avenue, which matured into a secure tenancy in due course. In 2021 Company A discovered the Appellant held two council tenancies, served notice seeking termination and possession of [Number] Thompson Avenue on Grounds 1 and 5 of Schedule 2 to the 1985 Act, and obtained a possession order after the Appellant did not attend the possession trial. The Appellant was evicted on 21 March 2023.
After eviction the Appellant reapplied to Company A for homelessness assistance. On 15 September 2023 Company A decided she was homeless, eligible and in priority need but intentionally homeless from [Number] Thompson Avenue. The Appellant sought review; after interlocutory steps a review decision was issued on 11 July 2024 which upheld the intentional homelessness finding. The Appellant appealed under section 204. At a hearing before Judge Grimshaw the County Court quashed the 11 July 2024 review decision. Company A appealed to this court.
Legal Issues Presented
- How is section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996 to be applied where an applicant obtained a tenancy by deception and was later evicted—specifically, (v) whether the accommodation was available for occupation and (vi) whether it would have been reasonable for the applicant to continue to occupy it, and at what point in time those questions are to be answered.
- What significance should be attached, when answering questions (v) and (vi), to the applicant's causative deliberate act or omission (the deception) that led to the loss of accommodation?
- Whether the County Court erred in quashing Company A's review decision for failing to address Chishimba and Gliddon (i.e. whether those authorities required Company A to conclude the accommodation was not reasonable to occupy because the tenancy was obtained by deception).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Appellant argued (as a new ground in amended grounds) that Company A misdirected itself in law by finding she was intentionally homeless because [Number] Thompson Avenue was "reasonable for her continued occupation" despite the tenancy having been obtained by deception.
- She relied principally on Chishimba (and Gliddon) to say that where the tenancy was obtained by deception and the applicant never had a lawful right to occupy, it would not have been reasonable to continue to occupy that accommodation.
Company A's Arguments
- Company A contended the County Court was wrong to apply Chishimba: the Appellant had at all material times a secure tenancy (not merely a non-secure licence), and the possession order was obtained under Ground 5 after proof of inducement; that distinction meant Chishimba did not govern.
- Company A relied on evidence (Attorney Walker's witness statement) that, absent the misrepresentation, there was no basis to conclude Thompson Avenue was not available or not reasonable to occupy; Company A maintained its review decision was adequately reasoned.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Islington LBC v Uckac [2006] EWCA Civ 340, [2006] 1 WLR 1303 | Secure tenancy obtained by fraud is not void; landlord must use statutory possession route. | Referred to establish that a secure tenancy remains effective until possession order executed, even if obtained by deception. |
| Lewisham LBC v Akinsola (1999) 32 HLR 414 | Requirement of reasonableness when making possession orders under Schedule 2 Part 1. | Cited to underline that courts exercise broad discretion and consider circumstances at hearing date. |
| Cumming v Danson [1942] 2 All ER 653 | Principle concerning reasonableness in possession context. | Supported the proposition that reasonableness is a relevant judicial consideration. |
| LB Southwark v Erekin [2003] EWHC 1765 (Ch) | Example where possession order not justified due to children's needs despite tenant's fraud. | Used to illustrate that possession may be refused even where application was fraudulent, because of broader family circumstances. |
| Waltham Forest LBC v Roberts [2004] EWCA Civ 940 | Inducement for Ground 5: false statement material to housing decision suffices. | Cited to show landlord need only prove statement had a real and substantial part in inducing grant of tenancy. |
| Dyson v Kerrier [1980] 1 WLR 1205 | Deliberate act or omission may be in the antecedent history; timing of causative act. | Applied to show past acts can satisfy the deliberate-act elements of s191. |
| Watchman v Ipswich BC [2007] EWCA Civ 348, [2007] HLR 33 | Authority on timing and causation under s191. | Referenced in support of antecedent-history approach to deliberate acts. |
| Haile v Waltham Forest LBC [2015] UKSC 34, [2015] AC 1471 | Affirmed that availability and reasonableness are to be considered as at time applicant ceased to occupy; assessing continuing causal connection. | Used to explain that questions (v) and (vi) are generally assessed at the moment of cessation, but relevant facts before and after may be considered. |
| Din (Taj) v Wandsworth LBC [1983] 1 AC 657 | House of Lords held availability and reasonableness are to be considered at time of cessation of occupation. | Cited as supporting the timing rule for questions (v) and (vi). |
| LB v Tower Hamlets LBC [2020] EWCA Civ 439 | Consideration of domestic-violence risk and relation to timing of assessment under s191 and s177. | Interpreted to permit consideration of facts up to review date, not limited to single moment. |
| Denton v Southwark LBC [2008] HLR 161 | Approach that reasonableness should be determined ignoring the applicant's deliberate acts that caused loss of accommodation. | Adopted and applied: Court treated Denton as the correct approach to exclude the applicant's own culpable acts when assessing reasonableness. |
| R v Exeter City Council ex p Gliddon [1985] 1 All ER 493 | Where accommodation was obtained by deception and landlord requires surrender, it is normally unreasonable to continue to occupy against landlord's wishes. | Discussed and distinguished: court held Gliddon overbroad when applied to secure-tenancy cases. |
| R v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC, Ex p. P (1990) 22 HLR 21 | Temporal approach: reasonableness refers to a time before the acts causing loss of accommodation. | Used as authority for assessing reasonableness at a time before the deliberate acts. |
| Mohammed v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [2001] UKHL 57 | Reviewing officer may consider information arising after initial decision up to the review date. | Cited to show review decisions are not limited to material before the original decision and may include later-obtained facts. |
| Chishimba v Kensington & Chelsea RLBC [2013] EWCA Civ 786, [2013] HLR 34 | Held that where applicant never had lawful right to occupy (because of initial ineligibility induced by deception), it would not have been reasonable to continue to occupy. | Cited by Appellant; this court distinguished Chishimba on facts (secure tenancy and possession obtained under Ground 5) and declined to extend its principle to the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court adopted the six-question framework (i–vi) for s191(1). It accepted that questions (i)–(iv) were satisfied: the Appellant deliberately misrepresented facts, that inducement satisfied Ground 5, and the possession proceedings caused the cessation of occupation.
The disputed issues were (v) whether the accommodation was available and (vi) whether it would have been reasonable to continue to occupy it, and two subsidiary questions: (A) the temporal point at which (v) and (vi) are to be assessed, and (B) the weight to be given to the applicant's causative deceptive act when answering them.
The court surveyed authority: Din (and Haile) support assessing availability/reasonableness at the time of cessation, but subsequent authorities (Denton, ex p. P, LB v Tower Hamlets, Mohammed) demonstrate the assessment may consider facts before and after that moment and that the applicant's own culpable act should generally be excluded from the reasonableness inquiry (the Denton approach).
The court distinguished Chishimba and Gliddon from the present facts on two fundamental grounds: (1) in Chishimba the applicant never had any entitlement to assistance (initial ineligibility) and only held a non-secure tenancy which the authority could terminate; (2) by contrast the Appellant here had a secure tenancy at all material times until execution of the possession order and Company A relied on Ground 5 and inducement rather than a contention of ineligibility for assistance.
Applying Denton (excluding the Appellant's own deceptive act from the assessment), the court concluded there was no basis—on the evidence before Company A and the reviewing officer—to say the property was not available or unreasonable to occupy. The court held it would be inappropriate to extend Chishimba/Gliddon to cases where a tenant held a secure tenancy subsequently ended via Ground 5 possession proceedings, because that would undermine s191's statutory purpose and discourage the statutory sanction for obtaining accommodation by deception.
On procedural issues the court found Attorney Walker's witness statement admissible and sufficient to address the new point raised by the Appellant; the County Court's quashing of the review decision was therefore unsustainable.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED
Disposition: The court allowed Company A's appeal on both grounds and would restore Company A's review decision of 11 July 2024.
Implications: The direct effect is that the reviewing officer's decision upholding the original finding that the Appellant was intentionally homeless is restored. The court expressly refused to extend Chishimba/Gliddon to cases involving secure tenancies terminated via Ground 5 inducement; no broader new precedent beyond the application to these facts was asserted.
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