Summary of Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant is the local planning authority for the area containing The Hotel. The Defendant is the freehold owner of The Hotel. The Hotel lies within the Metropolitan Green Belt and a conservation area in The City and has been used at various times to provide accommodation for asylum seekers under contracts with service providers. The Secretary of State (first intervener) has statutory duties to provide accommodation for asylum seekers; Company A (second intervener) is one of the Home Office service providers; Company B contracted with the Defendant in 2025 for exclusive use of The Hotel for that purpose.

The Appellant alleged that the use of The Hotel to accommodate asylum seekers amounted to a material change of use from a lawful hotel use and therefore a breach of planning control under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (TCPA 1990), and applied for an injunction under s.187B of the TCPA 1990 and a declaration that the current use was not a hotel.

The Appellant issued claim proceedings on 11 August 2025 and obtained an interim injunction from Judge Eyre, later discharged by the Court of Appeal which also ordered joinder of the Secretary of State. Judge Mould heard the final trial (13–15 October 2025) and dismissed the Appellant's claim on 11 November 2025, making costs orders in favour of the Defendant and the Secretary of State, and ordering a payment on account. The Appellant's application for permission to appeal to this court was refused by the court giving this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the use of The Hotel to accommodate asylum seekers involved a material change of use from its lawful use as a hotel such as to constitute a breach of planning control under the TCPA 1990.
2. Whether an injunction under s.187B TCPA 1990 was appropriate (i.e. whether it was necessary or expedient and whether an injunction would be a commensurate remedy).
3. Whether the judge erred in making costs orders in favour of the Secretary of State (first intervener) and in ordering a payment on account to the Defendant.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The use of The Hotel to accommodate asylum seekers is a material change of use from a hotel and therefore development requiring planning permission.
• The Appellant needed injunctive relief under s.187B to restrain the alleged breach rather than using conventional enforcement routes (enforcement notice and s.174 appeal).
• The judge erred in not determining the primary question whether a breach had occurred and misapplied legal principles and evidence when refusing the injunction.
• The judge erred in the costs orders: (a) awarding the Secretary of State her costs on a mistaken legal basis; and (b) ordering a payment on account to the Defendant without procedural fairness and in respect of sums (including VAT and items previously ordered) which should not have been included.

Defendant's Arguments

• The use of The Hotel to accommodate asylum seekers did not involve a material change of use from its lawful use as a hotel and so no breach of planning control occurred.
• If enforcement action were appropriate, the conventional route (enforcement notice and appeal) was the correct forum, allowing a planning inspector to determine the factual and planning issues.
• There was no justification for an injunction under s.187B; the balance of harm and public interest (including the need to accommodate asylum seekers) weighed against injunctive relief.

Entity A (Secretary of State) and Company A (service provider) Arguments

• Entity A emphasised her statutory duties to provide accommodation for asylum seekers and the hardship and practical consequences that an injunction would have on those duties and on occupants; Entity A should be joined and was entitled to separate representation.
• Company A supported the view that injunctive relief was unjustified and that the public-interest implications of the accommodation need were material to the balancing exercise under s.187B.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
South Bucks District Council v Porter (No.1) [2003] UKHL 26; [2003] 2 AC 558	Leading authority on s.187B injunctions: scope of court's discretion, deference to LPA's decision to apply, consideration of seriousness/flags such as flagrancy, and appropriate balancing of harm.	The court and the judge applied South Bucks as the primary framework for deciding whether an injunction was appropriate, explaining that the court should not re‑assess the LPA's planning judgment but may consider factors that weighed with the authority; the judge followed its principles in his analysis of harm and proportionality.
South Bucks District Council v Porter (No.1) [2003] EWCA Civ 1549; [2002] 1 WLR 1359 (Simon Brown LJ)	Earlier Court of Appeal reasoning on issues relevant to s.187B and the hotel/hostel distinction.	Referenced by the High Court and treated as supporting authorities on the fine distinction between hotel and hostel uses and on the approach to injunction applications.
West Midlands Probation Committee v Secretary of State for the Environment (1998) 76 P & CR 589	Principles on attributing fears of crime to a land use vs behaviour of individuals.	The judge applied West Midlands to conclude that fears of crime were not shown to arise from the land use of accommodating asylum seekers generally, but from the conduct of particular individuals; this reduced the weight of crime-related harm relied upon by the Appellant.
Messier-Dowty Limited v Sabena SA [2000] 1 WLR 2040	Whether a declaratory remedy would "serve a useful purpose" as a matter of judicial discretion.	The court applied the Messier-Dowty test in refusing to make a declaration on the material change of use, concluding that a declaration would usurp functions properly allocated to LPAs and planning inspectors and would not serve a useful purpose here.
Great Yarmouth Borough Council v Al-Abdin [2022] EWHC 3476 (KB)	Authority regarding enforcement action and locationally specific development control policy considerations.	The judge compared the present facts with Great Yarmouth, finding the Appellant's position distinguishable and that the use here was not flagrant as in that authority.
Bolton Metropolitan District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 WLR 1176	Principles on costs where there is multiple representation: normally not more than one set of costs unless justified by separate interests/issues.	The judge applied Bolton in awarding costs to Entity A, finding that Entity A had a separate interest requiring separate representation and had raised distinct issues justifying her costs.
Bechtel Ltd High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Limited [2021] EWHC 640 (TCC)	Guidance on when an intervener's costs may be recoverable where interests overlap.	Referenced by the Appellant on costs; the court distinguished that authority and upheld the judge's exercise of discretion to award Entity A costs given the separate interests and participation.
Betta Oceanway Company of SC Tomini Trading SRL v Georgios Vatistas [2025] EWCA Civ 595	Interpretation of CPR r.19.2(2) on joinder of parties.	The Court of Appeal's prior application of Betta Oceanway supported joinder of Entity A; the appellate court relied on that reasoning in assessing the judge's decision to award Entity A costs.
Westminster City Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWCA Civ 482; [2015] JPL 1276	Principles on distinguishing hotel and hostel uses.	Used by the judge in assessing the factual/character distinctions between hotel and hostel use and in concluding that the distinction is fine and fact-sensitive.
Ipswich Borough Council v Fairview Hotels (Ipswich) Limited [2022] EWHC 2868 (KB); [2023] JPL 630	Case discussing relevant factors in distinguishing hotel and hostel uses and the court's approach to injunctions.	The judge relied on Ipswich as a comparable authority identifying factors that may point to a material change of use; Mr Stubbs' analysis was noted to have parallels with factors identified in Ipswich.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court (appeal judges) reviewed Judge Mould's comprehensive judgment and addressed each ground of the proposed appeal. The appellate court accepted that the High Court correctly identified and applied the legal framework in South Bucks for s.187B injunctions and related authorities on the hotel/hostel distinction. The court summarised Judge Mould's findings:

• Procedural and evidential background: Judge Mould found that the Appellant's delegated decision to apply for an injunction lacked an adequate contemporaneous record and pre-action correspondence, a serious procedural error causing prejudice.
• Threshold/breach: Judge Mould accepted that the Appellant had at least a reasonable basis to allege a material change of use for the purpose of considering an injunction, but did not find it necessary to make a definitive factual finding on breach when refusing injunctive relief.
• Assessment of harm: The judge conducted a detailed harm assessment (visual impact of fencing, conservation area effects, local amenity, pressure on services, crime fears, protests) and applied West Midlands on crime fears, concluding fears arose from individual behaviour not the use generally. He treated the protests carefully and concluded they did not justify injunctive relief.
• Countervailing public-interest factors: The judge gave significant weight to Entity A's evidence about the ongoing practical need for temporary hotel accommodation to meet statutory duties to asylum seekers; he also gave some weight to the adverse impact on the Defendant's investment prospects if the income stream were removed.
• Proportionality and remedy: Balancing harm and countervailing factors, Judge Mould concluded an injunction under s.187B would not be a commensurate remedy; the alleged breach was not flagrant, conventional enforcement steps remained open, and a declaration would not serve a useful purpose.
• Costs: The judge applied Bolton and related principles to award Entity A her costs, finding Entity A had a separate interest requiring separate representation; he also ordered a payment on account to the Defendant after considering submissions and the late costs schedule, leaving detailed assessment issues open.

The appellate court analysed each ground of appeal and concluded:

• Ground 1 (failure to determine breach): unarguable. The judge permissibly assumed the breach for the purposes of the injunction analysis and reasonably concluded a declaration was unnecessary; he had applied the correct tests.
• Ground 2 (discrete criticisms of the judge's reasoning): each sub-ground failed. The appellate court found no misapplication of principle, Wednesbury unreasonableness, or material misunderstanding of evidence. The judge's weighting of the need for accommodation and other factors was within discretion.
• Ground 3 (award of Entity A costs): unarguable. The judge correctly applied Bolton, having found Entity A had a separate interest, separately represented issues, and had provided material evidence; awarding costs was a proper exercise of discretion.
• Ground 4 (payment on account to Defendant and procedural fairness): unarguable. The court found no unfairness in the timing of the costs schedule or the award; adjustments and challenges remained available on detailed assessment and refund if excessive.
• No compelling reason existed to grant permission under the alternative limb for "some other compelling reason": the case did not raise novel points requiring appellate clarification beyond existing authorities and the factual distinction between hotel and hostel is inherently fact-specific.

Holding and Implications

PERMISSION TO APPEAL REFUSED

Consequences:

• The Appellant's application for permission to appeal the orders of Judge Mould (11 and 25 November 2025) is refused.
• The High Court judgment dismissing the Appellant's claim and the associated costs orders in favour of the Defendant and the Secretary of State remain in effect; the Appellant remains liable for the costs as ordered and for the payment on account ordered to the Defendant, subject to detailed assessment and any refund if excess is found.
• No novel legal principle or wider precedent was established by this decision; the court emphasised that the distinction between hotel and hostel use remains fact-sensitive and that s.187B injunctions are governed by established South Bucks principles.