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T.M. [Georgia] v The International Appeals Tribunal and Anor (Approved)
Summary of Judicial Review Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant, a national of The State, applied for international protection in The Host State. The Appellant alleged extensive stalking by an identified individual (the Perpetrator) beginning in 2018, reported the matter to local police with no effective remedy, relocated within The State and later to State B, and then to The Host State in June 2022. The International Protection Office (IPO) declined to recommend international protection on 7 December 2023, finding state protection available. The Appellant appealed to the Tribunal (Defendant 1). On 19 August 2024 the Tribunal issued the Decision affirming the IPO recommendation that the Appellant should not be granted refugee status or subsidiary protection, principally on the basis that COI showed The State now operated effective, non-temporary state protection (including police oversight). The Appellant obtained leave for judicial review on 15 November 2024. The matter was heard by Judge O'Donnell, who delivered judgment on 10 March 2026.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Tribunal failed to take account of the 2023 United States Department of State (USDOS) country report when assessing state protection.
- Whether the Tribunal's reliance on country-of-origin information (COI) was selective or unreasonable, producing an irrational conclusion about availability of effective state protection under section 31 of the International Protection Act 2015.
- Whether the Tribunal correctly identified and applied the legal test for state protection under section 31 of the 2015 Act.
- Whether the Tribunal unreasonably concluded there was effective independent oversight of the police in The State.
- Whether the Tribunal provided adequate reasons for its finding that state protection would be effective for the Appellant.
- Whether the Tribunal failed to give sufficient weight to section 28(6) of the 2015 Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Tribunal failed to consider the 2023 USDOS report (most up-to-date COI) and relied improperly on the 2022 report.
- The Tribunal's use of COI was selective and ignored material passages in the same reports that pointed to significant shortcomings in state responses to gender-based and sexual violence, including low enforcement on rape and persistent femicide rates.
- The Tribunal identified the correct test but failed to apply the section 31 test properly by conflating observed improvements with effective, non-temporary protection.
- The Tribunal erred in concluding there was effective independent police oversight sufficient to protect the Appellant.
- The Tribunal failed to give adequate reasons on why state protection would be effective in the Appellant's specific circumstances.
- The Tribunal did not give sufficient weight to section 28(6) of the 2015 Act.
Defendants' Arguments
- The Tribunal expressly stated it had considered all submitted materials (including the 2023 USDOS report) and the general statement should be accepted unless contrary evidence is shown (relying on the line of authority from GK to Rana).
- Even if the Tribunal emphasised the 2022 USDOS report in parts of the Decision, that did not demonstrate material difference warranting quashing; the Appellant had not shown a qualitative, comparative difference between 2022 and 2023 COI as required by authority such as A.S. v. IPAT.
- The burden is on the Appellant to demonstrate that state protection is not available; the Tribunal applied the correct legal test and reasonably concluded, on a mixed picture of COI, that reasonable steps had been taken in The State (including police oversight reforms) and that perfection is not required.
- The Tribunal did not act selectively nor irrationally in weighing COI and its reasoning was sufficient for the purposes of judicial review.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| B.C. v IPAT [2019] IEHC 763 | Breakdown of the elements of the section 31 test and that analysis must focus on the applicant's particular circumstances. | The Tribunal had referred to and the Court used the four-part test from B.C. as the correct framework for state protection analysis. |
| GK v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 418 | General proposition that a decision-maker's statement that materials were considered should be accepted absent evidence to the contrary. | The Court relied on this authority to accept the Tribunal's statement it had considered the 2023 USDOS report in the absence of evidence that it had not. |
| Rana v Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46 | Part of the line of authority supporting the principle that general statements of consideration of materials will be accepted unless contradicted. | Presented as part of the authority ranged from GK to Rana relied upon by Defendants to support the Court's view on material consideration. |
| A.S. v. IPAT [2025] IEHC 184 | Requirement of a qualitative comparative exercise to show a relevant and material difference between older and newer COI to ground a complaint. | The Court applied this principle to find the Appellant had not shown a material difference between the 2022 and 2023 USDOS reports sufficient to quash the Decision on that basis. |
| FM. & R.M. v. IPAT [2021] IEHC 817 | Critical exposition of errors where improvements were equated with effective protection and the need to ask if the state response reaches the threshold of effectiveness under s.31. | The Court drew analogy to Ferriter J.'s analysis to underscore that a finding of effort is not necessarily a finding of effectiveness; used to support the Court's conclusion that the Tribunal conflated improvements with effectiveness. |
| BD v IPAT [2024] IECA 186 | Observation that it is insufficient to say a state is making endeavours if those endeavours are ineffective. | Cited by the Appellant and relied on by the Court in assessing whether the Tribunal's emphasis on improvements sufficed to demonstrate effective protection. |
| Idiakheua v Minister for Justice [2005] IEHC 150 | Definition that state protection must be "reasonable protection in practical terms". | Referred to by the Appellant as articulating the standard to be applied when assessing state protection. |
| D.V.T.S. v Minister for Justice [2008] 3 IR 476 | Examples of quashing where Tribunal failed to recognise conflicting COI and did not explain how conflict was resolved. | The Court cited this case to illustrate the type of legal error (failing to address conflicting COI) that can render a Tribunal's conclusion unlawful. |
| B.A. v. IPAT [2020] IEHC 589 | Illustration where Tribunal's summary of COI was inconsistent with its positive finding of state protection, rendering that finding irrational. | Used as a comparative example showing how a Tribunal may err by reaching a conclusion not rationally supported by its own COI summary. |
| X.S. v. IPAT [2022] IEHC 100 | Authority that places the burden on an applicant to show state protection would not be available. | Relied on by Defendants to emphasise the Appellant's burden in challenging availability of state protection. |
| X.S. and J.T. v. IPAT and Minister for Justice and Equality [2022] IEHC 100 | Example of Tribunal lawfully preferring a specific COI report over more general sources where appropriate. | Cited as an example of a cogently reasoned Tribunal preference for specific COI material (CEDOCA report) that was open to the Tribunal. |
| W.P.L. and BP v. The Minister for Justice and Equality [2024] IEHC 184 | Confirmation that the test turns on the nature of measures put in place (reasonable steps) rather than success rates; state protection need not be perfect. | Relied on by Defendants and noted by the Court when discussing the Tribunal's proper focus on reasonable steps rather than perfection. |
| ES v IPAT [2022] IEHC 613 | Statement that State protection need not mean crime and corruption are completely or substantially under control. | Invoked by Defendants to support the proposition that imperfections in state response do not automatically negate availability of protection. |
| H.O. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal and Anor [2007] IEHC 299 | General principle that courts should not interfere with findings within the range of conclusions open to a properly directed Tribunal. | Referred to in support of the proposition that judicial review is not an opportunity to re-weigh COI where Tribunal's conclusion is lawfully open to it. |
| E.G. (Albania) v. IPAT and Anor [2019] IEHC 474 | Similar principle on deference to Tribunal findings within the range of reasonable conclusions. | Cited as part of the body of authority emphasizing the limited role of the court on judicial review. |
| E.D. (a minor) v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2017] 1 IR 325 | Authority illustrating limits on judicial intervention in Tribunal fact-finding. | Referenced as part of the jurisprudential context for judicial review restraint. |
| G.K. v IPAT [2022] IEHC 204 | Authority on adequacy of reasons and the extent of narrative required in Tribunal decisions. | Used to explain the standard for reasons and to show that reasons need not be discursive but must engage core claims. |
| YY v Minister for Justice and Equality [2017] IESC 61 | Principle that an affected person and the court must be given sufficient information to understand the decision-maker's reasoning. | Referenced in relation to the adequacy of reasons provided by the Tribunal. |
| Middelkamp v Minister for Justice and Equality [2023] IESC 2 | Authority on the requirement for clarity in the decision-maker's reasoning. | Invoked alongside YY to support the Court's assessment that the Tribunal's reasons were sufficiently clear. |
| MG (Georgia) v. IPAT [2026] IEHC 151 | Recent, related High Court judgment addressing state protection in the context of gender-based violence. | The Court noted overlap between issues in that judgment and adopted some observations made there (including treatment of W.S.) as applicable. |
| W.S. v. Intervyuirasht organ na Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite pri Ministerskia savet C-621/21, ECLI:EU:C:2024:47 | CJEU decision addressing the significance to be attached to domestic or gender-based violence in protection claims. | The Court adopted and relied upon the undoubted general importance of the W.S. decision in its assessment of gender-based violence issues before the Tribunal. |
| R (Atkinson) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] all England Reports (D) 14 | English authority quoted on the point that doing one's "incompetent best" is not a legal answer where protection falls below required standard. | Quoted in the opinion (via Ferriter J.) to support the principle that inadequate efforts do not equate to effective protection. |
| D.V.T.S. v. RAT | Referenced in the judgment as an instance of selectivity of COI being criticised. | The Court stated it was not persuaded the Tribunal engaged in selectivity of the kind criticised in D.V.T.S. v. RAT, relying on that authority as a contrast. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began from the uncontested factual findings: the Tribunal accepted the Appellant's account as credible, found a well-founded fear of persecution and that the Appellant was a member of a particular social group (women who suffer gender-based violence). The Tribunal and IPO both accepted those facts but concluded state protection in The State was effective and accessible.
The Court addressed each principal contention. On the alleged failure to consider the 2023 USDOS report, the Court accepted the Tribunal's express statement that it had considered all documents (including the 2023 report) and relied on the line of authority from GK to Rana; alternatively, the Court held that the Appellant had not presented the requisite comparative evidence (per A.S.) to show a material difference between the 2022 and 2023 reports that would have altered the outcome.
The central analytical focus was the Tribunal's treatment of COI in assessing state protection under section 31 of the 2015 Act. The Tribunal described COI as presenting a "mixed picture" and relied on material pointing to improvements, including establishment of police oversight (Special Investigation Service), concluding that effective, non-temporary protection existed. The Court reviewed authorities explaining when a Tribunal's COI appraisal will be unlawful (e.g. D.V.T.S., B.A., F.M. & R.M.), and reiterated the proper standard of review: the Court must ensure the Tribunal's conclusion was lawfully open on a fair reading of the relevant COI, without substituting its own view.
The Court found error. Although the Tribunal correctly identified the statutory elements of s.31 (citing B.C.), it conflated observed improvements with the existence of effective state protection. The COI as summarised did not plainly support a finding that protection for gender-based violence (and specifically stalking) in The State met the threshold of effectiveness and non-temporariness required by s.31. The Tribunal's emphasis on improvements—without sufficiently demonstrating those improvements reached the required threshold—meant the conclusion that effective state protection was available did not flow rationally from the COI. The Court therefore concluded there were material errors in the Tribunal's treatment of COI and a misdirection in applying the s.31 test.
On the issue of police oversight, the Court found no error: the Tribunal traced post-2018 reforms and the establishment of the Special Investigation Service and there was no evidential basis to treat that oversight mechanism as ineffective; the Appellant could not succeed on that ground. On adequacy of reasons, the Court held the Tribunal provided sufficient explanation for the Decision, even if the ultimate legal application of COI was flawed.
Holding and Implications
The Tribunal's Decision dated 19 August 2024 is QUASHED and the Appellant's appeal from the IPO decision is REMITTED to a differently constituted Tribunal for reconsideration.
Consequences: The Tribunal's Decision has been quashed solely because the Court found material legal errors in the Tribunal's treatment of COI as it related to state protection under section 31 of the 2015 Act (conflating improvements with effectiveness and reaching a conclusion not rationally supported by the COI). The matter is remitted for rehearing by a differently constituted Tribunal. The Court made no finding that state protection is unavailable as a matter of final determination and did not purport to set a new general legal rule beyond applying existing authorities. The Court indicated a provisional view that costs be adjudicated in default of agreement and listed the matter for final orders on the date specified in the judgment.
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