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Rural Residents Wind Aware and Environmental Group and Ors v An Coimisiun Pleanala and Ors [II] [No. 2] (Approved)

High Court of Ireland
Mar 6, 2026
Smart Summary (Beta)

Summary of Judgment (Anonymised)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Applicants sought judicial review of a decision dated 10 September 2024 by the Planning Authority under s.146B of the Planning and Development Act 2000 to alter two turbines (T6 and T7) and associated infrastructure of an existing permitted wind farm. Company A (the Notice Party) requested the alterations on 7 June 2024, proposing relocations of circa 170m and 220m for T6 and T7 respectively, and associated ancillary works. The Planning Authority appointed an inspector, carried out a site inspection and decided the alterations were not material and made the alterations. Proceedings commenced on 4 November 2024. The litigation was modularised: Module I was heard 30 September–1 October 2025 (judgment delivered 6 November 2025); Module II was heard 13 February 2026 and judgment in this proceeding was delivered by Judge Humphreys on 6 March 2026. Certain challenges to the parent permission had previously been dismissed in related proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Planning Authority lawfully applied s.146B when deciding that the proposed alterations were not a material alteration to the permitted development.
  2. Whether the absence of public participation in the s.146B process rendered s.146B invalid where an Appropriate Assessment (AA) under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive (and EIA/Article 11) would be required.
  3. Whether the State (Minister/competent authority) failed to establish conservation objectives or measures for certain bird species (Gray Heron, Mallard, Golden Plover) in breach of the Birds and Habitats Directives and domestic regulations.
  4. The applicability of the doctrine of harmless error and whether any pleaded defects materially affected the outcome.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

  • Section 146B was invalid or misapplied because the Planning Authority purported to alter the substance of the permitted development without public participation and beyond its jurisdiction.
  • Failure to conduct or to allow public participation connected to an AA breached Article 6(3) Habitats Directive, Article 11 EIA Directive, the Charter and the Aarhus Convention.
  • The State failed to establish necessary conservation objectives/measures for Gray Heron and Mallard (River Nore SPA) and Golden Plover (River Barrow & River Nore SAC) contrary to SI No. 477/2011 and EU law (relying on C‑66/23 Elliniki Ornithologiki Etaireia).
  • Section 146B is incompatible with EU law because it does not guarantee public participation where AA is required.

State Respondents' Arguments

  • The Applicants failed to plead and prosecute core points in time and/or in previous proceedings; core complaints are inadequately pleaded and lack sufficient interest.
  • On the facts AA was not required in respect of the s.146B request; the Planning Authority lawfully screened out AA and acted within s.146B discretion.
  • Conservation objectives/measures for the relevant species were lawfully established or no obligation arose because the species did not meet the significance criteria for site-level protection.
  • The Applicants failed to adduce evidence displacing the Planning Authority's conclusion; pleading and evidential burdens were not met.

Planning Authority (Commission) Arguments

  • The Applicants' pleaded case did not establish that AA was required on the s.146B application; the prior finding that AA was not required remains decisive.
  • Section 146B confers discretion (s.146B(2)(b)) to invite submissions and can be interpreted conformingly with EU law; absence of express wording does not render it invalid.
  • Pleadings lack clarity as to what mandatory AA-triggered participation rights are alleged to have been omitted; the factual basis for AA was not established by the Applicants.

Company A (Notice Party) Arguments

  • Core grounds against the Planning Authority are inadequately pleaded and, on the facts, the s.146B application gave rise to no significant effects and AA was not required.
  • The Applicants seek declaratory relief only as against the State; the notice party's evidence establishes a lack of impact on the relied-on species.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Reilly v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 659 Described the eight-fold path to relief by judicial review. Used to frame tests (jurisdiction, pleading, onus, materiality, discretion) applicable to applicants seeking certiorari.
Foran v. An Coimisiún Pleanála & Glenveagh [2026] IEHC 23 Referenced on judicial review tests contextually with Reilly. Reinforced the eight-fold framework for relief in planning judicial review.
O'Sullivan v. Health Service Executive [2023] IESC 11 Draft-judgment procedure and limits on rearguing substance in response to drafts. Cited to explain court's draft judgment circulation practice and constraints on parties' comments.
O'Sullivan v. Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2017] IESC 75 Limits on equating different procedures with criminal-type processes; caution against over-formalism. Referred to support limits on parties' use of draft-judgment procedure.
Sweeney v. Fahy [2014] IESC 50 Judicial review concerns legality not merits. Applied to emphasise limits on substituting court's view for decision-taker's evaluative judgments.
State (Keegan) v. Stardust Compensation Tribunal [1986] I.R. 642 Judicial review is not an appeal on the merits. Cited to underline deference to administrative fact-finding.
Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3 Judicial review focuses on legality; onus of proof principles. Used in framing onus and limits of review.
R (Cart) v. Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28 Distinction between law and fact in judicial review. Cited to caution against treating factual disputes as pure law in review.
R (Hoareau and Bancoult) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2019] EWHC 221 Judicial review should not be "politics by another means". Invoked to stress separation of powers and limits on courts substituting policy choices.
Sinnott v. Minister for Education [2001] IESC 63 Respect for policy choices and separation of powers. Applied as general principle limiting judicial policy intrusion.
T.D. v. Minister for Education [2001] IESC 101 Similarly about judicial restraint and separation of powers. Reinforced the same theme.
B. v. Child & Family Agency & Ors. [2025] IESC 2 On separation of powers and limits of judicial substitution. Supported restraint in reviewing policy-laden administrative choices.
G. v. Ireland [2025] IESC 49 Constraint on courts substituting judgment on social issues for legislature. Used to caution against expansive constitutional interpretation beyond remit.
Re SC [2021] UKSC 26 Warning against expansive application of equality guarantees. Cited in context of judicial restraint on social/political judgments.
United States v Butler (1936) 297 US 1 On limits of judicial substitution of political decision-making. Quoted to emphasise separation of governmental roles.
Tesco Stores Ltd v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 WLR 759 Evaluator's weight of evidence is for decision-maker. Applied to stress that evaluative judgments belong to the administrative decision-taker.
Baby O v. Minister for Justice [2002] IESC 44 Deference to administrative fact-finding. Used to support deference to decision-maker's evaluative judgments.
M.E. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2008] IEHC 192 Weight of evidence and evaluative judgment for decision-taker. Reinforced principle on deference to administrative assessment.
Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52 On evaluative judgment and planning discretion. Referred to when discussing scope of review for planning judgments.
Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 13 Evaluative planning judgments reviewed on irrationality standard. Applied to indicate appropriate standard of review for planning evaluative judgments.
M.R. (Bangladesh) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 41 Decision should be read in a way that makes sense; avoid arid parsing. Invoked to caution against hyper-technical readings to secure certiorari.
Rostas v. DPP [2021] IEHC 60 Principle against parsing decisions to find invalidity where a valid reading exists. Used to emphasise holistic reading of administrative decisions.
St. Margaret's Recycling v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 94 Similar principle on reading decisions in context. Cited in support of reading decisions as valid where reasonably possible.
Duffy v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 715 Decisions should not be quashed for sub-optimal wording where valid reading exists. Cited for the same purpose.
R (Blewett) v. Derbyshire County Council [2003] EWHC 2775 Against legalistic over-parsing. Invoked to discourage micro-analysis of administrative language.
Altrip (Gemeinde Altrip and Others v Land Rheinland-Pfalz) C-72/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:712 Doctrine that not every procedural defect requires quashing if defect is harmless (EIA context). Applied to assess whether any procedural defect was harmless and whether permission should be quashed.
Walton v. Scottish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44 Harmless error doctrine in environmental context. Referenced when discussing harmless error and Article 6/EIA jurisprudence.
R (Champion) v. North Norfolk District Council [2015] UKSC 52 On harmless error and exclusion of reasonable doubt. Cited in explaining the standard for excluding reasonable doubt about effects on protected sites.
Carrownagowan Concern Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 300 On harmless error and court reliance on developer evidence to assess materiality. Used to support the proposition that courts may accept developer evidence to assess harmlessness.
Massey v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 206 Harmless error and application in planning context. Cited in discussion of harmlessness doctrine and consequences for quashing decisions.
Eco Advocacy CLG v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 4) [2023] IEHC 713 Pleading standards and acceptable clarity for identification of relied EU law. Used to stress pleading rigour in EU/transposition claims.
Ballyboden Tidy Towns Group v. An Bord Pleanála (various) Pleading requirements and limits on amendments/unpleaded relief. Referred to when stressing confinement to pleaded grounds.
Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 28 On court's jurisdiction to grant unpleaded relief only within contours of pleaded case. Applied to limit scope of relief to properly pleaded matters.
O'Doherty and Waters v. Minister for Health [2022] IESC 32 On presumption of validity and onus remaining on applicant. Cited to reinforce the presumption of validity for administrative decisions and onus rules.
M.R. (Bangladesh) and related citations (re decision reading; harmless error) Multiple principles about reading decisions in the round and not privileging semantic quibbles. General application to avoid technical quibbles leading to certiorari.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by reference to the established judicial-review framework (the eight-fold path) and emphasised the cumulative requirements for certiorari: jurisdictional compliance, legally correct and workable points, particularised pleading, standing, material before decision‑maker, onus discharged by applicant, error transcending harmless or technical defects, and discretionary considerations.

The Court analysed core ground 7 (alleged invalidity of s.146B for failing to trigger public participation upon AA). It found the contention did not arise because AA was not required on the facts: public-participation rights tied to AA screening do not arise where AA is lawfully screened out (citing Carvill v. Dublin City Council). The Court also held a conforming interpretation of s.146B is available and, in any event, absence of an express reference to the Habitats Directive did not render the provision invalid in the circumstances.

On core ground 6 (alleged failure to establish conservation objectives/measures for Gray Heron, Mallard and Golden Plover), the Court carefully parsed the pleadings and confined what was actually pleaded. It concluded that the complaint about Golden Plover in an SAC was fundamentally misconceived because the Habitats Directive's Annex II species framework does not cover bird conservation objectives (birds are addressed by the Birds Directive). The part of core ground 6 concerning the SPA (Gray Heron and Mallard) raised a more nuanced question: whether a Member State may, in practice, apply significance criteria (used for SPA selection) when deciding whether to set site-level conservation objectives for additional bird species present in an SPA. The Court found the factual basis on which the Applicants relied was weak: the Notice Party's evidence established a lack of impact of the proposed alteration on the species relied on and the Applicants had not displaced that evidence. Given evidential shortcomings and the harmless-error doctrine, the Court dismissed certiorari but allowed limited survivals of declaratory claims regarding SPA objectives for further written submissions.

The Court applied the harmless-error doctrine: even if certain defects were established, the Applicants had not shown those defects could have made a difference to the permit outcome, given the developer's evidence of no impact. The Court emphasised pleading and evidential burdens remain with the applicant; expert evidence is required to displace competent authority conclusions on AA/EIA where the material before the decision-maker did not create reasonable scientific doubt.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court dismissed the proceedings except that it retained limited matters for further declaratory consideration concerning the setting of conservation objectives/measures for Gray Heron and Mallard in the River Nore SPA and related declarations (as specified). The Court dismissed the challenge to s.146B (core ground 7) and dismissed certiorari on the pleaded grounds given lack of necessity for AA and evidential shortcomings.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Planning Authority's s.146B decision of 10 September 2024 stands and the amendment was made. No broad new precedent altering the assessment of s.146B or AA was created; the judgment restates existing principles on pleading rigor, onus of proof, harmless error in environmental/judicial-review contexts, and confirms that where AA is not required, associated public-participation rights do not arise. The Court permitted a limited further module (Module III) on narrowly defined declaratory issues relating to SPA conservation objectives for Gray Heron and Mallard, with directions for further written submissions and procedural timetables; cost orders in respect of that module were reserved as set out in the order.