McCann, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant pleaded guilty to two related series of offences committed on 5 May 2025 and 7 May 2025 and to a separate offence of handling stolen goods discovered during the investigation. On 5 May the Appellant drove a motor vehicle onto a pavement deliberately towards a pedestrian (the Victim) and was driving while disqualified and without insurance ("the 5 May offences"). On 7 May the Appellant again mounted the pavement while attempting to evade police and was again driving while disqualified and uninsured ("the 7 May offences"). A stolen driving licence in another person's name was found on the Appellant and led to a guilty plea for handling stolen goods.

On 22 December 2025 the Appellant was sentenced in the Crown Court. The sentencing judge (Judge Barnett) imposed concurrent and consecutive terms across counts, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 26 months' custody, together with a three-year driving disqualification with an extended re-test requirement. The Appellant appealed with leave granted by a Single Judge.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge erred in increasing the sentence for the affray (count 7) above the guideline starting point by relying on aggravating features that were either overlapping with the affray or improperly double-counted.
2. Whether the sentence for the 7 May dangerous driving (count 4) failed to allow appropriately for totality when measured against the applicable guideline category and the Appellant's plea credit.
3. Whether the sentencing judge gave insufficient allowance for the Appellant's personal mitigation (including traumatic upbringing, vulnerability and medical diagnosis) when determining the overall sentence.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution's Arguments

• The prosecution submitted full credit for the 5 May offences and 25% credit for the 7 May offences and the handling offence.
• The affray was the lead offence and should be treated as category A (A1) with a 2-year starting point and a guideline range of 1 year 6 months to 2 years 9 months; dangerous driving on 5 May should be treated as culpability A and as an aggravating feature to be concurrent.
• The 7 May dangerous driving was submitted as category A2 (evading police) with a 36-week starting point; driving while disqualified and uninsured were aggravating features; the handling offence submitted as category C4 (fine starting point).

Appellant's Arguments

• Ground 1: The increase above the 2-year starting point for affray was unjustified; any reliance on the dangerous driving to aggravate the affray amounted to double counting.
• Ground 2: The sentence for the 7 May dangerous driving was effectively equivalent to treating it as A2 reduced by plea credit but without adequate allowance for totality with the 5 May offences.
• Ground 3: The sentencing judge failed to make sufficient allowance for the Appellant's personal mitigation (traumatic childhood, vulnerability, diagnosed PTSD and positive supporting material), warranting a reduction in overall sentence.
• Post-appeal mitigation submission (Attorney Levett): With the reduced aggregate sentence proposed by the court, the Appellant would have served sufficient time to be released immediately and the disqualification should be ordered from the date of release with the extended test requirement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's sole appellate question was whether the sentence was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. The court analysed each ground sequentially.

Ground 1 (affray): The court found that categorising the affray as A1 was appropriate because the Appellant used the vehicle to cause serious fear. The dangerous driving was the means by which the affray was committed and therefore substantially overlapped with the affray; increasing the affray sentence for dangerous driving risked double counting. The fact that the Appellant was driving while disqualified and uninsured was not wholly subsumed and properly qualified as an additional aggravating factor under motoring guidelines ("other driving offences committed at the same time as the dangerous driving"). The court concluded the sentencing judge did not adequately reflect the Appellant's personal mitigation and should not have elevated the affray sentence as far as he did.

Ground 2 (7 May dangerous driving): The court accepted that the 7 May offence fell within category A2 (evading police) with a 36-week starting point and that driving while disqualified/uninsured could justify a modest uplift. The sentencing judge did not articulate a notional sentence before reductions, but the court inferred any reasonable notional figure could not have been much more than about a year. Given the separate nature of the two incidents and the concurrent handling of other offences, the court would not disturb the 7 May sentence unless it was shown the judge made materially insufficient allowance for mitigation.

Ground 3 (personal mitigation and totality): The court accepted the Appellant's traumatic background and PTSD and acknowledged some offending may have been influenced by anger management difficulties. However, choices to buy and drive the car when disqualified and uninsured were not plainly attributable to those difficulties. Balancing the factors (seriousness of offences, antecedents, mitigation), the court concluded the aggregate of 26 months was manifestly excessive.

Remedy and ancillary matters: The court recalculated sentences to reflect overlap and mitigation, quashed the 20-month sentence on the affray and substituted a sentence of 15 months (after applying plea reduction and mitigation). It retained the 6-month consecutive sentence for the 7 May dangerous driving, producing an aggregate sentence of 21 months. The court considered and rejected suspending the aggregate sentence as the offending across two days was too serious. The court also corrected the description of custody for certain counts: counts that were committed while the Appellant was under 21 should have been recorded as detention in a young offender institution rather than "imprisonment" pursuant to statutory provisions, while the affray count (convicted when aged 21) properly carried a sentence of imprisonment. The court stated it would hear submissions on the impact of Needham.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is allowed in part. The court quashed the 20-month sentence imposed for the affray (count 7) and substituted a sentence of 15 months; the 6-month consecutive sentence for the 7 May dangerous driving (count 4) was left in place, producing an aggregate sentence of 21 months. The aggregate sentence remains custodial and is not suspended. The court ordered corrections to the form of custody for counts committed while the Appellant was under 21 (to detention in a young offender institution) and confirmed the three-year driving disqualification with the requirement to pass an extended driving test.

Implications: The direct consequences are (i) reduction of the Appellant's aggregate term from 26 to 21 months, (ii) the sentence remains custodial and is not capable of suspension, (iii) certain custodial terms should be recorded as detention in a young offender institution in accordance with statutory provisions, and (iv) the driving disqualification and extended re-test requirement were clarified. The court left open submissions on the impact of Needham and did not make a determination on that point in the provided text.