Jancevskis, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act restriction on identifying the victim applies and has not been lifted.

On 19 February 2025 the Appellant was convicted of rape in the Crown Court in The City before Judge [Mooncey]. On 20 March 2025 Judge [Mooncey] sentenced the Appellant to 15 years' imprisonment. The Appellant was granted leave to appeal the sentence by the Single Judge and now pursues that appeal.

Factual summary: On 17 April 2022 the Complainant attended a nearby barbecue, became heavily intoxicated and was taken home and left asleep on a sofa. The Appellant left the barbecue purportedly to get alcohol, was later alleged to have returned to the Complainant's flat, sexually assaulted and raped her. The Complainant resisted, asked the Appellant to stop, made phone call attempts, and afterwards escaped via an open bedroom window and reported the assault to the police. The Appellant, upon arrest, denied being at the Complainant's address and asserted the sexual activity was consensual.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the judge mischaracterised the harm of the offence under the Sentencing Guidelines by treating it as category 1A rather than category 2A/2B.
2. Whether there was a category A culpability factor (significant degree of planning) justifying the categorisation as category A culpability.
3. Whether, on correct characterisation of harm and culpability, the imposed sentence of 15 years was manifestly excessive and should be varied.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Attorney [Rose])

• The psychological impact evidence should be tempered by facts known at sentencing (the Complainant subsequently had a partner and expected a child), lessening the weight of continuing impact.
• The incident was not "sustained" as a guideline factor; it was a single act of rape and CCTV suggests a shorter period in the flat than the judge found.
• There was no violence or threat beyond that inherent in the offence.
• The applicable category 2 harm factors (severe psychological harm, uninvited entry, particular vulnerability from intoxication) were not extreme and did not combine to elevate to category 1.
• There were no category A culpability factors: the Appellant's deviation to the Complainant's address was opportunistic, not evidence of a significant degree of planning.
• Accordingly, the offence should have been categorised at lower levels (category 2B or alternatively category 1B) yielding a lower starting point and range, making the 15-year sentence manifestly excessive.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by reviewing the judge's assessment of harm under the Sentencing Guidelines. It accepted that multiple category 2 factors applied: uninvited entry to the Complainant's home and particular vulnerability from intoxication and sleep. The judge also found severe psychological harm based on the Complainant's victim impact statement (loss of career, relocation from the country, ongoing anxiety and need for therapy) and treated the incident as sustained (20–30 minutes).

The appellate court agreed the judge was entitled to take the Complainant's significant life impact into account and that those factors could justify elevation to category 1 for harm, though it accepted there was force in the submission that the incident lacked the duration normally indicated by the "prolonged detention/sustained incident" factor.

On culpability, the judge had found a category A factor of a "significant degree of planning" based on the Appellant going to the Complainant's address after leaving the barbecue and having previously been there that day. The appellate court concluded that the evidence did not support a finding of significant planning: the Appellant's route to the local store and last-moment change of direction to the Complainant's address, and entry through an open window, were more consistent with opportunistic offending than pre-planned conduct.

Balancing these conclusions, the appellate court accepted the judge's view on harm (case properly placed within category 1 for harm) but rejected the category A culpability finding. It therefore reclassified the offence as category 1B culpability (harm category 1, culpability category B).

The court then applied the guideline starting points and ranges: category 1A had a 15-year starting point (13–19 years), while category 1B has a 12-year starting point (10–15 years). The appellate court noted the judge's assessment that aggravating and mitigating features cancelled each other out but observed limited weight should generally be afforded to previous good character in serious offending. Nonetheless, it held the original sentence required adjustment once culpability was reclassified.

Holding and Implications

Decision: The appeal is allowed in part. The original sentence of 15 years is quashed and substituted with a sentence of 12 years' imprisonment.

Implications: The direct effect is a reduction of the custodial sentence from 15 to 12 years. The court did not purport to establish any new binding precedent beyond its application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the facts of this case.