Aksahin v London Borough of Enfield

Factual and Procedural Background

Company A obtained a High Court injunction on 6 December 2024 prohibiting persons unknown from participating as drivers, riders or passengers in street cruising and related dangerous driving in Company A's area between 3pm and 7am. Personal service of the injunction was dispensed with; service was effected by notices displayed at prominent locations in The City retail park and by publication on social media and in specialist car publications.

On 18 May 2025 the Appellant was personally served with a Section 59 warning after being found by police to be driving antisocially and doing donuts in The City retail park; the Appellant accepted being so served. On 23 May 2025 the Appellant was a passenger in a vehicle driven by the Defendant. The vehicle was observed racing and was stopped and both men were arrested for breach of the injunction.

At a preliminary hearing the defendants were advised to obtain legal advice: the Defendant did so; the Appellant did not. At trial before Judge Kimblin, the Defendant admitted breaching the injunction; the Appellant denied the breach, gave evidence and was cross-examined. The judge found, to the criminal standard, that the Appellant knew of the injunction and participated as a passenger. Both were sentenced to terms of imprisonment suspended on conditions of compliance with the injunction and each ordered to pay Company A's costs of £5,170.50 payable at £100 per month. The Appellant appeals on six grounds.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Appellant participated in the prohibited activity such that he was in contempt for breaching the injunction.
2. Whether the Appellant had actual knowledge of the injunction such that committal for breach was available.
3. Whether the legal test for breach was misapplied by treating passive presence as sufficient without proof of knowledge or intention.
4. Whether an administrative Section 59 warning was improperly relied upon to establish knowledge, propensity or breach.
5. Whether the sanction and costs imposed were disproportionate to the Appellant's culpability and means.
6. Whether procedural unfairness occurred due to lack of legal representation and limited English, engaging Article 6 ECHR.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• He was a passive passenger discouraging the driver, not participating or encouraging; passive presence is insufficient for breach.
• He had no knowledge of the injunction; he had not been served with it and did not reside in Company A's area; the earlier Section 59 warning did not equate to knowledge of an injunction.
• The judge misconstrued the legal test for breach by not requiring actual knowledge or intent for passengers.
• The court gave improper weight to the Section 59 warning, which is administrative and not a judicial finding.
• The sanction and costs were disproportionate given his role as passenger and his financial position.
• Procedural unfairness: he was unrepresented and had limited English, so he did not receive a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR.

Company A's Arguments (as reflected in the opinion)

• There was good service of the injunction by prominent notices in The City retail park and by the service methods provided in the order.
• Evidence, including witness statements, established that the vehicles were racing at speed and that the Appellant was present in the vehicle at the time of the breach.
• The Section 59 warning issued five days earlier was relevant to the Appellant's knowledge and credibility.
• Sanction and costs orders were appropriate in the circumstances and within the judge's discretion; instalment payments were ordered.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed procedural fairness first and concluded the Appellant had been given opportunities to obtain advice, had chosen to proceed unrepresented, had not sought an adjournment and had communicated adequately in English for the issues at stake. The court found no procedural irregularity or Article 6 breach.

On participation, the judge's findings of fact were upheld: the Appellant was present in the vehicle when a substantial course of dangerous conduct (racing at speed) occurred; the judge accepted the Appellant's evidence but found it lacked credibility in context. The court held that passive presence in these circumstances was strong evidence of participation because a passenger's presence tends to encourage the showing-off conduct central to car cruising; the fact that the Appellant was not the driver went to sanction rather than liability.

On knowledge, the court accepted the judge's primary finding that the Appellant knew of the injunction, based on (a) the Section 59 warning served five days earlier at the same retail park and (b) the clear and prominent notices displayed at locations where the Appellant had been. Applying Cuciurean and Wolverhampton, the court held that where there has been good service in accordance with the order it is not open to a defendant in committal proceedings to plead ignorance of the injunction; actual knowledge may however be relevant to sanction.

The court rejected the submission that the Section 59 warning was irrelevant: the judge was entitled to attach weight to it in assessing knowledge, credibility and culpability because it was directly relevant to those issues.

On sanction and costs, the court found the judge had directed himself correctly with reference to authorities and had a wide discretion. The judge differentiated between the Appellant and the Defendant when considering aggravating and mitigating features, reduced seriousness for the Appellant's passenger status but gave no credit for electing to have a trial. The court noted the suspended sentence period has lapsed. It also held the judge was entitled to order costs without making a detailed inquiry into the Appellant's ability to pay; instalment payments were ordered and permitted some account of means.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

Outcome: The appeal was dismissed. The judge's findings on participation and knowledge were upheld; the suspended committal sentence and costs order remain (subject to instalment payments ordered). The court certified the appeal as totally without merit had permission been required. The decision leaves intact the existing application of the authorities cited; it does not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond its application of established authorities.