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M v The Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration (Approved)

High Court of Ireland
Dec 18, 2025
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The summary is of an ex tempore judgment delivered by Judge O'Higgins on 18 December 2025 concerning an application for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision dated 20 August 2025 made under section 49(4)(b) and section 49(7) of the International Protection Act 2015 refusing the Applicant permission to remain in The State. The Respondent opposed leave on the basis that the proceedings had no reasonable prospect of success and that the higher 'substantial grounds' threshold under the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 applied.

The Applicant is a national of The State of Origin, born January 1997, married since September 2021, with twin children born February 2022 who remain in The State of Origin. The Applicant identifies as bisexual, suffered a serious assault in 2023 after being discovered with another man, later travelled to The Other State and then arrived in The State on 31 July 2024, applying for international protection on 1 August 2024. International protection was refused at first instance and on appeal (IPO and IPAT found the Applicant not credible and rejected the claim of bisexuality). The IPO refused permission to remain on 22 November 2024.

On 11 August 2025 the Applicant submitted further information under section 49(7); the Respondent's review report dated 20 August 2025 (notified 25 August 2025) affirmed the refusal. Subsequent medical correspondence preceded a deportation order dated 17 September 2025 and a section 50 report finding no refoulement concerns. The Applicant filed judicial review papers seeking leave with a one-month extension of time; the leave application was brought on notice to the Respondent by direction of Judge Bradley on 19 November 2025.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Respondent gave sufficient reasons in refusing the Applicant's application for permission to remain, specifically whether the decision engaged with the Applicant's "common good" submissions (training as a healthcare worker and need for healthcare workers) with sufficient analysis.
  2. Whether the Applicant satisfied the statutory threshold of "substantial grounds" for leave to seek judicial review under section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000.
  3. Application for an extension of time to bring judicial review proceedings (approximately one month beyond the 28-day limit).

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The Respondent failed to provide sufficient reasons for refusing permission to remain, merely reciting submissions without engaging them (example: the "common good" submission about healthcare training and the State's need for healthcare workers).
  • The Applicant sought an extension of time (filed affidavit by solicitor explaining delay during long vacation, ongoing work on file, need to reformulate pleadings on counsel's advice, inclusion of deportation challenge in same proceedings, modest length of delay, and absence of prejudice to the Respondent).
  • The Applicant narrowed grounds to focus on the reasons challenge (ground two); ground one (exceptionality) was not pursued in light of recent jurisprudence.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The Respondent contended the review decision and report engaged with and weighed the Applicant's submissions, including common good points, and provided adequate reasons consistent with authorities on the duty to give reasons and the section 49 process.
  • The Respondent argued the proceedings had no reasonable prospect of success and the Applicant had not identified "something more" to outweigh the State's interest in maintaining an orderly immigration system.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
MK (Albania) v. Minister for Justice [2024] 2 IR 113 Establishes that refusal of leave to remain normally impacts Article 8 and that only in exceptional circumstances (i.e. "something more") will private life outweigh the State's interest; where residence is precarious the State's interest in maintaining an orderly immigration system will usually prevail. The court applied MK to require the Applicant to demonstrate "something more"; found the Applicant had not met that burden and that the State interest prevailed.
A. (Albania) v. Minister for Justice [2023] IEHC 692 Illustrates circumstances where the decision‑maker failed to engage with submissions and provided perfunctory reasons leading to quashing of a section 49 decision. Used as a contrasting example of deficient reasoning; the court distinguished that case from the present decision which it found was not merely a recital of submissions.
P. (Zimbabwe) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2025] IEHC 403 Listed among authorities provided to the court (no distinct principle set out in this opinion extract). Cited among authorities; the opinion does not elaborate further on its specific application.
S.M. v. The Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 629 Sets out detailed analysis of section 49 reasoning requirements, emphasising fairness, the ability of the applicant to engage, and that reasons may be sufficient where the process is fair, open and transparent; applied Connelly and related jurisprudence. The court regarded S.M. as having strong bearing on the present case, acknowledged it removed the need to pursue ground one, and relied on its reasoning to find that a decision can comply with reasons jurisprudence even absent exhaustive discursive analysis.
Connelly v. An Bord Pleanála [2021] 2 I.R. 752 Describes the "middle ground" in reasons jurisprudence—decision‑makers must provide reasons beyond perfunctory statements but need not produce a court-like discursive judgment; underpins fairness in process. Applied to assess sufficiency of the Respondent's reasons; the court found the decision reached the necessary middle ground and was procedurally fair.
D.E. (An Infant) v. Minister for Justice [2018] 3 IR 326 Explains that section 49 territory involves ministerial humanitarian discretion rather than established legal rights, and that the Minister's discretion is broad—impacting the duty to give reasons. Cited to support the proposition that the Minister's broad discretion affects the extent of the duty to give reasons in humanitarian/judicial review context.
Rawson v. Minister for Defence [2012] IESC 26 Leading case on the duty to give reasons and the objective of attaining fairness in administrative decision‑making. Cited to emphasise the overarching objective of fairness and that the process in the present case met that objective.
G.L. v. IPAT [2025] IEHC 185 Authoritative on the "substantial grounds" threshold applicable in certain statutory contexts for leave to seek judicial review. The court applied G.L. to conclude the Applicant had not identified reasonable or weighty grounds, and thus failed the substantial grounds test.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court adopted the uncontested background facts from the Applicant's submissions and divided its analysis into factual background, grounds and extension of time, relevant authorities, consideration of the decision, and conclusion.

The Applicant narrowed the challenge to a single grounds complaint about insufficiency of reasons (ground two); exceptionality was not pursued. The court reviewed the authorities supplied (notably MK (Albania) and S.M.) and emphasised the legal framework: section 49 proceedings engage ministerial humanitarian discretion rather than a rights-based terrain, and where residence is precarious the State interest in immigration integrity is ordinarily decisive unless "something more" is shown.

The court examined the 22-page impugned decision and identified the key passages where the decision-maker recorded the Applicant's submissions (including training as a healthcare worker and volunteering), acknowledged the Applicant's contributions, noted the short duration of residence and the negative credibility findings of IPO and IPAT, and expressly weighed humanitarian considerations against the common good in upholding immigration procedures. The decision stated that the common good in maintaining the integrity of the international protection and immigration system outweighed the Applicant's features.

Applying the standards from MK (Albania), Connelly and S.M., the court found that the decision engaged with the Applicant's common-good submission, weighed it in the balance, and did not merely recite submissions without comment. The court considered the Applicant's primary factual position to be weak and concluded that the Applicant had not discharged the onus to demonstrate "something more" sufficient to outweigh the State's interest. The court further held that the process was fair and transparent and that the reasons for refusal were evident on a fair appraisal.

Because the court concluded the Applicant had no reasonable prospect of success and failed the statutory "substantial grounds" test, it was unnecessary to resolve the extension of time application.

Holding and Implications

REFUSED — the application for leave to apply for judicial review is refused.

Consequences: The Applicant's challenge to the Respondent's section 49(7) decision and the consequential challenge to the deportation order were dismissed at the leave stage for failing to meet the "substantial grounds" threshold; the court did not grant the requested extension of time as the substantive refusal obviated the need to decide that matter. The opinion does not purport to set a new precedent but applies existing authorities (MK (Albania), S.M., Connelly, Rawson, et al.) to conclude that the Respondent's reasons were adequate on the facts.

Appearances were recorded in the judgment; counsel and instructing solicitors are anonymised in this summary.