Richards, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Applicant was convicted at the Crown Court before Judge [Last Name] on 1 November 2024 of an offence under section 85(1) of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 for carrying on a licensable marine activity otherwise than in accordance with a marine licence. Sentence was imposed on 14 November 2024: a conditional discharge for three years and an order to pay a contribution of £15,000 towards prosecution costs within six months. The Applicant owned foreshore at The City and a 26.5 metre barge. He fitted spud legs (pin anchors) to the barge and used them to hold the barge on the foreshore. The Applicant had applied for, and been refused, a licence to install a residential barge mooring; an appeal against that refusal was dismissed. In February 2022 the prosecuting authority, Company A, discovered the barge was anchored with spud legs without a licence and charged the Applicant.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the installation or use of the spud legs amounted to a licensable marine activity within section 66(1) of the 2009 Act (specifically item 1: deposit of any substance or object from a vessel onto the seabed).
2. If licensable, whether the activity was exempt under Article 4 and Part 3, paragraph 22 of the Marine Licensing (Exempted Activities) Order 2011 as a deposit in the course of normal navigation or maintenance.
3. Whether emails from officers of Company A were admissible opinion evidence on licensing/exemption questions.
4. Whether the trial judge's additional explanatory directions to the jury (on the meaning of "deposit" and "normal navigation") amounted to unfair comment, misdirection or failure to fairly summarise the defence case.
5. Whether the costs contribution ordered on sentence was disproportionate or unreasonable.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• The spud legs (or spud wells welded to the barge) meant the legs formed part of the barge, so there was no deposit "from a vessel" as alleged.
• The Applicant sought to rely on emails from Company A officers suggesting no licence was required.
• The trial judge's additional explanation to the jury improperly steered the jury, failed to mention burden/standard of proof in that passage, and did not adequately summarise the defence case (claims of imbalance/unfairness).
• As to sentence, the Applicant contended the £15,000 contribution was disproportionate, particularly as regards counsel's fees incurred by Company A.

Respondent's Arguments (Company A)

• The activity constituted a deposit of objects from a vessel (item 1 of section 66(1)).
• The emails from Company A officers were opinion evidence on legal questions and therefore inadmissible.
• The trial judge's directions (including burden/standard directions and the explanatory passages) were legally correct and did not unfairly prejudice the defence.
• The costs order was within the court's powers, the prosecution costs were properly and reasonably incurred in a specialist area, and the Applicant had means to pay.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court recited the elements of the offence and the statutory framework: the section 66(1) list, the paragraph 22 exemption in the 2011 Order, and the allocation of burden (the Applicant must prove exemption on balance of probabilities once the prosecution proves deposit). The court held the emails from Company A officers were plainly inadmissible opinion evidence on whether an activity was licensable or exempt; exclusion by the trial judge was proper.

On jury directions, the trial judge had directed the jury to apply ordinary meanings to "deposit" and "normal navigation," set out two sequential questions for the jury (first whether the prosecution proved deposit from a vessel on the seabed beyond reasonable doubt, second whether the Applicant proved on balance that any deposit was in the course of normal navigation), and gave a full good character direction. The judge gave a further explanatory passage about how juries define words and about fact and degree for "normal navigation."

The appellate court examined the criticisms of that explanatory passage. It rejected the contention that the additional explanation improperly withdrew a defence by steering the jury away from whether the spud legs were part of the vessel: the full question (deposit from a vessel) remained accurately put in writing and orally, and it was not arguable that the spud legs were not "objects from a vessel" (an anchor analogy was given). The court also rejected the complaint that the judge's explanation omitted reiteration of burden/standard, noting those directions were given separately and correctly. The court held it was unarguable that an activity initially part of navigation could not, as a matter of fact and degree, become something else; the judge's description of fact and degree was therefore correct. The court considered that the additional explanation was, if anything, helpful to the defence because it required conviction only where the activity was qualitatively different from ordinary anchoring.

On sentence/costs, the court accepted the single judge's reasoning that the court had power to order costs, a proper means enquiry was made, and the prosecution's costs included reasonable instruction of specialist counsel. The arithmetic of the costs order was analysed: prosecution claimed £21,443.36 plus counsel's fees; the order required an effective contribution of £15,000 (effectively 66.2% of counsel's fees recovered). The court found no arguable case that this was unjust or unreasonable. The court therefore dismissed the challenge to the costs contribution. The court also ordered the Applicant to pay £101.06 for transcripts of the proceedings in this court and refused Company A's application for additional costs of the day as not just and reasonable.

Holding and Implications

Both renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence are refused.

Direct consequences: the Applicant's renewals for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence were dismissed; the sentence (conditional discharge for three years and a contribution of £15,000 towards prosecution costs) remains in force; the Applicant was ordered to pay £101.06 for transcripts for the proceedings in this court. Company A's application for additional costs of the day was refused.

No new legal precedent was established by this decision; the court applied statutory provisions and conventional principles on admissibility, burden of proof, jury directions and the exercise of discretion on costs to the facts of the case.