- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Omar, R. v
Factual and Procedural Background
An anonymity order was made in relation to the victims. The Appellant was convicted on 17 September 2024 at the Crown Court in The City before Judge Buckingham of one count of conspiracy to commit robbery contrary to section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977. On 13 January 2025 the Appellant was sentenced to 17 years and three months' imprisonment. The Appellant was 24 at sentence and 22 at the time of the offending. Four co-conspirators were sentenced at the same time: Co-conspirator A (aged 21) to 16 years 9 months after trial; Co-conspirator B (aged 21) to 16 years 5 months after pleading guilty; Co-conspirator C (aged 21) to 16 years 2 months detention in a young offender institution after pleading guilty; and Co-conspirator D (aged 23) to 12 years after trial.
The conspiracy comprised nine robberies between 1 April 2023 and 23 February 2024, one in The City (Derby in the source) and eight in The City (Birmingham in the source). The conspirators targeted gay and bisexual men using false profiles on the dating application Grindr, then robbed, detained and degraded victims, often using threats or knives. The opinion limits factual description to robberies in which the Appellant had direct involvement. Specific incidents involved victims identified here as Victim A, Victim B, Victim C, Victim D, Victim E, and Victim F. The robberies varied in duration (from around 50 minutes to many hours), involved threats of stabbing, physical assaults, theft of phones, access to banking apps and substantial sums stolen; one incident included theft of cryptocurrency. The victims provided personal statements describing serious mental and emotional effects. The Appellant had no previous convictions; a pre-sentence report indicated upbringing in the Netherlands, arrival in the United Kingdom in 2018, possible learning difficulties, family difficulties, and low maturity; the report-writer considered him unlikely to reoffend.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sentencing judge engaged in unlawful double counting by treating hostility based on sexual orientation both as part of high culpability under the Robbery (street) Guideline and separately as an aggravating factor under section 66 of the Sentencing Act 2020, and whether failure to adopt a discrete two‑stage approach (sentence absent aggravation then uplift) was an error.
- Whether the judge failed to give sufficient weight to the Appellant's age and immaturity as mitigation.
- Whether the judge failed adequately to distil the Appellant's individual role within the conspiracy or to explain disparities between the Appellant's sentence and co-conspirators' sentences.
- Whether the judge rigidly or arithmetically balanced aggravating and mitigating factors, producing a manifestly excessive sentence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Attorney Solley)
- Ground 1: The judge double counted hostility based on sexual orientation—counting it in culpability (Level A) and again as an aggravating factor under section 66; the judge also failed to pronounce the sentence absent the hostility aggravation and failed to state a discrete uplift as in the two-stage approach of R v Kelly & Donnelly.
- Ground 2: The judge arguably did not give sufficient weight to the Appellant's youth and immaturity as mitigating factors.
- Ground 3: The sentencing did not sufficiently distil the Appellant's individual role in the conspiracy or explain why others received shorter sentences beyond credit-based reductions.
- Ground 4: The judge took a rigidly arithmetical approach to aggravating factors and did not properly balance them against mitigation, producing an excessive sentence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Kelly & Donnelly [2001] EWCA Crim 170, [2001] 2 Cr App R (S) 73 | Suggested two-stage approach for racially aggravated offences (sentence absent aggravation, then uplift). | Cited as background; court observed the two-stage approach is not required by statute and predates current guidelines; considered applicability in present case. |
| R v Graeme Paul Fitzgerald [2003] EWCA Crim 2875, [2004] 1 Cr. App. R. (S,) 436 | Qualification of Kelly & Donnelly: where aggravation is inherent to the offence, a two-stage approach may be inappropriate. | Cited to support that the hostility here was integral to the conspiracy and the two-stage approach need not sensibly be applied. |
| R v Gargan [2017] EWCA Crim 780, [2018] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 6 | Example where the racial element was the essence of the offence, negating need for discrete uplift. | Cited to illustrate when the two-stage approach is inapposite because the aggravating characteristic is the very essence of the offence. |
| R v Cush [2024] EWCA Crim 1382, [2025] 1 WLR 387 | Principle that an offender's 18th birthday is not a "cliff edge" and that courts may treat immature adults as if dealing with a child for sentencing purposes. | Cited to confirm the judge's duty to consider youth and maturity; court applied and found the judge had properly done so. |
| R v Clarke [2018] EWCA Crim 185, [2018] 1 Cr App R (S) 52 | Support for the approach to immaturity and sentencing of young adults. | Cited as supporting authority for considering reduced maturity in sentencing young adults. |
| R v ZA [2023] EWCA Crim 596, [2023] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 45 | Scientific and social evidence that brain development and adverse experiences can affect maturity up to age 25. | Cited to support the proposition that young offenders may show reduced maturity up to age 25; court considered this in rejecting the appellant's age ground. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by recognising Parliament's enactment in section 66 of the Sentencing Act 2020 that hostility based on protected personal characteristics is a statutory aggravating factor and must be stated in open court. The Sentencing Council's General Guideline warns against double counting aggravating factors already accounted for in culpability or harm assessments.
The judge had categorised each robbery as high culpability (Level A) because knives were used or hostility based on sexual orientation was demonstrated. The Appellant submitted this produced double counting because the judge also treated hostility as an aggravating factor under section 66 and did not state a discrete uplift. The court accepted that the sentencing remarks did count hostility both in culpability and as an aggravating factor and that the judge acknowledged the risk of double counting; however, the court found it unclear from the remarks how the judge avoided double counting.
Notwithstanding that lack of clarity, the court held the judge was correct to assess culpability at Level A given the deliberate targeting of gay and bisexual men via Grindr, the use of hateful language and degrading conduct, and the intended effect of the conspiracy. The court concluded the hostility was integral to the conspiracy—analogous to Fitzgerald and Gargan—so the two-stage approach of Kelly & Donnelly was not sensibly applicable. The additional elements of hostility justified a significant upward adjustment in sentence and the judge was justified in the adjustment made.
On age and immaturity, the court applied authorities recognising continued brain development up to 25 and the need to avoid a "cliff edge" at 18. Reading the sentencing remarks fairly, the judge had expressly considered the Appellant's immaturity and treated it as mitigation; there was no arguable error.
Regarding individual role, the court noted the Appellant was convicted of a conspiracy forming a campaign of multiple robberies; the judge took into account that the Appellant was not involved in every robbery and considered his role within the conspiracy. The judge was not required to attribute specific actions to the Appellant beyond recognising his participation and support for the conspiracy.
On balancing aggravating and mitigating factors, the court acknowledged mitigating features (youth, no previous convictions) but emphasised the repeated, prolonged, sophisticated nature of the conspiracies, substantial financial loss, and severe harm to victims. The judge's classification of some offending as Category 1A (starting point 8 years, range 7–12 years for a single robbery after trial) was noted, but the court accepted that a campaign of this gravity justified a sentence well above that range.
Holding and Implications
DECISION: The renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence is REFUSED.
Implications: The refusal leaves the original sentence of 17 years and three months' imprisonment in place for the Appellant. The court held that although the sentencing remarks could have been clearer on avoidance of double counting, the judge's overall approach and adjustments were justified; the hostility was integral to the conspiracy and the two-stage uplift approach was not sensibly applicable. The opinion indicates no new legal principle was established beyond applying existing authority to the facts; the decision resolves the appeal on the merits by finding the grounds not reasonably arguable.
Alert