Khan, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns an application by Attorney [SolicitorGeneral] for leave to refer a sentence to the court under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 on the ground that it was unduly lenient. The sentencing being challenged was imposed by Judge [Sentencing] at the Inner London Crown Court on 5 November 2025 following a two-day sentencing hearing with a significant adjournment between hearing days. The victim is a child and lifelong anonymity under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 was confirmed.

The Defendant (born 23 October 2002) was 21 at the time of the offending (February–May 2024) and pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity to four offences: (1) meeting a child following sexual grooming (s.15 Sexual Offences Act 2003); (2) sexual activity with a child by an adult in an abuse of position of trust (s.16); (3) sexual communication with a child (s.15A); and (4) possession of an indecent photograph of a child. The sentencing judge imposed concurrent suspended terms producing an overall term of two years' imprisonment suspended for two years, together with an indefinite restraining order, a 10‑year Sexual Harm Prevention Order, and 10 years' notification requirements.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentence imposed was unduly lenient such that intervention under section 36 Criminal Justice Act 1988 was required.
2. Whether the sentencing judge erred in selecting and adjusting the guideline starting point for the lead offence (meeting a child following sexual grooming) given the duration and number of offences.
3. Whether the sentencing judge gave excessive weight to mitigating factors (notably the offender's age and maturity and reductions for guilty plea) resulting in a suspended sentence that should have been immediate custody.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney [SolicitorGeneral]'s Arguments

• The judge started from a four‑year guideline for the lead offence but should have applied a significant uplift to that starting point because of the duration (four months) and multiple instances of penetrative sexual activity; the starting point should have been increased (to five or six years) before mitigation.
• The judge applied too great a reduction for mitigating factors, particularly the offender's age, resulting in an unduly low notional term (three years) before credit for guilty pleas and a final two‑year suspended sentence.
• The combined effect of starting point and reductions produced a sentence that was unlawfully lenient and liable to be increased on reference.

Attorney [Counsel2] for the Defendant

• The mitigation available (age, immaturity, genuine remorse, voluntary engagement with support, good character and prospects) made the sentence, though merciful, properly open to the sentencing judge.
• The Defendant was entitled to full credit for early guilty pleas entered in the Magistrates' Court and committed for sentence at the earliest opportunity.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded from the materials before the sentencing judge and the statutory and guideline framework applicable to the four offences, identifying the guideline for meeting a child following sexual grooming as the lead guideline. The judge had treated the offence as category A1 (raised harm and culpability), which carries a four‑year starting point (range three to seven years), based on factors the judge found present: continued contact despite interventions, exchange of sexual images, and the child's particular vulnerability.

The court acknowledged aggravating features identified by the sentencing judge (continuation of offending after school and police interventions, abuse of trust, manipulation of parents, use of a false name to arrange hotel meetings, multiple instances of penetrative sexual activity, and evidence of drug use during encounters). The Solicitor General argued these aggravating features required an uplift of the starting point; the judge had increased the starting point to four years but did not uplift it further.

The sentencing judge also identified mitigating factors: the Defendant's lack of maturity (within the 18–25 age range), genuine remorse (accepted by the judge), voluntary engagement with professional support, employment and educational prospects, and good character. The judge balanced aggravation and mitigation, reduced the starting point from four to three years, then gave full credit for early guilty pleas to reach two years' custody, which he suspended under the Imposition Guideline because prospects of rehabilitation were realistic and additional protective orders were imposed to address public protection concerns.

The appellate court reviewed whether that exercise of judgment produced an unduly lenient sentence. It accepted that a longer, immediate custodial sentence could properly have been imposed in many comparable cases, but concluded that the sentencing judge's approach — including substantial weight accorded to age, remorse and voluntary steps taken by the Defendant — was within the available sentencing range. The court therefore characterized the sentence as merciful rather than unduly lenient and decided not to increase it. Leave to bring the reference was granted but the court declined to interfere with the sentence.

Holding and Implications

SENTENCE UPHELD

Holding: The court granted leave to bring the reference but declined to increase the sentence; the two years' imprisonment suspended for two years (with accompanying orders: indefinite restraining order, 10‑year Sexual Harm Prevention Order, 10 years' notification requirements, and other risk‑management orders) remains in force.

Implications: The direct effect is that the sentencing outcome imposed by Judge [Sentencing] stands. The court emphasized that no new legal precedent was established; the decision reflects that, in the particular facts and with the weight given to mitigation (notably youth and genuine remorse), a merciful suspended sentence was within the permissible range and not unlawfully lenient.