Supreme Court (Ireland) – Anonymized Summary

Citation: [2026] IESC 10

Judge: Judge Collins (judgment delivered 18 February 2026)

Factual and Procedural Background

The proceedings concerned the ownership of six valuable stained-glass works commissioned in 1927 from an artist’s studio and installed in a long-established café premises in The City in March/April 1928. The works comprised four “Four Orders” windows set into openings on one wall, and two “Swan Yard” windows associated with openings on another wall. The works were designed to function as windows and were originally fitted with mechanisms intended to facilitate opening and ventilation; over time, various alterations occurred, including removal for safekeeping/refurbishment, changes to mechanisms, relocation of the “Swan Yard” works to an internal wall in 1987, and later backlighting.

Company A (the landlord’s successor in title) claimed ownership on the basis that, upon installation, the works became “part and parcel” of the premises (i.e., part of the structure) and therefore belonged to the freehold. Company B (the tenant) had occupied the premises continuously since 1927 (with changes in the tenant’s ownership in 1987). In December 2020, Company B purported to transfer ownership of the works to Company C (its parent company), with a licence back to Company B for continued use; Company A challenged the transfer’s validity, resulting in the litigation. Company C’s claim depended entirely on Company B having owned the works at the time of the 2020 transfer.

In the High Court, Judge McDonald (after a six-day trial) held that Company A owned the “Four Orders” works but that Company B owned the “Swan Yard” works as tenant’s fixtures removable under section 17 of the Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act 1860 (Deasy’s Act) ([2023] IEHC 25).

Both sides appealed. The Court of Appeal (majority) allowed Company A’s appeal and dismissed Company B’s cross-appeal, holding Company A owned all six works ([2024] IECA 199). Judge Whelan dissented.

The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal on significant and complex fixtures issues ([2025] IESCDET 15), but the appeal ultimately focused on factual/evidential limits of judicial fact-finding, particularly (i) who paid for the works and (ii) whether the “Swan Yard” works were installed in 1928 as true exterior windows or as an inner decorative layer in a “double fenestration” arrangement.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the six stained-glass works, upon installation in 1928, became “part and parcel” of the premises (i.e., structural parts of the realty) such that they belonged to Company A and could not be removed by Company B.
2. If the works were not “part and parcel” of the premises, whether Company B established the necessary preconditions to treat them as tenant’s fixtures removable under section 17 of Deasy’s Act, including proof that they were affixed by the tenant at the tenant’s sole expense.
3. Whether the evidence was adequate to permit reliable findings on the disputed factual questions, and how the burden of proof should operate where the evidence was fragmentary and ambiguous.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant’s (Tenant’s) Arguments

• The “fundamental issue” was whether the works were “part and parcel” of the premises or tenant’s fixtures; it contended they were not structural parts of the premises.
• The works were not part of the original structure when the tenant went into occupation; they were readily removable; and they were essentially ornamental, installed to enhance the café trade.
• The “Swan Yard” works were said to have been installed as part of a “double fenestration” arrangement (inside plain-glass windows) such that they were not true exterior windows, but decorative panels (“mock windows”).
• On payment, the tenant relied primarily on a March 1928 board minute (“the Board Minute”) as establishing that expenditure on café fittings/fixtures was the tenant’s liability; it argued this was sufficient to meet the “threshold issue” that the tenant paid for (or should be treated as having paid for) the works.
• It argued it could succeed even if it did not overturn the Court of Appeal’s finding on the 1928 installation method, provided payment was established.

Plaintiff’s (Landlord’s) Arguments

• All six works were commissioned and designed as windows for the premises and, on installation, became “part and parcel” of the premises (structural), and thus belonged to the landlord’s title.
• The “double fenestration” theory lacked reliable evidential support and was inconsistent with the design and ventilation purpose of the works and with expert evidence.
• Even if the works were not structural, the tenant could not claim a right of removal without proving they were tenant’s fixtures, including proof of payment by the tenant (a “threshold” requirement under section 17 of Deasy’s Act), which the tenant had not established.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Climie v Wood (1868-69) LR 4 Ex 328	Distinction between chattels/fixtures/structural items; items essential to convenient use (e.g., doors/windows) may be irremovable even by a tenant; separate category for trade/ornament fixtures removable by tenant.	Used in discussing the conceptual treatment of windows and items essential to premises’ use; part of the authorities underpinning “part and parcel” analysis.
Boswell v Crucible Steel Company [1925] 1 KB 119	Windows forming part of the original structure are part of the demised premises and not “landlord’s fixtures” for repairing-covenant analysis; “skin of the house” may include glass.	Treated as informative but fact-specific; the Supreme Court explained it did not resolve the ownership/removal dispute here, but the “structural” theme supported the courts below regarding windows’ integration into a building.
Wake v Hall (1883) 8 App Cas 195	In fixtures/removal disputes, key considerations include original ownership, object/purpose of annexation, and removability without great damage.	Referenced in the Court of Appeal dissent (summarised in the Supreme Court judgment) as part of the legal framework on tenant removal rights.
Holiday Fellowship Ltd v Hereford [1959] 1 WLR 211	For repairing covenants, windows may be “in” the walls but not “of” the main walls; Boswell does not set a general binding rule and turns on facts.	The Supreme Court held this case addressed a different question (construction of “main walls” in a repair covenant) and did not determine whether windows are “part and parcel” of premises.
Bain v Brand (1876) 1 App Cas 762	General rule: what is fixed to the freehold becomes part of it; separate rule on irremovability and the important trade-fixture exception allowing severance/removal during the tenancy.	Used as the starting point for the applicable legal framework; the Court emphasised that “part and parcel” items cannot be removed, and trade/tenant exceptions operate only where applicable.
Elitestone Ltd v Morris [1997] 1 WLR 687	Adopts threefold classification (chattel/fixture/part and parcel of land); cites limits on contracting out of the accession rule.	Both parties accepted the threefold classification; the Court used it to frame the dispute as primarily “part and parcel” versus tenant fixture.
Melluish (Inspector of Taxes v BMI (No 3) Ltd [1996] AC 454	Cited (via Elitestone) on the proposition that the accession rule cannot be contracted out of.	Not explored further because no evidence of any agreement affecting operation of the rule was relevant on the facts as addressed by the Court.
Holland v Hodgson (1871-72) LR 7 CP 328	“True rule” emphasising annexation and intention inferred from circumstances; allocates onus depending on degree of affixation (slight affixation presumptively makes it part of land unless intended to remain chattel).	Used to explain the importance of burden of proof and annexation; the Court noted it might imply the tenant bore an onus to show intention to remain chattel in relation to the “Swan Yard” works.
Ardfert Quarry Products v Moormac Developments Limited (In Receivership) [2013] IEHC 572	Purpose/object of annexation assessed objectively (not by subjective intention).	Relied on to confirm the objective nature of the annexation-purpose inquiry.
R v Hedges (1779) 1 Leach 201	Whether window sashes were fixed to the freehold for theft analysis.	The Court noted the implications for this appeal were unclear and gave it no decisive role.
Burt v Haslett (1856) 18 C B 161	Under certain lease terms, a replacement shopfront plate-glass could be treated as a “window belonging to the demised premises” and not removable at term end.	Recognised as heavily dependent on lease terms and not significantly assisting the present dispute.
Easton v Isted [1903] 1 Ch 405	A window is not less a window because it cannot be opened; ventilation is not essential to the concept of a window.	Noted as a largely self-evident proposition with limited impact on the resolution of the central issues.
Ball v Plummer (citation not provided in the opinion)	Referenced as the source of the phrase “the skin of the house.”	Mentioned only in passing in discussing Boswell.
Re Ross and Boal Ltd [1924] IR 129	Annexation analysis in a mortgage/liquidation context; mode vs object of annexation; trend toward greater emphasis on purpose inferred from circumstances.	Discussed as part of trade-fixture authorities and the move toward purpose-based analysis.
Lombard and Ulster Banking Limited v Kennedy [1974] NI 20	Tenant’s right to remove trade fixtures; critical inquiry into object of annexation; lease terms may exclude removal rights.	Used as an example of modern liberalisation towards tenants, while recognising contractual exclusion can prevail.
In re Galway Concrete Ltd (In Liquidation) [1983] ILRM 402	Plant/machinery affixed for trade may be removable as tenant’s fixtures.	Treated as of limited weight on its facts because the landowners expressly disclaimed any interest.
In re De Falbe [1901] 1 Ch 523	Ornament-fixture principles; evolution of tenant rights to remove certain annexed articles.	Used to illustrate that exceptions are not confined to trade fixtures, but distinguished because the works here were not purely ornamental.
Leigh v Taylor [1902] AC 157	Fact-sensitive nature of fixture/chattel determinations; purely ornamental articles removable where no intention to dedicate to the house is shown and removal causes trifling disturbance.	Discussed and distinguished: the stained-glass works were capable of functioning as windows and were commissioned for the premises, unlike purely ornamental tapestries/panelling.
Spyer v Phillipson [1931] 2 Ch 183	Ornamental fixtures; tenant’s right of removal; emphasis on whether annexation made the item an integral permanent part of the premises.	Cited in the Court of Appeal dissent (as summarised) and in the Supreme Court’s discussion of the tendency to enlarge tenant rights; distinguished on the facts and on the payment-evidence gap.
Elliot v Bishop (1854) 10 Ex 496	Functional items serving an ornamental function may be removable by a tenant (example given: ornamental chimney pieces).	Noted as consistent with the possibility of “ornamental trade fixtures” in principle, but did not resolve whether these windows were tenant fixtures on the evidence.
Hay v O’Grady [1992] 1 IR 210	Appellate restraint regarding findings of fact by a trial judge who heard witnesses.	Explained as part of the general appellate framework; the Court noted the case largely involved inference from limited records rather than extensive primary fact findings.
Leopardstown Club Ltd v Templeville Developments Ltd [2017] IESC 50, [2017] 3 IR 707	Reaffirms Hay v O’Grady principles on appellate review of fact.	Referenced as confirmation of the limited-review principle.
Donegal Investment Group plc v Danbywiske [2017] IESC 14, [2019] 1 IR 150	Appellate approach to a trial judge’s assessment of conflicting expert testimony.	Referenced to underscore deference on expert-conflict resolution, though the Court ultimately addressed the adequacy of evidence and reasonableness of inferences.
DPP (Kelly) v Burke [2014] IEHC 483, [2014] 2 IR 651	Status/weight of admitted statements (as referenced in argument about evidential effect).	Noted as inconsistent with any claim that an admitted statement compelled acceptance of its contents; used to reject the contention that the trial judge was constrained to accept a particular witness statement.
Rhesa Shipping CO SC v Edmunds (“The Popi M”) [1985] 1 WLR 948	Where evidence is unsatisfactory, the court may conclude the party with the burden failed to prove the fact; judges are not forced to choose between competing improbable theories; common-sense application of balance of probabilities.	Central to the Supreme Court’s approach to fragmentary evidence on payment: the Court held it was permissible and just to decide the threshold issue against the tenant for failure to discharge the burden.
Quinn v Mid-Western Health Board [2005] IESC 19, [2005] 4 IR 1	Cites The Popi M; emphasises trial judge’s duty to attempt to resolve causation/fact issues while recognising burden-of-proof outcomes may be necessary.	Used to support the approach to fact-finding where evidence is inadequate, even outside strict causation contexts.
James Elliot Construction Ltd v Irish Asphalt Ltd [2011] IEHC 269	Common-sense and logic in assessing expert evidence; court not obliged to choose one version over another in every case; burden of proof can decide where evidence is inadequate.	Relied on to reinforce that the court may find a party has failed to prove its case on inadequate evidence.
[2023] IEHC 25 (High Court judgment in these proceedings)	Trial findings: “Four Orders” were part of the external skin and “part and parcel” of premises; “Swan Yard” held to be tenant fixtures based on “double fenestration” and section 17.	The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court on “Four Orders” but held the “Swan Yard” conclusion rested on an inadequately supported “double fenestration” theory.
[2024] IECA 199 (Court of Appeal judgment in these proceedings)	Majority set aside the High Court’s “double fenestration” finding for “Swan Yard” and held all works were “part and parcel” of the premises; dissent would have treated all as tenant fixtures.	The Supreme Court affirmed the majority approach and order.
[2025] IESCDET 15 (leave decision)	Leave granted due to significant and complex fixtures issues, including items both functional and decorative and tenants’ de-annexation rights.	Provided procedural context for the Supreme Court appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

(1) Governing framework. The Court treated the dispute through the accepted threefold classification of objects as chattels, fixtures, or “part and parcel” of land. It was common case that if the works became “part and parcel” of the premises on installation in 1928 (i.e., structural in the legal sense), they could not be tenant fixtures and could not be removed by the tenant in any circumstances. By contrast, section 17 of Deasy’s Act applies only to tenant fixtures and requires, as a fundamental precondition, that the item was erected and affixed by the tenant “at his sole expense.”

(2) Identification of the key disputed facts. The Court identified two disputed factual issues: (i) who paid for the works, and (ii) how the “Swan Yard” works were installed in 1928 (true windows versus “double fenestration”). It emphasised the severe evidential gaps and the importance of burden of proof where evidence is fragmentary or inadequate.

(3) The “Four Orders” works. The Court accepted the High Court’s finding (also upheld by the Court of Appeal) that these works were installed and functioned as windows from 1928 and were not part of any double-fenestration arrangement. A later video (1998) and physical evidence were treated as strongly supporting this finding. The Court rejected the tenant’s attempt to rely on a witness statement regarding lack of weathering as displacing those findings, and noted the admitted statement did not support the tenant’s double-fenestration theory.

(4) Threshold issue: payment for the works. The tenant accepted it bore the burden of proving it paid for, or undertook liability for, the works. The tenant relied primarily on the March 1928 Board Minute. The Court held the minute was insufficient to discharge that burden: it did not mention the stained-glass works; its listed items were classic café fittings (ovens, tables, chairs, counters) and reliance on a general phrase (“other café fittings and fixtures”) to include the stained-glass works was speculative; the minute was fragmentary amid an evidential void; and parsing it as determinative would give it an unwarranted evidential status. The Court also rejected the inference that a cash payment of £200 in June 1928 was probative of payment by/on behalf of the tenant. Applying the approach endorsed in The Popi M and Quinn, the Court held that where evidence is inadequate to permit a reliable positive finding, deciding against the party with the burden is the only just course. The tenant therefore failed the threshold condition for any tenant-fixture claim, which was fatal to its ownership claim.

(5) The “Swan Yard” installation method (“double fenestration”). Although payment failure was dispositive, the Court addressed this issue and agreed with the Court of Appeal majority. It held the High Court’s “double fenestration” conclusion was unsupported by adequate evidence and was inconsistent with multiple factors: the works were designed to function as windows with ventilation mechanisms; effective ventilation was critical; a dual-window arrangement would severely compromise ventilation; unchallenged expert evidence indicated no known usage of dual systems by the artist or peers of the era; and the artist’s surviving correspondence referred to “windows” and gave no hint of a novel dual system. The Court considered that observations in 1987 did not reliably establish the 1928 configuration given intervening alterations (including a bricked-up opening and later backlighting), and that extrapolation backward was unjustified. It concluded the reasonable inference was that the “Swan Yard” works were installed in 1928 as windows for the purpose for which they were commissioned and designed.

(6) Classification as “part and parcel.” The Court held that both the “Four Orders” and “Swan Yard” works became “part and parcel” of the premises on installation in 1928, were not fixtures (and still less tenant fixtures), and thus belonged to the landlord’s title irrespective of any payment question. It rejected the contention that removability, installation after the café opened, or ornamental character prevented the works from being structural in the relevant legal sense, and distinguished the “ornament cases” because these works were not purely decorative and were site-specific commissions for the premises.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: APPEAL DISMISSED. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Court of Appeal. It held that all six stained-glass works became “part and parcel” of the premises upon installation in 1928 and are the property of Company A (the landlord’s successor in title). The Court further held that, in any event, Company B failed to prove the threshold requirement that it paid for (or undertook liability for) the works, preventing any claim that they were tenant fixtures removable under section 17 of Deasy’s Act.

Implications: The immediate effect was to defeat Company B’s and Company C’s asserted ownership and to uphold Company A’s claim to the works. The judgment emphasised that, where the evidence is fragmentary and ambiguous, courts may be compelled to resolve a disputed factual issue by applying the burden of proof rather than by speculative inference. The decision applied existing fixtures principles to the particular evidential record; it did not purport to create new legal tests.