Chapman, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

Anonymity protections under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 applied to this judgment and the opinion is anonymised accordingly. The Victim was aged 20 at the time of the offending. The Defendant pleaded guilty on re‑arraignment to multiple sexual offences in the Crown Court in The City and was sentenced by Judge Cartwright on 18 September 2025. The sentences included 4 years and 3 months' imprisonment for rape (count 1) with other counts made concurrent, a statutory surcharge, a 10‑year sexual harm prevention order, forfeiture of a mobile telephone, and notification and barring consequences under relevant statutory regimes. Counts 2 and 6 were ordered to lie on the file. His Majesty's Solicitor General applied under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for leave to refer the sentences as unduly lenient. The Defendant had no previous convictions. The factual background, taken from the Final Reference, was that the Defendant (aged almost 20 when the relationship began) formed a sexual relationship with a 14‑year‑old Victim met via social media, including repeated sexual activity over about a year, unsolicited sexual images, photographing the Victim without consent, and a rape occurring at a party while the Defendant was intoxicated. The Defendant had initially pleaded not guilty but indicated an intention to plead guilty shortly before trial and entered guilty pleas on 18 August 2025.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentences imposed by the sentencing judge were unduly lenient within the meaning of section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
2. If unduly lenient, what adjustment to the sentence on count 1 (rape) was appropriate to reflect the overall gravity of the offending while accounting for mitigation and guilty plea credit.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney Jones (on behalf of the Solicitor General)

• No issue with the 15% credit for guilty plea nor with making count 1 the lead count and running others concurrently.
• Submitted that the rape fell in Category 2B but that aggravating factors (severe psychological harm to the Victim, Victim's particular vulnerability notably her age, grooming, location, intoxication, expressed intention to impregnate) required an upward adjustment from the 8‑year starting point—arguing a notional sentence higher than 7 years was appropriate.
• Contended the reduction for mitigation (immaturity) was excessive—reducing a notional starting point to 4 years was too great and placed the sentence below the guideline range for Category 2B.
• Submitted that counts 3 and 4 represented repeated, penetrative offending over a year (Category 1A) and required an upward adjustment, contributing to an overall sentence that the Solicitor General said was unduly lenient.

Attorney Majid (for the Defendant)

• Argued the sentence was a considered and fair exercise of judicial discretion; the judge had taken a high starting point and balanced competing factors rather than merely ticking guideline boxes.
• Submitted the Victim's pre‑existing troubled history meant she was not necessarily "particularly vulnerable" by reason of age alone; the judge's assessment of vulnerability was open to him.
• Accepted the judge made significant mitigation for immaturity, supported by the pre‑sentence report and character references, and that sentencing should not treat turning 18 as a cliff edge.
• Maintained that the judge was best placed to weigh the factors and that the sentence was not outside the reasonable range.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court applied the established section 36 principles (as summarised in Egan and earlier authorities) and concluded these sentences were unduly lenient. The Court accepted many of the Solicitor General's contentions: it was proper to make count 1 the lead count with others concurrent, but the total sentence had to reflect the overall gravity. Turning to culpability and harm, the Court concluded that aggravating features—particularly grooming, the Victim's severe psychological harm and particular vulnerability (including age), the location, intoxication, and expressed intent to impregnate—required raising the notional starting point for a mature adult from 8 years to 9 years for the rape; for the other sexual offences the notional sentence after trial for a mature adult should have been 6 years because of multiple offending and aggravation. Applying totality, the Court found that the notional sentence for a mature adult should have been at least 12 years overall. Allowing a reduction for the Defendant's immaturity, the Court reduced that notional 12 years to 8 years for the Defendant. Applying the agreed 15% credit for the guilty plea produced a sentence of 6 years and 8 months on count 1. The Court left the concurrent structure of other sentences unchanged. The Court grounded these adjustments on (a) the applicable Definitive Guidelines, (b) the aggravating features demonstrated by the facts, (c) the mitigating material (notably immaturity and health), and (d) the totality principle.

Holding and Implications

The Court granted the Solicitor General's application for leave to refer the sentences under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and quashed the sentence on count 1, substituting a sentence of 6 years and 8 months' custody on that count.

Practical consequences: the Defendant's sentence for rape (count 1) was increased to 6 years and 8 months' custody; other sentences remain concurrent and unchanged. The decision applied established sentencing principles and adjusted the sentence to reflect aggravating features, mitigation and guilty plea credit. The opinion does not purport to create a new principle of law beyond its application of existing authority.