AM & Anor v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellants are nationals of The State of Kurdish ethnicity: the primary Appellant (born 12 January 1993) and her child (born 1 April 2019). The primary Appellant gave evidence that she had been the subject of an arranged marriage to Individual A (a maternal cousin) but married Individual D instead. Individual A, who has an affiliation with Company A, allegedly recovered from serious injury in 2021, returned to The Region and made repeated threats to the Appellant, including an incident in which he attended the Appellants' home with armed men and threatened the child. The Appellants reported the threats to the police but were told nothing could be done because of Individual A's connection to Company A. Shortly after, the Appellants left The State via The State C and arrived in The State D on 30 April 2021, where they claimed asylum. Company B refused the claim in a decision dated 24 July 2023.

The Appellants appealed. The First-tier Tribunal (Judge McQuillan) heard the appeal on 13 August 2024 and promulgated a written determination dismissing the appeal on 9 September 2024. The Appellants appealed to the Upper Tribunal (Judge Kebede and Judge Alis), which dismissed the appeal on 13 March 2025 and refused permission to appeal on 2 April 2025. On 30 July 2025 Judge Zacaroli granted permission to appeal on Ground 1 and adjourned permission on Ground 2 to a rolled-up hearing. The court below (this court) granted permission on Ground 2 and allowed the appeal on both grounds, remitting the case to the FTT for re-hearing by a different tribunal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the FTT's reasoning was irrational or unreasonable in using adverse findings on peripheral/post‑flight credibility matters to undermine the reliability of the Appellant's account on the central/pre‑flight elements bearing on risk (Ground 1).
2. Whether the FTT failed to make clear findings as to the weight it attached to the evidence of the Appellant's husband (Individual D), leaving the reader unable to determine what the FTT made of his evidence (Ground 2).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Attorney Greer)

• The FTT failed to make findings on the essential factual elements bearing on the Appellant's fear of honour‑based violence (the pre‑flight matters: arranged marriage, Individual A's injury and return, threats including armed visit, police complaint, Company A affiliation), and instead relied on adverse credibility findings about peripheral/post‑flight matters (e.g., why asylum was not claimed in The State C, identity documents, assistance from Individual E) without explaining the logical connection to core risk.
• The FTT did not properly address or weigh Individual D's first‑hand evidence on events in The State relevant to risk and on the question of assistance from his uncle, leaving it unclear which parts of his evidence were accepted or rejected.

Respondent's Arguments (Attorney Barnes / Company B)

• The judge properly addressed credibility, which the parties had identified as the central issue; a global credibility finding can be applied to the key issues and the judge was entitled to reach an overall conclusion that the Appellant had not discharged the lower standard of proof.
• Although the Determination could have been clearer, the criticisms do not amount to an error of law; the FTT appropriately applied evaluative techniques and considered the Appellant's evidence across distinct areas, including matters the UT identified as bearing on risk.
• Individual D's evidence did not advance the Appellant's case materially on the central issues, and the judge was not required to address every item of evidence exhaustively.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the Determination and the UT decision for material error of law, applying the authorities on appellate review, the lower standard of proof in protection cases, and the requirements for credibility assessment.

The court accepted that credibility may properly be assessed globally and that findings on peripheral/post‑flight matters can be relevant to overall credibility. Nevertheless, the court found that the FTT's written Determination left it impossible to discern which of the key pre‑flight indicia of risk the judge accepted or rejected. The FTT used conditional language ("should I accept…", "if I accept her account…") when discussing matters central to risk, but did not make explicit findings on those matters. The judge reached a conclusion that the Appellant's credibility was "sufficiently damaged" without identifying which core elements were rejected or explaining why the parts he accepted did not, on the lower standard, establish a real risk.

The court further analysed the treatment of Individual D's evidence and found that references to his evidence were sparse and equivocal. Given Individual D's first‑hand knowledge of pre‑flight events (and of matters regarding assistance from Individual E), the absence of clear findings as to what of his testimony was accepted or rejected meant the Determination failed to show how the tribunal weighed that evidence in relation to risk.

Overall, there was a break in the essential chain of reasoning: the FTT acknowledged that some parts of the Appellant's account might be true, but did not explain why those parts did not meet the applicable lower standard of proof. That failure amounted to an error of law warranting interference.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED

The court would grant permission on Ground 2 and allow the appeal on both grounds. The court concluded that the First‑tier Tribunal's Determination contained an error of law in reasoning and remitted the case to the First‑tier Tribunal to be re‑heard by a different tribunal.

Direct effect: the Appellants' appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted for re‑hearing. The opinion does not purport to establish any new legal principle beyond its application of existing authorities.