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Mullen, R. v
Factual and Procedural Background
The Defendant, born 7 May 1991, was tried on a joint indictment arising from two separate sets of sexual offences: offences committed in September 2013 when he was 22 (against Victim A) and offences committed in August 2020 when he was 29 (against Victim B). At trial on 22 August 2025 the jury convicted the Defendant of three counts of rape (relating to Victim A), one count of rape (relating to Victim B) and one count of sexual assault (relating to Victim B); one allegation of sexual assault was ordered to lie on the file. On 3 October 2025 Judge Godfrey sentenced the Defendant to concurrent and consecutive terms producing an overall determinate sentence of 11 years' imprisonment and imposed a statutory surcharge order.
The Solicitor General applied under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for leave to refer the sentences as unduly lenient. This Court considered the Final Reference, the sentencing judge's findings of fact, victim personal statements, a report provided for the appeal, sentencing notes and oral submissions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sentences imposed by the sentencing judge were unduly lenient within the meaning of section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
- If unduly lenient, what adjustment to the individual sentences and overall totality was just and proportionate in light of the Sentencing Council's Definitive Guideline on rape (assessment of harm and culpability, starting points and category ranges) and the principle of totality.
Arguments of the Parties
Solicitor General (Attorney Jarvis)
- The overall sentence of 11 years was unduly lenient given multiple serious rapes against two different victims, some occasions when victims were asleep (heightened vulnerability) and category 2B starting points of 8 years for the relevant rapes.
- The sentencing judge reduced sentences on counts 2 and 3 from the category starting point to levels beneath the category range and then reduced them further for totality, producing a sentence too low to reflect culpability and harm.
- While consecutive ordering was permissible, the aggregate sentence should have been considerably longer than 11 years.
Respondent (Attorney Animashaun)
- The sentences on counts 2 and 3 were correctly adjusted by the sentencing judge in light of mitigation (youth at time of some offences, lengthy and partly pre-charge delay, previous good character and post-offending conduct).
- The sentencing judge applied the correct totality approach; downward adjustment for totality was required when consecutive sentences were imposed.
- The judge properly assessed harm and vulnerability and the sentence was proportionate compared with relevant comparative decisions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Attorney-General's Reference (No 4 of 1989) (1990) 90 Cr App R 366 | Structure of section 36 CJA 1988: sentence may be increased only if unduly lenient; definition of unduly lenient as outside the range which a judge applying his mind to relevant factors could reasonably consider appropriate; and the Court's residual discretion even if sentence is unduly lenient. | The Court applied the principles to assess whether the sentencing judge's reductions and totality adjustments produced a sentence outside the reasonable range; these principles framed the threshold and the appellate discretion. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded on the sentencing judge's factual findings. It reviewed the Sentencing Council Guideline for rape: category assessment (harm and culpability), starting points and ranges, and the guideline's instruction that adjustments may be required and that severe cases can merit much higher sentences.
The Court agreed the relevant rapes (counts 2, 3 and 4) fell within category 2B (starting point 8 years; range 7–9 years). It accepted the sentencing judge's decision to order the two temporal sets of offences to run consecutively but examined the reductions applied for mitigation and totality.
The Court found the sentencing judge's reduction of counts 2 and 3 from the 8-year starting point to 6 years and then to 5 years (below the category range for a single offence) was too great, even allowing for totality. The Court acknowledged that cumulative notional sentences would have indicated a much longer total (the Court observed a notional sum that could have been 16 years or more) but recognised the need for a totality adjustment.
Balancing aggravating and mitigating features and applying the principles of totality, the Court concluded a different incremental adjustment was warranted: increase counts 2 and 3 to 6 years concurrent and increase count 4 to 7 years (to run consecutively to counts 2 and 3), leaving counts 1 and 6 unchanged.
Holding and Implications
The Court granted leave to refer and concluded the original sentences on counts 2, 3 and 4 were unduly lenient.
Disposition: The Court quashed the sentences on counts 2, 3 and 4 and substituted sentences of 6 years on each of counts 2 and 3 (to run concurrently) and 7 years on count 4 (to run consecutively), producing an overall determinate sentence of 13 years' imprisonment. Sentences on counts 1 and 6 remain unchanged and concurrent.
Implications: The immediate effect is an increased total sentence for the Defendant from 11 to 13 years. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel principle of law beyond applying established guidance on sentencing categories, mitigation, totality and the section 36 test.
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