Summary of Opinion — Judge Cubie

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff, a company formed to represent local interest in education on The Island, sought judicial review of the Defendant's decision of 7 March 2025 selecting a preferred site for a new 2-18 single-site campus. The Defendant is the local authority responsible for education on The Island. The Defendant had earlier (20 December 2024) determined to proceed with a single-site campus (a "like for like" replacement) after obtaining funding via the Funding Programme (LEIP) and adopting a Learning Estate Strategy. A competitive funding bid was submitted and accepted into phase 3 of LEIP. Following public engagement and a call for sites, four short-listed sites were scored by officials. Shortly before the elected members' meeting, Persons A and B (landowners of Site B) sent a letter offering to gift their site subject to collaboration on adjacent housing infrastructure. The Plaintiff and Community Group A advanced surveys and commentary favouring split-site options. The Defendant's elected members met on 7 March 2025 and confirmed "Site 4 - Town A South" as the preferred site; that decision is challenged in these proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the petition is competent — i.e. whether the Defendant's site-selection decision of 7 March 2025 is amenable to judicial review.
2. Whether the Defendant acted unlawfully by failing to make adequate enquiries about the offer from Persons A and B (the landowner gift letter).
3. Whether the Defendant's site-selection decision was irrational because of inadequate consultation with the island community (including treatment of the Community Group A survey).
4. Whether the procedure used at the 7 March 2025 meeting (including recording of dissent and standing orders) involved a procedural flaw invalidating the decision.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The Defendant failed to inform itself and elected members adequately about the landowners' offer to gift Site B, and therefore proceeded without material facts.
• The Defendant acted irrationally by presenting members with options premised on closure of education provision in Town A and by failing to conduct adequate consultation with the wider island community.
• The Defendant failed to comply with its standing orders and constitutional voting procedure at the meeting, vitiating the decision.

Defendant's Arguments

• The petition is incompetent because site selection was part of the LEIP/RIBA process and contractual/administrative stages not susceptible to review; alternatively, any decision was within the Defendant's discretionary statutory powers.
• The Defendant had no obligation to make the further enquiries sought by the Plaintiff in the stage-0/RIBA context; the landowners' letter invited negotiation and was not an unconditional gift susceptible to de plano acceptance.
• There was no general common-law duty to consult beyond engagement; the Defendant's engagement steps were reasonable and, in any event, a December 2024 decision rejecting a split-site made further consultation on that option immaterial.
• The meeting procedure complied with standing orders: no competent amendment or alternative motion was moved, and recording of dissent requires a competent motion or amendment under the standing orders.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Stannifer Developments Ltd v Glasgow Development Agency (No 2) 1998 SCLR 870	Gateways for duty of procedural fairness; factors admitting supervisory jurisdiction.	Used to conclude that certain statutory decision-making can attract procedural fairness and supervisory jurisdiction; supported competence analysis.
Stannifer Developments Ltd v Glasgow Development Agency (IH) 1999 SC 156	Limits on general duty to act fairly; examples when duty arises (quasi-judicial decisions, deprivation of rights/benefits).	Referred to in assessing whether the Defendant's decision attracted a duty of fairness.
Redcroft Care Homes Ltd v Edinburgh City Council 2025 SC 103	Recent discussion of supervisory jurisdiction and tripartite relationship test; contract-context decisions may be reviewable if statutory power/exercise independent of contract.	Supported proposition that contractual or funding context does not automatically exclude judicial review; guided competence conclusion.
AXA General Insurance Ltd, Petitioners 2012 SC (UKSC) 122	Courts' role in preservation of the rule of law and supervisory jurisdiction beyond protection of private rights.	Supported public-interest basis for supervisory jurisdiction analysis; court declined to need full AXA test but relied on its principles.
R (on the application of Plantagenet Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Justice and others [2015] 3 All ER 261	Duty to carry out sufficient inquiry (Tameside duty) and standards for reasonable inquiry.	Applied principles to assess whether Defendant's refusal to investigate the landowners' letter was irrational or insufficient inquiry.
Secretary of State for Education and Science v Metropolitan Borough of Tameside [1976] 3 All ER 665; [1977] AC 1014	Foundational statement of duty to make sufficient inquiry before decision.	Adopted as the basis for the reasonable-inquiry analysis (Tameside duty) regarding the Knights' letter.
R (on the application of Khatun) v Newham London BC [2004] EWCA Civ 55; [2005] QB 37	Decision-maker determines manner/intensity of inquiry; court limited to Wednesbury review.	Supported deference to Defendant's reasonable choice of inquiry intensity.
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1947] 2 All ER 680; [1948] 1 KB 223	Wednesbury unreasonableness standard for judicial review.	Framed the standard for assessing whether Defendant's inquiries or decisions were irrational.
R v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London BC, ex p Bayani (1990) 22 HLR 406	Intervention only if no reasonable authority could be satisfied on inquiries made.	Reinforced threshold for intervening on adequacy of inquiry.
R v Nottingham City Council, ex p Costello (1989) 21 HLR 301	Court should only strike down decision not to make further inquiries if no reasonable authority would have considered inquiries sufficient.	Adopted in evaluating Defendant's decision not to investigate further.
Ibrahimi v GCC 2026 CSIH 4	Recent authority affirming limited circumstances for intervention under Tameside principles.	Fortified conclusion that no unreasonable failure to inquire existed in the present facts.
R v Barnet London Borough Council ex parte Varies House School Ltd	Example of consultation requirements prior to disposal of land held for educational purposes.	Referenced in discussion of when statutory duties give rise to consultation obligations.
R (on the application of Harrow Community Support Unit) v Secretary of State for Defence [2012] EWHC 1921	No general duty to consult at common law.	Supported Defendant's submission that there is no overarching common-law duty to consult.
R (on the application of Cheshire East BC) v Secretary of State for Environment Food and Rural Affairs [2011] EWHC 1975	Circumstances where common-law duty to consult arises.	Used in consultation duty analysis.
R (on the application of Bhatt Murphy (a firm)) v Independent Assessor; R (on the application of Niazi) v Secretary of State for the Home Dept [2008] EWCA Civ 755	Common-law reluctance to require consultation absent clear assurance or practice.	Supported conclusion that no legitimate expectation to consult arose from the decision context.
R (on the application of BAPIO Action Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Dept [2007] EWCA Civ 1139	Limits on open-ended consultation duties.	Referred to in defining scope of consultation obligations.
R (on the application of Hillingdon London BC) v Lord Chancellor [2008] EWHC 2683	Court should not add consultation burden absent democratic choice.	Supported restraint in imposing extra procedural obligations on elected bodies.
Board of Education v Rice [1911] AC 179	Common-law supply of fairness where statute silent.	Referenced on when courts import fairness obligations.
R (on the application of Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Dept; R (on the application of Amirthanathan) v Secretary of State for the Home Dept [2003] EWCA Civ 1768	Legitimate expectation may arise from express representation to consult.	Used in analysis of whether any promise to consult existed.
R (on the application of Davies) v Revenue and Customs Comrs; R (on the application of Gaines-Cooper) v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2011] UKSC 47	Clarity and unconditionality required for practice to create legitimate expectation.	Applied in testing whether engagement amounted to enforceable expectation to consult.
R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan [2000] 3 All ER 850	Unfairness/abuse threshold for legitimate expectation remedies.	Referenced in legitimate-expectation limb of consultation analysis.
R (Moseley) v Haringey London Borough Council [2014] UKSC 56	Gunning requirements for consultation content and timing.	Applied to test whether any engagement met the essential requirements of consultation.
R (Medway Council) v Secretary of State for Transport Local Government and the Regions [2003] JPL 583	Fairness may require consideration of arguable yet discarded options.	Considered in paragraphing of consultation obligations.
Westminster City Council v Greater London Council [1986] 2 All ER 278; [1986] AC 668	Limits to legitimate-expectation doctrine where expectations arise from scale/context alone.	Supported rejection of claim that scale of decision alone creates duty to consult.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed competence. Applying Stannifer and subsequent authorities (including Redcroft and AXA), the court held that the discrete decision of 7 March 2025 selecting a preferred site was amenable to the supervisory jurisdiction because it flowed from statutory educational powers and could affect all persons within the statutory remit. The challenge was therefore competent.

On the Knights' (Persons A and B) letter, the court applied the Tameside/Plantagenet principles on the duty to inquire. The court held the obligation was to take such reasonable steps as were appropriate in context (RIBA stage 0 and the LEIP/funding constraints). The landowners' letter was read (and supported by the landowner's affidavit) as a conditional statement of intent inviting further work and collaboration rather than an unconditional gift. Given the stage-0, desk-based appraisal process, the use of independent valuation and the prospect that acquisition/procurement issues were matters for later RIBA stages, the court concluded no unreasonable failure to inquire arose. The Tameside threshold for intervention was not met; no reasonable council in possession of the material would have been compelled to make the further enquiries the Plaintiff demanded.

On consultation, the court analysed the applicable principles (Plantagenet, Gunning and related authorities). It held there is no general common-law duty to consult; such a duty arises only in limited circumstances (statute, promise, established practice, or exceptional conspicuous unfairness). The court found the Defendant's engagement steps constituted engagement rather than a legally enforceable promise to consult on precise shortlisted sites; the prior December 2024 decision to reject a split-site option materially limited what consultation could achieve. Even if a duty to consult had been arguable, the court concluded the engagement undertaken addressed the substantive matters relevant to site selection and did not give rise to conspicuous unfairness. Accordingly the consultation-related challenge failed.

On procedural challenge to the meeting/vote, the court accepted the Defendant's explanation of standing-order practice: absent a competent amendment or alternative motion, the officer recommendation stood as the proposition before the council. Members who sought their dissent to be recorded had not moved a competent motion or amendment required by the standing orders. The court found no procedural irregularity sufficient to vitiate the decision.

Overall the court sustained the Defendant's preliminary pleas on competence aspects it advanced, rejected the Plaintiff's primary substantive grounds (failure to inquire; inadequate consultation; procedural flaw) and concluded the March decision was lawfully reached.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

Holding: The petition for judicial review is dismissed. The court held:

• The 7 March 2025 site-selection decision is amenable to review (action competent).
• No unlawful failure to make further inquiry arose from the landowners' letter; the decision not to pursue further enquiries at stage 0 was reasonable.
• There was no legal obligation to conduct wider consultation in the manner urged; the engagement undertaken was adequate and failure to consult did not produce conspicuous unfairness.
• There was no procedural irregularity in the council meeting/vote sufficient to vitiate the decision.

Direct effect: The Defendant's decision of 7 March 2025 remains in force and the Plaintiff's petition is dismissed. The court ordered that the Defendant's pleas in law numbers 4, 5 and 6 be sustained and the Plaintiff's pleas be repelled; costs issues were left for agreement or further enrolment.