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Underwood, R. v
Factual and Procedural Background
The Defendant was born on 23 November 1964. On 11 September 2025 at the Crown Court at The City he pleaded guilty to an offence of attempting to incite a child to engage in sexual activity contrary to section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. On 3 October 2025 Judge Carr sentenced the Defendant to 18 months' imprisonment suspended for 2 years, with a rehabilitation activity requirement of up to 20 days, a victim surcharge, a sexual harm prevention order for 10 years, and an order for forfeiture and destruction of a mobile telephone. Notification requirements under Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and possible listing by the Disclosure and Barring Service were noted.
The factual background (undisputed for present purposes) was that the Defendant engaged in online sexual communications over several weeks with what he believed to be a 13‑year‑old child but which was a decoy run by Group A. He incited the decoy to digitally penetrate herself and solicited indecent images. Contact began on 23 December 2022 via Company A using an alias. The organisation running the decoy identified the Defendant by IP address, arranged a "sting" on 11 January 2023 at the Defendant's home, detained him, live‑streamed the incident, and called the police, who arrested him. The Defendant first appeared in the magistrates' court on 21 July 2025 and the case was sent to the Crown Court; a not guilty plea was initially indicated but the Defendant pleaded guilty at the Crown Court plea and trial preparation hearing on 11 September 2025. A pre‑sentence report was prepared.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sentence imposed by the Crown Court was unduly lenient.
- Whether, by reference to the Sentencing Guideline, the offence fell into culpability category 1A (and the appropriate starting point and range for sentence).
- Whether the suspended sentence was permissible in light of the Imposition Guideline and authorities indicating that immediate custody will usually be required for offences of this type.
Arguments of the Parties
Attorney Hole (on behalf of the Solicitor General)
- Submitted the total sentence was unduly lenient.
- Accepted the case was category 1 for harm but argued the judge failed to take sufficient account of factors indicative of category A culpability (noting significant age disparity and solicitation of sexual images) and thus the case should have been placed in category 1A.
- Contended the sentence should not have been suspended: the judge did not properly apply the Imposition Guideline and appropriate punishment required immediate custody.
- Relied on authorities (including R v Reed & Ors) that usually immediate imprisonment is inevitable for offences of this type, subject to exceptional circumstances.
Attorney Quaife (on behalf of the Respondent)
- Contended the sentence was not unduly lenient and was just and proportionate when passed by an experienced judge.
- Accepted the offence fell into category 1 and, by concession, into culpability category A, but argued the judge was entitled to go below the category range given the particular circumstances and mitigation.
- Submitted that, although the judge did not explicitly reference the Imposition Guideline, suspension was permissible here because of personal mitigation, the pre‑sentence report's conclusions about the Defendant's sexual interests, and the prospect of rehabilitation; noted the Defendant had complied with the rehabilitation requirement since sentence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Timpson [2023] EWCA Crim 453 | Guidance on effect of delays: where there has been unreasonable delay in proceedings since apprehension (not the offender's fault) the court may reduce sentence; reductions are usually less than 25% for serious offences. | The court relied on this guidance when considering the limited mitigating effect of delay in the Defendant's favour. |
| R v Stewart [2016] EWCA Crim 2238 | Principle that Law Officers and the Court are not bound by a concession made by the prosecution. | The court relied on that principle to permit the Solicitor General to challenge the prosecution's earlier concession regarding culpability factors. |
| R v Reed & Ors [2021] EWCA Crim 572; [2022] 1 Cr App R(S) 6 | Authority that usually immediate imprisonment will be inevitable for offences of this type; suspension may be permitted only in exceptional circumstances. | The court applied this authority in concluding that, notwithstanding mitigation, the appropriate punishment required immediate custody in this case. |
| R v BRJ [2023] EWCA Crim 351 | Observations concerning the Reference procedure under the 1988 Act. | The court cited this authority in the context of the Reference procedure and its established practice. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court accepted the Solicitor General's submissions and concluded the sentence was unduly lenient. The court endorsed that the substantive offence, judged by the Definitive Guideline on Sexual Activity with a Child/Causing or Inciting a Child to Engage in Sexual Activity, fell into culpability category 1A, with a starting point of 5 years' custody and a category range of 4 to 10 years. The court explained that any downward adjustment for the victim being a decoy must be very small because the offence was prevented for reasons beyond the Defendant's control.
The court allowed some mitigation for the Defendant's previous good character and delay, but concluded the notional sentence after trial could not have been below 4 years' custody. Applying the 25% reduction for the guilty plea produced a notional sentence of 3 years' imprisonment. The court considered the Imposition Guideline and authorities (noting Reed), and determined that suspension was inappropriate because appropriate punishment required immediate custody. The court therefore quashed the suspended sentence and substituted a sentence of immediate custody.
Holding and Implications
The Crown Court's suspended sentence was quashed and substituted with a sentence of 3 years' immediate custody.
Direct effect: the Defendant's suspended sentence imposed by Judge Carr was quashed and replaced by a 3‑year term of immediate imprisonment; the court ordered the Defendant to surrender to the custody suite referred to by the Solicitor General by the time stated in court (4.00 pm on the day of the hearing as recorded). The opinion does not purport to establish a new general precedent beyond its application of existing guidelines and authorities.
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