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Ulemu Chimwala v The Residential Tenancies Board and Anor (Approved)

High Court of Ireland
Feb 10, 2026
Smart Summary (Beta)

Summary of High Court Judgment (2026 IEHC 71)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant has occupied "The Property" since 9 July 2019 under a lease. The Notice Party (the Landlord) served a warning notice for rent arrears (23 October 2023) and a Termination Notice delivered on 27 November 2023. The Appellant applied to the Residential Tenancies Board ("the Tribunal"/"the Respondent") on 29 November 2023 alleging breaches by the Landlord and challenging the validity of termination notices; the Landlord claimed rent arrears and other breaches.

An adjudication on 14 June 2024 found the 25 July 2023 termination notice invalid, found the November 2023 Termination Notice valid and ordered vacation, awarded the Appellant €3,000 damages and found rent arrears. The Appellant sought further review; a full rehearing by a Tenancy Tribunal occurred on 19 November 2024 and a Determination (18 December 2024) found the November 2023 Termination Notice valid, ordered vacation within 42 days, awarded the Appellant €6,000 in damages and directed the Appellant to pay net arrears of €6,947.49.

The unusual factual feature is that the Termination Notice as served to the Appellant was in fact signed by the Landlord, but the Tribunal had before it only the first page without the signature page and proceeded on the (mistaken) belief that the notice lacked a signature. The Appellant brought an appeal on a point of law under section 123(3) of the Residential Tenancies Act 2004; Judge Cahill delivered judgment on 10 February 2026 dismissing the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether it was ultra vires or erroneous as a matter of law for the Tribunal to treat the apparent absence of the Landlord's signature on a termination notice as a "slip or omission" within the meaning of section 64A of the Residential Tenancies Act 2004, such that the notice remained valid.
  2. Whether a failure to include a landlord's signature on the face of a notice of termination can be excused under section 64A, and if so, whether the Tribunal correctly applied that provision in the circumstances.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Act requires the landlord's signature on the face of a notice as a core statutory ingredient of a valid notice; this cannot be treated as a mere "slip or omission" under section 64A.
  • The Appellant lacked legal representation at the Tribunal hearing and had medical issues, so she did not raise the signature point then.
  • The omission of a signature prejudiced the tenant because it led to termination of a tenancy of over five years.
  • There was no authorised agent within the meaning of section 12(1)(e) to sign on behalf of the Landlord.
  • The fact that the execution page (the page containing the signature) was not before the Tribunal is irrelevant; the appeal must proceed on the unsigned, one-page document that was before the Tribunal.
  • The signature exhibited elsewhere was not the Landlord's and the Landlord admitted he did not sign (alleged forgery).

Respondent's (Tribunal) Position

  • The Termination Notice as served on the Appellant was in fact signed; the Appellant is estopped from asserting prejudice on that basis.
  • The Tribunal applied section 64A correctly; there was no error of law and its exercise of discretion was proper.
  • The Appellant did not raise the signature issue before the Tribunal and cannot raise a new case on appeal.
  • The appropriate relief (if any error existed) would be subject to section 123(5) of the Act.
  • Affidavits from the Chairperson of the Tribunal and the Acting Deputy Director verified the factual position that the Tribunal only had the first page and that the signed page was not before it.

Notice Party's Evidence

  • The Notice Party (the Landlord) gave evidence that the served documents were signed and, in response to questioning, indicated that a signature appearing on certain documents was his.
  • The Landlord stated that an individual (referred to in the hearing transcript by a first name) typed and assisted with paperwork; no contention before the Tribunal that an agent signed on the Landlord's behalf was pursued by the Appellant at that hearing.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Deely v. The Information Commissioner [2001] 3 IR 439 Principles governing appeals on a point of law (limits on overturning findings of fact and inferences). Applied to assess whether there was evidence to support Tribunal findings and whether inferences were ones no reasonable Tribunal could draw.
Doyle v PRTB [2015] IEHC 724 Application of Deely principles in the RTB context. Cited as an example of Deely's application to appeals under section 123.
Marwaha v. RTB [2016] IEHC 308 Application of Deely principles in the RTB context. Cited as authority for appeal principles in RTB cases.
Web Summit v. RTB [2023] IEHC 634 Emphasis that appeals may not succeed unless there was no evidence to support primary findings or inferences were ones no Tribunal could reasonably reach. Used to reinforce the high threshold for overturning Tribunal factual inferences.
Rotunda Hospital v. Information Commissioner [2013] 1 IR 1 Points of law advanced on appeal must have been advanced, argued and determined at first instance. Applied to limit admissible points on appeal and to emphasise that new points not argued below are normally not permitted.
Fitzpatrick v. Residential Tenancies Board [2023] IEHC 229 The point of law must arise from the determination under appeal; the High Court is not hearing de novo. Applied to conclude the Tribunal's decision on the signature issue was properly the subject of this appeal because the Tribunal had decided it.
Heather Hill Management Company CLG & McGoldrick v an Bord Pleanala [2024] 2 IR 222 Statutory interpretation principles: start with the words of the section and consider context, framework and legislative object. Applied in interpreting section 64A and its plain meaning.
Foley v. Johnson [2017] IEHC 424 PRTB/RTB proceedings are relatively informal and legal representation is not necessary. Cited in considering whether lack of legal representation affected the Appellant's failure to raise the signature point.
Stulpinaite v. Residential Tenancies Board [2021] IEHC 178 Approval of informality and non-necessity of lawyer in RTB proceedings. Cited in the context of the Appellant's lack of representation.
Hyland v. Residential Tenancies Board [2017] IEHC 557 Authority on admissibility of new points on appeal where not argued below. Cited by analogy on the limits of raising new points on appeal.
Governors & Guardians of the Hospital for the Relief of Poor Lying-in Women, Dublin v. Information Commissioner [2011] IESC 26, [2013] 1 I.R. 1 Reasoning on when appellate courts should decline points of law not raised before the primary decision-maker. Referred to in discussing the boundary of points admissible on appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The High Court (Judge Cahill) proceeded on the basis that this was an appeal on a point of law only and applied the Deely line of authorities to limit interference with factual findings and inferences unless no evidence supported them or they were ones no reasonable Tribunal could draw.

The court identified five issues: (1) the relevance of the missing signature page (the Tribunal had only the unsigned page when deciding); (2) whether omission of a signature can be treated as an omission within section 64A; (3) whether the Tribunal acted ultra vires or erred in applying section 64A here; (4) the significance of the Appellant's lack of legal representation; and (5) adequacy of reasons.

On statutory interpretation the court applied the ordinary rules (citing Heather Hill) and concluded that the plain words of section 64A permit the Tribunal to treat a slip or omission in a notice of termination as not of itself invalidating the notice provided two conditions are met: (a) the slip does not prejudice, in a material respect, the notice, and (b) the notice is otherwise in compliance with the Act. The court rejected the Appellant's contention that a signature is a non-derogable "core" requirement of section 62 that section 64A cannot excuse; there is nothing in the text or context to read such a limitation into section 64A.

Applying the Deely standard to the Tribunal's findings, the court held that the Tribunal's conclusion that the absence of a signature (as the Tribunal perceived it) was a slip not materially prejudicing the notice and that the notice was otherwise compliant was a conclusion a reasonable Tribunal could reach on the material before it. The court further held that the Appellant's lack of legal representation did not excuse her failure to raise the signature point at the hearing and did not justify overturning the Tribunal's findings. The court found the reasons given by the Tribunal addressed the statutory criteria of section 64A and were adequate.

The court also observed the artificiality that the omission did not in fact exist (the served notice was signed) and noted that the Appellant's additional factual assertions about forgery or agency were not before the Tribunal and could not properly be the basis of this appeal.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Holding: The High Court rejected the Appellant's challenge and refused the reliefs sought. The Court found no error of law or ultra vires application by the Tribunal in applying section 64A to treat the apparent absence of a signature (on the document before the Tribunal) as a forgivable slip where the statutory criteria were met.

Direct consequences: The Determination of the Tenancy Tribunal (that the Termination Notice was valid and related orders) stands. The Court indicated a provisional view that the Appellant should be liable for the costs incurred by the Tribunal and listed a costs hearing for 10:45am on 17 February 2026 to determine final costs orders.

This summary reflects the direct effect on the parties as set out in the judgment. The opinion does not state that it establishes any broader or novel precedent beyond its interpretation and application of section 64A to the facts before the Tribunal.