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Moss and Ors v An Coimisiun Pleanala and Anor (Approved)
Summary of Judgment (Anonymised)
Factual and Procedural Background
Judge Humphreys delivered judgment in judicial review proceedings brought by the Plaintiffs against Entity A, with Company A as notice party, challenging Entity A's grant of planning permission for a solar photovoltaic (PV) development with associated battery storage on lands in The Town, The County. The proposal sought a 10-year permission (40-year operational timeframe) for solar arrays, battery energy storage system (BESS) equipment, ancillary structures and internal tracks, accessed from three access points including The Road and an unnamed local road. The planning authority (Authority A) granted permission; the decision was appealed to Entity A, which issued a direction and later, by order dated 20 May 2025, granted permission subject to conditions.
The Plaintiffs filed judicial review proceedings (statement of grounds filed 14 July 2025). Leave was granted except as to core ground 5. The hearing occurred on 13 January 2026; draft judgment circulated 16 January 2026; judgment delivered 10 February 2026. The Plaintiffs sought certiorari quashing the grant of permission and ancillary relief, advancing core grounds concerning (inter alia) alleged failure to require EIA, challenge to reliance on the development plan, and alleged invalidity of the planning application documentation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Entity A lawfully determined that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) / EIAR was not required for the project, in particular whether internal access tracks amounted to a "private road" triggering mandatory EIA under Class 10(dd) of Schedule 5, Part 2.
- Whether Entity A unlawfully had regard to a development plan that the Plaintiffs alleged was affected by a Ministerial (draft) direction such that the plan was invalid for the purposes of decision-making.
- Whether the planning application and accompanying notices, maps and drawings were invalid for failure to comply with the Planning and Development Regulations 2001 (Articles 17–19, 22, 23), such that the application was void and any permission was vitiated.
- Whether any procedural unfairness arose from Entity A's handling of a s.132 notice and subsequent decision not to require an EIAR.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The internal access tracks were in substance "private roads" exceeding 2,000m and therefore fell within Class 10(dd) requiring EIA; Entity A erred by granting permission without EIAR.
- Entity A unlawfully relied on the Kilkenny City and County Development Plan 2021–2027 notwithstanding a Ministerial direction (alleged by Plaintiffs) affecting parts of Chapter 11, rendering the plan invalid for decision-making.
- The public notices, maps and drawings were insufficiently particularised (missing counts of panels, inverters, BESS components; inadequate maps/elevations/contours), rendering the application invalid under the 2001 Regulations.
- Entity A's change of view after issuing a s.132 notice and the manner of communicating/withdrawing reliance on that notice breached fair procedures and public participation rights.
Entity A's (Respondent) Arguments
- No Ministerial direction issued as alleged; only a draft direction existed — Plaintiffs' premise was incorrect; Plaintiffs failed to discharge onus of proving reliance on any inoperative plan provisions.
- S.132/133 regime permits Entity A to consider submissions and determine an appeal after a notice period; Entity A lawfully considered the developer's response and other submissions and concluded EIAR was not required.
- Pleadings on alleged regulatory non-compliance were deficient and speculative; the application documents, read as a whole, complied with the Regulations; Plaintiffs failed to show prejudice or specific non-compliance.
- On discretion, any technical non-compliance (if proved) would not warrant certiorari given public interest and absence of demonstrated prejudice.
Company A (Notice Party) Arguments
- The internal tracks are not "roads" for Class 10(dd) purposes; the design and stone/crushed-stone finish meant they were access tracks, consistent with recent authority (Cummins) and previous caselaw that solar farms are not EIA projects.
- The s.132 notice process was properly conducted; the developer's response was circulated and considered; Entity A acted within the scope of s.132/133.
- The application documentation provided required detail; Plaintiffs participated in the planning and appeal process and did not demonstrate inability to understand the proposal or any evidential prejudice.
- If any legal error were hypothetically made, discretion favored refusing relief.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 28 | That solar farms are not EIA projects; limits on recharacterisation of internal works as EIA-triggering. | Cited as authority that the characterisation advanced by Plaintiffs (tracks as roads) had been previously rejected; supported dismissal of EIA ground. |
| Sweetman v. An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 39 | Relevant authority on EIA and planning judicial review pleading standards. | Cited in support of precedent that solar projects are generally not EIA projects and pleading requirements for EU-based arguments. |
| Kavanagh v. An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 259 | Related support on EIA characterisation in planning context. | Referenced among authorities emphasising that solar farms are not EIA projects. |
| Reilly v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 659 | The "eight-fold" tests for judicial review (jurisdiction, workability, pleading, standing, material before decision-maker, onus, materiality, discretion). | Adopted as the framework for assessing whether relief should be granted; used to structure the court's analysis. |
| Foran v. An Coimisiún Pleanála & Glenveagh [2026] IEHC 23 | Referenced as part of judicial review jurisprudence. | Included among authorities illustrating the judicial review approach to planning decisions. |
| O'Sullivan v. Health Service Executive [2023] IESC 11 | Limits on re-argument via draft-judgment procedure; guidance on process for draft judgments. | Quoted regarding the use and restriction of draft judgments; informed procedural directions in the judgment. |
| O'Sullivan v. Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2017] IESC 75 | Warnings against treating non-trial administrative procedure as trial-like; limits on procedural expectations. | Cited in discussion of draft judgment restrictions and process expectations. |
| Attorney General v. Crosland (No. 2) [2021] UKSC 58 | Reasons for restricting publication of draft judgments in interests of administration of justice. | Applied to justify non-publication direction for the circulated draft judgment. |
| Sweeney v. Fahy [2014] IESC 50 | Judicial review concerns legality rather than correctness; not an appeal on merits. | Cited to underline the court's role in reviewing legality not reweighing merits. |
| State (Keegan) v. Stardust Compensation Tribunal [1986] I.R. 642 | Support for principle that judicial review is not an appeal on merits. | Referenced in setting out legal standard for judicial review. |
| Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3 | Limits of judicial substitution of view; legal standards for review. | Cited to reinforce that the court does not substitute its view for decision-taker's evaluative judgments. |
| R (Cart) v. Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28 | Distinguishing legal questions from recharacterised factual attacks. | Quoted for the proposition that arguments dressed as law may be factual attacks. |
| Stapleton v. An Bord Pleanála & Savona [2025] IEHC 178 | Recent planning judicial review authority referenced in context. | Cited among cases illustrating limits on merits review. |
| Moran v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 | Support on standards for evaluative judgement and pleading; onus of proof. | Used to illustrate application of review standards in planning cases and onus allocation. |
| Tesco Stores Ltd v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 WLR 759 | Evaluative judgments weight is for decision-taker. | Cited to show deference to administrative evaluative judgments. |
| Baby O v. Minister for Justice [2002] IESC 44 | Authority on evaluative judgments and deference. | Referenced to support deference principles in planning context. |
| M.E. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2008] IEHC 192 | On evaluative judgments and standard of review. | Cited among authorities on deference and evaluation. |
| Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52 | Authority on evaluative judgment deference in administrative decisions. | Referenced for principle that weight is for the decision-maker. |
| Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 13 | Evaluative judgements with planning content are reviewable on irrationality standard. | Cited for the standard applicable to planning evaluative judgments. |
| M.R. (Bangladesh) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 41 | Decisions must be read in a way that makes sense; avoid hyper-technical invalid readings. | Cited to support approach that decisions should be read to preserve validity where reasonable. |
| Rostas v. DPP [2021] IEHC 60 | On reading decisions sensibly; avoiding literalistic invalidation. | Referenced in reasoning about reading administrative decisions in context. |
| St. Margaret's Recycling v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 94 | Interpretive approach to administrative decisions to avoid invalidation when valid reading exists. | Used to support sensible reading of Entity A's decision. |
| E.M. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2024] IESC 3 | Decision-reading principles to avoid defeating validity. | Cited in support of overall interpretive approach. |
| Friends of Killymooney Lough v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 407 | Presumption of validity of administrative decisions; treatment of draft directions/plans. | Relied upon to reject speculative assertions about reliance on certain plan sections. |
| Mulloy v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 86 | Reading decisions to preserve validity. | Referenced for interpretive principles. |
| O'Donnell v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 381 | Read decisions in their substance; avoid micro-parsing. | Used to emphasise holistic reading. |
| Save Roscam Peninsula CLG v. An Bord Pleanála (No.6) [2024] IEHC 335 | Decision-reading and avoidance of semantic quibbles. | Cited among authorities on approach to administrative decisions. |
| Moore v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2016] IESC 70 | Distinguishing substance from technicalities; proportionality in relief. | Referred to when considering whether technical non-compliance warrants certiorari. |
| Save Cork City Community Association CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 52 | Discretion and proportionality in quashing decisions for technical procedural error. | Applied in discretion analysis regarding technical breaches. |
| Watchhouse Cross Shopping Centre v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 520 | Referenced regarding remedial discretion in planning review. | Cited in support of discretionary refusal of relief for minor defects. |
| Waltham Abbey v. An Bord Pleanála; Pembroke Road Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 30 | Statutory provisions should have workable interpretation. | Invoked to support workable reading of s.132/133 regime. |
| McGowan v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 405 | Discretion should avoid unworkable or unenforceable requirements. | Cited to support need for workable statutory interpretation. |
| An Taisce v. An Bord Pleanála (Kilkenny Cheese) [2022] IESC 8 | European law should not impose impossibly onerous obligations; standards for EIA/AA challenges. | Referenced in context of onus and scientific doubt in EIA/AA challenges. |
| A.P. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2011] IESC 2 | Applicants are confined to pleadings in judicial review. | Applied to criticize the Plaintiffs' scattergun pleadings. |
| Khashaba v. Medical Council [2016] IESC 10 | Pleading standards and limitation on raising unpleaded points. | Cited to support strict pleading requirements. |
| Casey v. Minister for Housing, Planning and Local Government [2021] IESC 42 | Pleading stringency in complex EU-related planning challenges. | Relied on to reject insufficiently particularised EU-law arguments. |
| Eglington Residents Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 209 | On fair procedures and public participation timing. | Cited in discussing Article 8 / public participation principles. |
| Reid v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 7) [2024] IEHC 27 | Pleading rules in planning judicial review; permissible amendments and particulars. | Referred to when assessing adequacy of Plaintiffs' pleadings. |
| People Over Wind & Anor v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors (No.1) [2015] IEHC 271 | Pleading requirements and EU-derived complexities. | Used to stress stringency of pleadings for EU law claims. |
| Ballyboden Tidy Towns Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IEHC 7 | Pleading precision and consequences of ambiguity. | Cited in criticism of scattergun pleadings. |
| Babington v. Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform & Ors. [2012] IESC 65 | Critique of repetitive and vague pleadings. | Quoted to describe risks of scattergun pleadings. |
| Eco Advocacy CLG v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 4) [2023] IEHC 713 | Standard for acceptable clarity in EU-law pleadings. | Cited to show that specific EU provisions need not be enumerated if identifiable with clarity. |
| Kennedy & Anor. v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 570 | Pleading standards and need for acceptable clarity. | Referenced in pleading analysis. |
| Leech v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 599 | On acceptable clarity in pleadings. | Cited in support of pleading standards. |
| Mount Salus Residents' ... v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 14 | Pleading clarity standard (illustrative). | Referenced in pleading jurisprudence. |
| Carvill v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IECA 84 | Court should address pleading objections before accepting points. | Invoked concerning developed pleading objections. |
| H.A. v. Minister for Justice [2022] IECA 166 | On shifting onus where applicant demonstrates error. | Cited to explain onus shifting to opposing parties once error demonstrated. |
| R v. Crischuk 2010 BCSC 716 | Onus of proof in environmental assessment challenges. | Used to state that applicants bear onus to prove EIA/AA deficiencies, typically by expert evidence. |
| Reid v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 1) [2021] IEHC 230 | Onus in AA/EIA context and demonstration by evidence. | Cited to support principle that applicants must establish scientific or factual shortcomings by evidence. |
| Carrownagowan Concern Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 300 | Onus and evidential requirements in environmental assessment challenges. | Referenced for evidential standards in EIA/AA challenges. |
| Nagle View Turbine Aware Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 603 | Applicants bear burden to establish scientific/factual shortcomings in EIA/AA. | Cited to reinforce that point. |
| Eco Advocacy v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET (ref) | On reasons sufficient to dispel scientific doubt in AA/EIA context. | Referred to for sufficiency of reasons standard in AA/EIA assessments. |
| Byrnes v. Dublin City Council [2017] IEHC 19 | Non-compliance with regulations does not automatically lead to certiorari; discretion applies. | Applied in discretion analysis when considering quashing permission for technical defects. |
| Pembroke Road Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2021] IEHC 403 | Discretion in quashing decisions for technical non-compliance. | Used to support discretionary refusal of certiorari. |
| Ballyboden Tidy Towns Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 722 | On discretionary remedies and pleading requirements. | Cited in analysis of discretion and remedial proportionality. |
| Heather Hill Management Company CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 43 | Interpretation of s.132/133 and conformity with EU law obligations; conforming interpretation principle. | Relied upon to show Entity A's lawful scope under s.132/133 and duty to interpret legislation compatibly with EU obligations. |
| Cummins v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 521 | Recent authority distinguishing access tracks from roads for EIA purposes. | Relied upon by Entity A and Company A; Court treated Cummins as persuasive in concluding tracks were not EIA-triggering roads. |
| Okunade v. Minister for Justice [2018] IESC 56 | Judicial review is not an exercise in formalism; balanced assessment required. | Invoked to frame the court's holistic assessment of Entity A's decision. |
| Additional domestic and EU authorities cited in text (various) | Support for general principles on pleading, onus, discretion, public participation and climate policy context. | Collected and applied throughout the judgment to inform the court's multi-faceted analysis. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by applying the established judicial-review framework (the "eight-fold" tests) focusing on workability, pleadings, onus of proof and discretionary remedy. Key analytical steps were:
- Framework: The court adopted the multi-factorial test for grant of relief (jurisdictional prerequisites; legal correctness and workability; specificity of pleadings; standing; material before decision-maker; onus; materiality; discretion).
- Pleadings: The court found Plaintiffs' pleadings in many respects insufficiently particularised. The complaints about the development plan and the planning documentation were described as scattergun and lacking a clear route-map tying alleged facts to relief.
- Development Plan challenge (Core Ground 2): The court accepted that only a draft ministerial direction existed; Plaintiffs' premise that a Ministerial Direction had issued was incorrect. There was no evidential basis that Entity A relied on any plan provisions rendered inoperative by the draft. The draft related to wind energy targets and in substance was pro-renewables; invoking it would not logically support quashing a renewable-energy approval.
- Validity of application documentation (Core Ground 3): The court examined the specific regulatory provisions cited (Articles 17–19, 22, 23) and concluded Plaintiffs failed to identify which precise provision was breached and why. On the facts the documentation contained much detail (including counts and dimensions in plans and planning report); Plaintiffs failed to discharge onus of proving non-compliance or prejudice. Even if a minor defect existed, discretion would disfavour certiorari.
- EIA issue (Core Grounds 1 and 4): The court accepted that Entity A issued a s.132 notice initially but later, after considering the developer's clarifications and submissions, concluded an EIAR was not required. The court held that s.132/133 permits that course; decision-makers may change view during the process and are not procedurally barred from doing so provided parties have opportunity to comment. Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the internal tracks were, as a matter of law and on the materials, "private roads" falling within Class 10(dd). The court relied on caselaw establishing that solar farms and internal tracks routinely do not trigger mandatory EIA and found no evidential basis to displace that conclusion.
- Onus and evidence: The court reiterated that the applicant bears the onus to establish defects in EIA/AA by admissible (often expert) evidence or by demonstrating a patent flaw on face of material. Plaintiffs did not discharge that onus.
- Discretion: Even if technical non-compliance had been shown, the court would refuse certiorari in exercise of discretion given lack of prejudice, participation by Plaintiffs in the process, the public interest in renewable energy and proportionality considerations.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court ordered that the proceedings be DISMISSED. Core grounds 1, 3 and 4 were dismissed; core ground 2 was formally moved and dismissed; core ground 5 was refused at leave stage; core ground 6 was withdrawn.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The Entity A decision granting planning permission for the proposed solar PV and BESS development remains in force; the Plaintiffs' challenge failed in full and the proceedings were dismissed. The court directed that unless any party applies otherwise on costs, there will be no order as to costs (with reserved costs).
- Precedential scope: The judgment applies established principles concerning pleading rigor, onus of proof in EIA/AA challenges, the lawful operation of s.132/133 and the court's discretionary approach to certiorari. No new legal test was created; the decision reinforces recent authorities that internal access tracks to solar farms do not routinely convert projects into mandatory EIA road projects absent clear evidential basis.
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