Anonymised Summary of Opinion delivered by Judge May

Factual and Procedural Background

Following a Crown Court trial on 5 June 2024 before Judge Slater and a jury, eight defendants were convicted of historical sexual offences against two young female victims identified in the judgment as C1 and C2. The offences occurred in The City when C1 and C2 were aged 11–15. Several defendants (the present applicants/appellants) sought leave to renew appeals against conviction or sentence, or otherwise appealed their sentences and/or restraining orders. Sentences were imposed on 13 September 2024 (with a later slip-rule amendment in one case). Restraining orders and the usual notification/barring requirements were made as appropriate. The applications and appeals considered included: (a) a renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction by one appellant; (b) an appeal against sentence and restraining order by another appellant with leave granted; (c) an appeal against a restraining order by a third appellant (having withdrawn an appeal against sentence); and (d) a renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence by a fourth appellant.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether a renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction should be granted where the central factual issue for the jury was consent, including the question whether the evidence of "groomed" consent was such that no properly directed jury could convict (i.e., the correctness of a submission of no case to answer).
2. Whether sentences imposed were manifestly excessive, including issues of categorisation under sentencing guidelines, totality, concurrency/temporality of multiple counts, and comparative consistency with co-defendants.
3. Whether restraining orders made at sentence were necessary and proportionate where notice had not been given in advance of mitigation and where the offending was historic.
4. Whether a renewed application to order a sentence to run consecutively to an earlier sentence (and consequent adjustment for totality) should succeed.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (renewed application) — Attorney Wood

• Submitted that, in relation to counts concerning sex in The Hotel between specified dates, no properly directed jury could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was the person with whom C2 had sex on that occasion.
• Argued that the evidence showed C2 had consented on each occasion and that this was one of the exceptional cases (as in Usman) where consent was unequivocal and the issue should have been withdrawn from the jury.
• Asserted absence of evidence of grooming by the appellant and of incapacity by reason of alcohol on the occasions of intercourse; relied on contemporaneous indications of choice and intelligence by C2.

Prosecution — Attorney Bean

• Contended there was sufficient evidence on both the identification issue and on lack of consent for the jury to decide: evidence included the wider circumstances (age, vulnerabilities, grooming indicators, missing-person records and reports from the children's home) and C2's ABE interview material indicating alcohol/drug use and grooming.
• Submitted that the judge had correctly refused the submission of no case to answer and that consent issues in grooming contexts are generally for the jury.

Appellant (appealing sentence) — Attorney McGonigal

• Argued that the total sentence was manifestly excessive and should have been concurrent given the similarity and temporal proximity of the offences against the same complainant; relied on totality and comparators (including co-defendants' sentences) and the statutory maximum for indecent assault.
• Challenged the imposition of a restraining order made without prior notice and without reasons given at sentence, arguing historic nature of offences made such order unnecessary.

Other submissions

• Prosecution and other counsel drew attention to guideline ranges, the judge's sentencing reasoning, and the need to protect victims; defence counsel for another appellant later withdrew the sentence appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Ali and Ashraf [2015] EWCA Crim 1279	Leading authority on "groomed" consent: principles that questions of capacity and consent are normally for the jury; where grooming is alleged, consent will usually be a jury question unless evidence clearly indicates proper consent; prosecution need not call overt evidence that complainant did not consent; grooming can mask lack of true consent.	The court set out the main principles from Ali and Ashraf and applied them to conclude the judge was right to leave consent to the jury in this case.
Usman [2021] EWCA Crim 502	Referencing rare cases where the evidence of consent is so unequivocal that the trial judge may withdraw the issue from the jury.	The court considered Usman and concluded this was not one of the rare cases; the judge had correctly refused the submission of no case to answer.
R v Adalat [2022] EWCA Crim 1538	Emphasises considering the wider context and that a complainant's own account cannot be taken in isolation from that context when assessing consent.	Cited as supportive authority for considering the wider context of grooming and vulnerabilities when assessing the reliability of expressed consent.
R v Forbes [2016] EWCA Crim 1388	Sentencing guidance reference: the need to consider Sentencing Council guidelines for equivalent offences and the maximum sentence for the offence charged.	The sentencing judge applied the guideline approach (noting categorisation between relevant categories) when determining starting points and overall sentence for indecent assault/related offences.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two main strands: (A) assessment of the renewed no-case submission and consent issues; and (B) sentencing and ancillary orders.

(A) Consent and identification issues

• The court reviewed the authorities on "groomed" consent (notably R v Ali and Ashraf, Usman and Adalat) and reiterated the principles that questions of capacity and consent are ordinarily for the jury, and that grooming can create circumstances in which apparent compliance masks lack of true consent.
• The court examined the judge's summing up and the ABE interview material for C2, noting evidence of grooming indicators (alcohol/drug giving, presents, use of hotels, swapping partners, statements by C2 that "nowt ever happened when we were sober").
• On the identification issue for the hotel count, the court reviewed available contemporaneous records (missing-person entries and a handwritten report from the children's home), C2's evidence that the appellant had been with her in hotels, and related testimony; it concluded there was sufficient evidence for a properly directed jury to conclude the appellant was the person involved.
• Applying the authorities, the court concluded this was not an exceptional case where a judge should withdraw the issue of consent from the jury; the judge had properly left both consent and identification issues to the jury.

(B) Sentencing and restraining orders

• The court reviewed the sentencing judge's application of sentencing guidelines (referencing R v Forbes) and his categorisation of offences in reaching starting points and ranges. It concluded the custodial element challenged on appeal (a 14-year custodial term in one appellant's aggregate) fell within guideline ranges and was not manifestly excessive.
• On totality and concurrency, the court noted that while the judge indicated a particular structuring during mitigation, the appellate focus is on the overall total; no misstep was identified that rendered the total manifestly excessive.
• Regarding restraining orders imposed at sentence, the court observed that (i) restraining orders must be necessary and proportionate; (ii) notice had not been given before mitigation in the cases of two appellants; and (iii) given the historic nature of the offending and absence of material demonstrating necessity, the court quashed the restraining orders made in those two cases.
• On an appellant already serving a long sentence who sought consecutive treatment, the court accepted the trial judge had expressly considered totality and adopted an approach (concurrency) within judicial discretion; the renewed application was refused.

Holding and Implications

Yasin (renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction): REFUSED. The court held the judge properly refused the submission of no case to answer; there was sufficient evidence on identification for the hotel count and ample evidence of grooming and surrounding circumstances such that consent was a jury question.

Amar (appeal against sentence and restraining order): FINAL DECISION — SENTENCE UPHELD; RESTRAINING ORDER QUASHED. The custodial element was within guideline ranges and not manifestly excessive; however, the restraining order was quashed because it had not been shown necessary and no prior notice had been given to defence counsel.

Ajaib (appeal against restraining order / sentence withdrawn): RESTRAINING ORDER QUASHED; APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE DISMISSED. The appellant withdrew the sentence appeal; the restraining order was quashed for the same reasons as Amar.

Saddiq (renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence): REFUSED. The court concluded the sentencing judge had properly considered totality and that the final sentence was not arguably manifestly excessive.

Implications: The court applied established authorities on grooming and consent, reaffirming that in cases involving vulnerable, groomed victims the issue of consent will normally be for the jury unless evidence unequivocally indicates proper consent. The decisions on sentence underscore the appellate court's focus on the overall totality and guideline ranges and confirm that restraining orders made without notice and without demonstrable necessity may be set aside. No new legal precedent was created; the court applied and explained existing authorities to the facts before it.