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Delecia v R.
Factual and Procedural Background
On 03/03/2025 in the Crown Court at The City, before Judge Rowland, the Appellant (then aged 45) was convicted by a majority verdict of one count of rape. On 21/03/2025 the Appellant was sentenced to 7 years 3 months' imprisonment with ancillary orders under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The Appellant's application for leave to appeal against conviction was referred to the full court by a single judge.
The substantive events unfolded on 16 April 2023. The Complainant (aged 17 at the time) had been drinking heavily outside a bar/club (Company A) and left an initial taxi shortly after 00:55. CCTV evidence and witness testimony described her being very intoxicated, disoriented, and in the vicinity of the club thereafter. The Complainant gave evidence that she had patches of memory, recalled kissing a man (identified as the Appellant), recalled saying "no" but not to what, and later found blood on her clothing and reported to her sister that "it hurts down there" and that she thought she had been raped. The Appellant accepted in an earlier interview that intercourse was consensual, later elected to say "no comment" when shown CCTV. The prosecution's case was incapacity to consent (alternative: lack of consent); the defence maintained the sexual activity was consensual and the Complainant was capable of consenting.
After the judge's summing up the jury retired on Friday 28 February 2025. A juror subsequently sent a written note to the judge over the weekend expressing concern that jurors were using "preconceptions" and asking for guidance. The trial judge read the note to counsel when the jury were dispersed, and on the following Monday he re-read and reinforced the legal directions on burden and standard of proof, consent, capacity and avoidance of stereotypes, rather than isolating or questioning the juror. The Appellant applied for leave to appeal on the ground that the judge should have carried out further enquiries under Criminal Practice Direction 8.7.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial judge was obliged, upon receipt of a juror's note referring to "preconceptions", to undertake further enquiry (including segregating or questioning the juror) under Criminal Practice Direction 8.7 such that failure to do so renders the conviction unsafe.
- What standard or test applies in deciding whether to investigate alleged jury irregularity—in particular, whether there was a "real possibility" of juror bias requiring intervention.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as advanced to the court)
- The judge failed to undertake any enquiry into a potential jury irregularity after receipt of the juror's note.
- The juror's note indicated jurors were acting on "preconceptions," and there was a real concern that this amounted to prejudice (arguably racial prejudice) influencing the jury.
- Criminal Practice Direction 8.7 (particularly PD 8.7.14) imposes a mandatory obligation to enquire; the judge gave no clear reasoning why he considered further enquiry unnecessary.
- The absence of investigation creates a real possibility of bias and renders the conviction unsafe.
Crown's Reply
- The juror's note was not an unequivocal indication of prejudice or failure to follow the law; "preconceptions" could refer to assumptions about the effects of heavy drinking on the complainant.
- The judge followed the structured sequence in PD 8.7 and exercised legitimate discretion; the Practice Direction guides but does not dictate a single mandatory course.
- On the facts the judge's choice to re-emphasise legal directions rather than question jurors was a proper exercise of judicial discretion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ellis v Deheer [1922] 2 KB 113 | Support for the principle of confidentiality of jury deliberations and reasons for caution before invading that confidentiality. | Invoked to explain strong reasons for not intruding into jury deliberations unless essential. |
| Smith and Mercieca [2005] UKHL 12 | Emphasis on maintaining "the sanctity of the jury's deliberations" and related caution; consideration of whether a judge is obliged to question jurors. | Relied upon to show there is no automatic obligation to question jurors simply because a juror criticises other jurors; supports cautious approach. |
| Saad Essa [2023] EWCA Crim 608 | Re-statement that jury discussions must remain confidential; only two narrow exceptions (complete repudiation of oath or introduction of extraneous material). | Cited to underscore the long-established confidentiality principle and the narrowness of exceptions, supporting a cautious response to the juror's note. |
| Momodou [2005] EWCA Crim 177 | Trial judge's discretion to discharge an individual juror or the jury; decision requires case-specific analysis of whether impropriety has occurred and whether it can be cured. | Applied to affirm that the trial judge must exercise judgement and that whether to investigate or discharge is case-specific; supports the view that no mandatory enquiry arose here. |
| R v Mirza [2004] 2 WLR 201 | Referenced in the context of analysis about obligations to question jurors (as part of authority considered in Smith and Mercieca). | Referenced as part of authorities considered; the court noted that Smith and Mercieca answered that no such obligation to question jurors arose. |
| Porter and Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 [2001] UKHL 67 | Test: whether there is a real possibility or risk that the tribunal is biased such that it cannot reach a proper conclusion in accordance with duty and oath. | Used to frame the correct standard for assessing alleged juror bias in this case. |
| R v KK [2019] EWCA Crim 1634 | Practice Direction 8.7 is structured but open-ended; emphasises judge's discretion in how to follow its steps according to facts and circumstances. | Applied to support that PD 8.7 guides judges but does not remove their discretion; the judge's approach here fell within that discretion. |
| Cepe [2025] EWCA Crim 1634 | Example where an individual juror's unusual and worrying behaviour, combined with direct concern from another juror, showed a clear risk the juror would not apply the law as directed. | Referenced by comparison: facts in Cepe were starker than in the present case, supporting the conclusion that this case did not require similar intervention. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analysed the complaint under Criminal Practice Direction 8.7 (PD 8.7), explaining that PD 8.7 provides structured steps (STEP 1–STEP 7) to assist judges when they become aware of a jury irregularity but is not a straitjacket. The court emphasised that whether a juror's communication constitutes an awareness of a jury irregularity is a question of degree and judgment.
The court found that the trial judge had followed the initial steps of PD 8.7 in practice: the jury were effectively isolated for the weekend, the judge showed the note to counsel, allowed submissions, read defence written submissions, and gave counsel a further opportunity before deciding his response. The judge concluded he had established the "basic facts" sufficiently to decide an appropriate response and chose to re-emphasise and repeat legal directions (burden and standard of proof, consent, capacity, avoidance of stereotypes) rather than isolate and question the juror.
The court considered authorities emphasising confidentiality of jury deliberations and judges' discretion (Ellis v Deheer; Smith and Mercieca; Saad Essa; Momodou; R v KK; Porter and Magill). Applying those principles, the court concluded that a cautious approach is warranted and that there was no unequivocal trigger here requiring further enquiry. The term "preconceptions" in the juror's note was ambiguous and could refer to non-discriminatory assumptions (for example, about intoxication). The note originated from a single juror at the end of a demanding week, who herself did not display evidence of bias and primarily sought further direction. On the facts, the judge's decision to repeat directions was within proper judicial discretion and judgment.
The court therefore found no juror impropriety that could not be cured by direction and no basis to conclude the conviction was unsafe.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED — The application for leave to appeal was refused and the conviction was upheld.
Direct effect: the Appellant's conviction and sentence remain in place. The court concluded no jury irregularity requiring further enquiry occurred on the facts before it and that the trial judge's exercise of discretion was proper. The decision was certified as suitable for citation and reporting.
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