Miah, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal against sentence brought with leave of the Single Judge. On 10 March 2025 the Appellant, aged 26, was sentenced at the Crown Court at The City by Judge Turner for multiple offences of violence and an offence of controlling and coercive behaviour committed against the Complainant over a period of approximately 2½ years. The total sentence imposed was an extended determinate sentence of 17 years and 9 months' imprisonment pursuant to section 279 of the Sentencing Act 2020, comprising a custodial term of 12 years 9 months and an extended licence period of 5 years. Count 2 (wounding with intent, contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861) was treated as the lead offence; concurrent sentences were imposed on the other counts. Sentences pronounced on other counts included: count 1 (section 20 unlawful wounding) — 4 years; count 3 (controlling or coercive behaviour, section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015) — 5 years; count 4 (making a threat to kill, contrary to section 16 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861) — 6 years; count 7 (criminal damage) — 28 days.

The factual matrix, as found by the sentencing judge, was that the Appellant met the Complainant online, they entered a relationship, moved to The City, married in an Islamic ceremony and had two children. The offences included a stabbing (count 1), a sustained hammer attack (count 2), prolonged coercive control over some 2½ years (count 3), a mock-execution/threat to kill (count 4), and repeated destruction of the Complainant's phones (count 7). The sentencing hearing extended across two days with detailed oral reasons read the day after the sentences were announced. Leave to appeal had been granted by the Single Judge on the basis of the transcript of the sentences announced; the full sentencing remarks were delivered the following day and were before the appeal court.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the notional total sentence of 15 years' imprisonment (before credit for guilty plea) for the Appellant's overall criminality was manifestly excessive.
2. Whether the judge's chosen starting point and uplift (raising the s.18 starting point to reflect totality) involved double counting of aggravating factors or a failure to apply the principle of totality.
3. Whether insufficient weight was given to mitigation, in particular the Appellant's asserted drug-related psychosis and ADHD, such that the sentence should have been reduced.
4. Whether the extended licence period of 5 years was manifestly excessive given the Appellant's progress in custody.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney Yangye's Arguments (on behalf of the Appellant)

• The judge's starting point of 10 years for the section 18 hammer attack (count 2) was too high and the offence should have been placed in a lower category (suggested category 3A rather than 2A).
• The uplift of 7 years to reflect totality involved double counting of aggravating factors and an improper application of the totality principle.
• Insufficient weight was given to mitigation: the Appellant's remorse, maturity, progress in custody, ADHD, and a possible drug-induced psychotic illness which ought to have attracted some downward adjustment despite being self-induced.
• Although not challenging the extended sentence in principle, counsel submitted that a 5-year extended licence period was manifestly excessive in light of the Appellant's prison-based progress.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the sentencing exercise and the judge's application of the Sentencing Council guidelines and factual findings. Key points of analysis were:

• The judge correctly selected count 2 (section 18 wounding) as the lead offence because it carried the longest maximum sentence and reflected the most serious physical violence.
• On culpability under the relevant guideline the judge identified multiple high-culpability factors for count 2: victim vulnerability, use of a highly dangerous weapon (claw hammer), and a prolonged/persistent assault. These placed the offence in the highest culpability band.
• On harm the judge accepted significant and enduring psychological harm to the Complainant. The court agreed that harm fell within category 2 (at the upper end), not category 1 (which requires a permanent irreversible condition of the highest severity).
• The guideline starting point for category 2 was 7 years (range 6–10). Given multiple culpability factors and the level of harm, the judge was justified in moving the starting point to 10 years.
• The judge identified discrete aggravating factors (domestic abuse context, child present, abuse of trust, offence committed under the influence of drugs, previous convictions). These, together with the need to reflect the criminality of the other counts, justified a substantial uplift from the 10-year starting point to 17 years before mitigation.
• The judge allowed 2 years' reduction for mitigation (age, partial lack of maturity, remorse, ADHD, and work addressed in custody), producing 15 years, and then allowed 15% credit for a late guilty plea to the lead offence, arriving at 12 years 9 months' custody in respect of the lead offence and an overall extended determinate sentence of 17 years 9 months (including 5 years' extended licence).
• On the Appellant's asserted drug-related psychosis, the court agreed with the sentencing judge that, because the psychosis was self-induced by voluntary drug consumption, it was properly treated as an aggravating factor rather than mitigation. The court noted pre-existing tendencies to violence and drug access demonstrated by earlier convictions and reports.
• The court further analysed the individual guideline starting points for the other principal offences (count 1: category 3A — starting point 2 years; count 3: category 1A coercive control — starting point 2½ years, potentially up to 4 years; count 4: category 1A threats to kill — starting point 4 years, potentially up to 6 years). Considered cumulatively and respecting totality, the uplift to reflect overall criminality was not excessive.
• Finally, on the extended licence period, the court endorsed the judge's conclusion that a lengthy licence period (5 years) was necessary for public protection given the nature and seriousness of the offending and the Appellant's abuse of cocaine; this was consistent with the pre-sentence report and not manifestly excessive.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Holding: The appellate court concluded that the notional total sentence of 15 years' imprisonment before credit for plea was not manifestly excessive and that the overall extended determinate sentence of 17 years 9 months (custodial term 12 years 9 months; extended licence 5 years) and ancillary orders were lawful and properly imposed.

Implications: The direct effect is that the sentence and extension as imposed by the sentencing judge stand. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal precedent; it affirms the sentencing judge's application of the Sentencing Council guidelines, assessment of culpability and harm, treatment of self-induced psychosis as aggravating in the circumstances of this case, and the exercise of judgment on totality and public protection.