Summary of Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is the hearing of an application by the Attorney General for leave to refer a sentence passed on the Defendant, aged 34. The Defendant pleaded guilty at trial in the Magistrates' Court to stalking involving fear of violence on 13 June 2025; the matter was committed for sentence to the Crown Court. On 20 August 2025 the Defendant was sentenced in the Crown Court to 3 years' imprisonment and an 8-year restraining order.

The offending comprised repeated unwanted attendance at the Victim's address from 2019–2025, threats, attempts to force entry, following the Victim and their daughter, numerous communications in breach of bail, and a pattern of conduct causing the Victim significant distress. The Defendant was arrested in January 2025 and remanded; further breaches of bail led to a further arrest on 14 April 2025 and remand in custody.

At the sentencing hearing prosecution and defence disputed the appropriate category under the stalking guideline. The judge identified a starting point and then adjusted for aggravating and mitigating features, giving credit for plea; the Attorney General applied for leave to refer the resulting sentence as unduly lenient on the basis of alleged double counting of mitigation.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge erred by double counting mitigating factors such that the sentence imposed was unduly lenient.
2. Whether the sentence fell outside the range of sentences which the sentencing judge might reasonably have considered appropriate, justifying interference under section 36 Criminal Justice Act 1988.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney General's Arguments

• The sentence was unduly lenient because the judge double counted mitigating factors, producing a significant downward adjustment from the correct starting point.
• The judge applied a starting point that was too low after incorrectly treating mitigation in a way that led to a sentence outside the appropriate category range.

Defendant's Arguments

• The judge properly identified mitigating factors beyond absence of previous convictions and remorse and treated pre-sentence report, letters of support and the Sentencing Note as mitigation.
• The judge's sentencing judgment should be respected by the appellate court.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion, delivered by Judge Dingemans, proceeded as follows:

• The court granted leave to refer because some of the judge's sentencing remarks were difficult to follow and it was appropriate to consider possible double counting of mitigation.
• The court analysed the facts against the offence-specific stalking guideline. Although both parties had characterised culpability as B (high), the court agreed with the sentencing judge that the extreme nature and combination of culpability B factors elevated the offending to Category A1, with a starting point of 5 years and a recommended range of 3½ to 8 years.
• The court identified the principal aggravating features relied on by the judge: domestic context, exploitation of contact with the daughter, and breach of bail after the January arrest.
• The court accepted the relevant mitigating features acknowledged by the judge: remorse, no previous convictions, positive character references, the Defendant's scoliosis requiring medication, employment and prospects of return to work. The court rejected that the Defendant suffered from a mental disorder or learning disability for guideline purposes and did not accept other claimed background disadvantages on the evidence provided.
• The court observed that the sentencing judge's stage‑2 remarks (adjustments for aggravating and mitigating features) were not clearly expressed and could be read as double counting mitigation or failing to explain the approach clearly. Nevertheless, after analysis the court concluded the judge was correct to adopt the 5-year starting point and that the subsequent reduction to 40 months (before plea discount) was lenient but not so far outside the permissible range as to be unduly lenient.
• The court noted relevant principles for Attorney General references: deference to the sentencing judge's assessment of weight, interference only where a sentence falls outside the reasonable range, reluctance to grant leave in borderline cases, and that section 36 CJA 1988 addresses gross error. Applying those principles, the court found no gross error warranting interference.

Holding and Implications

REFERENCE REFUSED

Holding: The court granted leave to refer but, having considered the evidence and the sentencing judge's approach, refused the Reference, finding that although the sentence was lenient it was not unduly lenient.

Implications: The immediate consequence is that the Crown Court sentence stands — 3 years' imprisonment with an 8-year restraining order. The opinion states no new precedent was established; the decision applies the established principle of deference to the sentencing judge and confirms that unclear sentencing remarks that suggest possible double counting do not automatically require appellate interference where the ultimate sentence remains within the range a sentencing judge might reasonably have adopted.