YSA v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Anor (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff is a Jordanian national who arrived in the State on 5 August 2024 and applied for international protection on 6 August 2024. The International Protection Office (referred to in this summary as Company C) recommended that the Plaintiff be refused both refugee and subsidiary protection. The Plaintiff was notified of that refusal on 11 November 2024 and advised of a 15 working day period to appeal, which expired on 2 December 2024. No notice of appeal was lodged within that period. A voluntary return letter was served on 10 February 2025.

On 11 February 2025 an Attorney for the Plaintiff requested an extension of time to lodge an appeal, attributing failure to an administrative/clerical error and stating it had always been the Plaintiff's intention to appeal on time. The Tribunal (referred to in this summary as Company A) issued an email decision on 17 February 2025 refusing to extend time, describing the explanation as vague and inadequate and concluding that “administrative error” or “clerical oversight” did not meet the statutory threshold of “special circumstances.” The Plaintiff provided further detail on 17 February 2025 explaining misfiling compounded by not receiving decision papers from Company C. Company A replied on 20 February 2025 noting the appeal was ten weeks late, stating it had no power to reopen a rejected appeal, and referencing Regulation 10 of the 2017 Regulations and the decision in ND v IPAT & Anor. [2020] IEHC 451.

Leave to bring judicial review was granted on 28 April 2025. The judicial review was heard by Judge O'Regan, whose judgment was delivered on 27 January 2026. The relief claimed by the Plaintiff was refused. The Respondents (Company A and Company B) were declared presumptively entitled to costs, with directions permitting brief submissions on costs if contested.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether Company A was required, as a matter of fair procedure, to seek further information from the Plaintiff before refusing an extension of time under the 2017 Regulations.
2. Whether Company A has jurisdiction or power to set aside or reconsider an earlier decision refusing an extension of time (i.e. to reopen or rehear a rejected appeal).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• Fair procedure required Company A to seek further information or identify deficiencies before refusing the extension of time.
• Regulation 4(2) of the 2017 Regulations was relied upon to support a procedural obligation to invite further submissions.
• Company A had power to reconsider its earlier decision, with reference (in submissions) to Danqua v Minister for Justice (No. 2) [2017] 3 IR 192; [2017] IECA 20.

Respondents' Arguments (Company A and Company B)

• Regulation 4(2) notifies a default and does not oblige Company A to invite further representations; Rule does not create such a procedural duty.
• Company A is a creature of statute and any power to reopen or set aside decisions must be identified in legislation; Regulation 10 permits correction of errors/omissions but does not authorise setting aside and rehearing a decision.
• No clear legislative or principled basis was identified for unconstrained power to reconsider earlier decisions; the parameters and source of such power were not shown.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by noting overlap with the judgment in GB and proceeded to consider two additional issues raised by the Plaintiff. On the requirement to seek further information, the Court interpreted Regulation 4(2) of the 2017 Regulations as applying to a different factual scenario (a notice of appeal received after the prescribed period without an initial request for extension) and concluded that Regulation 4(2) is intended to notify a claimant of default rather than to impose an obligation on Company A to identify deficiencies and invite further submissions. The Court accepted the analysis in JVVM that to contend Regulation 4(2) creates such an obligation is unarguable. The Court rejected the Plaintiff's contention that fair procedure required Company A to point out shortcomings before refusing the extension, observing the distinction between a statutory power to seek further submissions and an obligation to do so.

On the power to reconsider a prior decision, the Court examined Regulation 10 of the 2017 Regulations and the decision in ND. The Court held that Regulation 10 permits correction of errors and omissions but does not authorise Company A to set aside a decision in full and rehear the matter. The Court agreed with Humphreys J's reasoning in ND (noting it need not be confined to obiter), and emphasised that Company A, as a statutory body, may only exercise powers conferred by legislation; no legislative basis for a broad power to reopen decisions had been demonstrated. The Plaintiff's reliance on Danqua was rejected as unparticularised and insufficient to establish such jurisdiction. Having found no obligation to seek further information and no power to reconsider the earlier decision, the Court concluded the Plaintiff had not shown entitlement to the relief sought.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Plaintiff's relief is refused.

Implications: The direct effect is that the decision of Company A refusing to extend the prescribed period for appeal was upheld and the judicial review seeking to set aside or require reconsideration of that decision was dismissed. The Respondents (Company A and Company B) are presumptively entitled to their costs, with an opportunity for parties to file brief submissions on costs as directed. No broader or novel legal principle was established in this judgment beyond the Court's application of existing statutory interpretation and the precedents cited.