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Moore and Anor v An Coimisiun Pleanala (Approved)

High Court of Ireland

Dec 18, 2025

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Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiffs sought judicial review of a decision of the Defendant made under section 37 of the Planning and Development Act, 2000 on 26 March 2025 which granted planning permission to Company A (ABP reference 319996-24) for demolition and construction works authorising the omission of a previously permitted house and the construction of 48 residential units. Both Plaintiffs had participated in the planning process and had appeals submitted on their behalf. A Statement of Grounds and affidavits were filed on 20 May 2025. The Plaintiffs applied to amend the Statement of Grounds prior to the Court's consideration of whether substantial grounds existed and also sought leave to apply for judicial review on the original or amended grounds. The application for leave was heard ex parte on 30 June 2025; the Defendant and Company A opposed the proposed amendment. Separate proceedings (Maughan & Anor., record 2025 687 JR) had already succeeded in obtaining leave to challenge the same planning decision.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Plaintiffs should be granted liberty to amend their Statement of Grounds prior to the grant of leave to seek judicial review, and if so on what test or threshold.
Whether the Statement of Grounds as filed disclosed substantial grounds to obtain leave to apply for judicial review of the Defendant's decision.
If the proposed amendments amount to a substantially new case, whether an extension of time under section 50(8) of the Planning and Development Act, 2000 is required and, if so, whether the Plaintiffs can satisfy that requirement.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

The Plaintiffs sought amendment under Order 84 rule 20(4) prior to leave, submitting that the court has a wider discretion at that stage and that proposed amendments primarily "plead out" matters implicit in the original grounds rather than introduce a new case.
They contended the amendments would particularise existing grounds (heritage and residential amenity), did not add new reliefs, and were arguable; they asserted limited prejudice to the Defendant and Company A.
The Plaintiffs explained delay as late decision to institute proceedings within the eight-week period and limited time to prepare detailed particulars; they relied on the solicitor's affidavit for this explanation.

Defendant's and Company A's Arguments

The Defendant and Company A contended the proposed amendments introduced an entirely new or substantially new case which could not reasonably have been anticipated from the original Statement of Grounds and therefore required an extension of time under section 50(8), which the Plaintiffs conceded they could not satisfy.
They submitted that the original Statement of Grounds did not disclose substantial grounds and that allowing the amendment would circumvent statutory time limits and prejudice the administration of the statutory scheme.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Byrne v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 222	Authority where liberty to amend Statement of Grounds was granted prior to leave, without prejudice to respondent's rights.	The court noted Byrne and observed that liberty to amend had been granted there but that the question whether amendments amounted to a new case was left open; Byrne did not compel grant here.
Keegan v. Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission [2012] IESC 29, [2012] 2 IR 570	Principles that each amendment application depends on its facts; requirement to apply within permitted time or persuade court to extend time; need to explain delay.	The court relied on Keegan for the proposition that amendments require explanation of delay and that interests of justice may permit amendment but applicants must explain why new grounds were not included earlier.
Re Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking Bill) 1999 [2000] IESC 19, [2000] 2 I.R. 360	Power to extend time is necessary to cater for interests of justice and access to courts.	Quoted to show the relevance of extension-of-time principles when considering whether late amendment should be permitted in the interests of justice.
North Westmeath Turbine Action Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IECA 126	Authority that a new arguable case may not be introduced for the first time without satisfying section 50(8); example where amendment introduced new relief but balance weighed against amendment.	Used to support the conclusion that proposed amendments here amounted to a substantially new case and that the balance of justice did not favour permitting amendment without satisfying statutory time-extension requirements.
Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 26	Post-leave amendment test: focus on arguability, explanation and lack of irremediable prejudice; lower threshold for amendment after leave than for initiating proceedings out of time.	The court contrasted the lower post-leave threshold in Sherwin with the present pre-leave context and applied Sherwin's principles by explaining why the Plaintiffs could not rely on that lower test here.
Copymoore Limited v Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland [2014] IESC 63, [2014] 2 I.R. 786	Factors to consider include public interest and conduct of the parties; oversight may justify amendment for matters notified early.	Applied to note that some new points may be permitted where early notification or oversight explains omission, but distinguished because the Plaintiffs did not provide an adequate explanation or early notification.
BW v. RAT [2017] IECA 296	Statement that amendment of pleadings requires three elements: arguability, explanation and lack of irremediable prejudice.	The court applied the three-element framework when assessing the proposed amendments and found the explanation deficient and that the amendments amounted to a new case requiring time-extension justification.
O'Lone v An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 136	General caution against using amendment to reprogram an entire case.	Cited to support reluctance to permit extensive restructuring of the pleaded case by amendment.
Coastal Concern Alliance v. Minister for Housing, Local Government & Heritage [2024] IEHC 524	An application for amendment should be approached as if it involves a late application where a substantially new case is sought.	Relied upon to justify treating the Plaintiffs' proposed amendments as requiring the same scrutiny as a late initiation of proceedings.
Clancy & Anor v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 528	Commentary that North Westmeath Turbine Action Group and Sherwin can be read harmoniously.	The court adopted a harmonising approach and applied that analysis to assess whether the amendments here were refinements or a substantial enlargement.
Alen-Buckley v An Bord Pleanála [2017] IEHC 541	Principle that linking new matters back to generally pleaded grounds is not permissible; court concerned with correctly pleaded arguments.	Used to reject the Plaintiffs' submission that new particulars could be read back to general pleas in the original Statement of Grounds.
Eco Advocacy CLG v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 4) [2023] IEHC 713; Leech v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 599; Mount Salus Residents' Owners Management Company Limited by Guarantee v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2025] IEHC 14	Authorities cited by analogy that a Statement of Grounds includes grounds acceptably clear from its terms.	Invoked to explain limits on reading additional matters into the Statement of Grounds and to determine what was acceptably clear from the original pleading.
Ballyboden Tidy Towns Group v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2022] IEHC 7	Where there is genuine doubt, ambiguity or confusion in the Grounds pleaded, an applicant cannot benefit from it.	Cited to support the proposition that the Plaintiffs could not rely on ambiguity in their Statement of Grounds to obtain amendment or leave.
McGowan v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 405	Recital of high-level principles does not suffice; applicant must provide a "route-map" connecting facts to relief sought.	Applied to conclude the Plaintiffs' pleadings lacked the necessary route-map and thus did not disclose substantial grounds.
Stapleton v. An Bord Pleanála & Savona [2024] IEHC 3	Commentary on the absence of a route-map from EU law provisions to reliefs sought.	Referenced to reinforce the requirement for specific pleading linking facts to legal relief.
Casey v. Minister for Housing, Planning and Local Government & Ors. [2021] IESC 42; Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2024] IESC 28	Authority that a Statement of Grounds frames issues for leave and, if granted, the Court's jurisdiction.	Relied upon to emphasise the central role of the Statement of Grounds in delimiting the case the Court may entertain.
Thomson & Anor v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESC 31	Failure to explain the entire period of delay is not necessarily fatal but may give rise to presumption against extension.	Used to explain that an inadequate explanation for the omission weighs against permitting late amendment or extension.
Hayes & Anor v. EPA [2024] IECA 162	Dictum that the scope of judicial review is defined by the pleadings and statutory time limits cannot be evaded by late substantive amendments.	Quoted to reinforce that the statutory eight-week limit cannot be circumvented by substantive amendment of a timely Statement of Grounds.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed whether the proposed amendments to the Statement of Grounds merely particularised grounds already acceptably clear from the original pleading or whether they introduced a substantially new case requiring an extension of time under section 50(8). The Court examined the text of the original Core Grounds (heritage impact / failure to have regard to a Character Appraisal; residential amenity impacts) and the Inspector's Report and Board reasons. It concluded:

The original Statement of Grounds advanced principally merits-based challenges about heritage and amenity but did not disclose substantial grounds such as would permit leave; it lacked the required particularity and a "route-map" linking asserted facts to legal relief.
The proposed amendments went beyond pleading-out existing grounds and sought for the first time to assert failures to properly consider or apply specific Development Plan provisions and statutory obligations — amounting to a substantially new case.
Where an amendment would introduce a substantially new case the Plaintiffs would need to obtain an extension of time under section 50(8); the Plaintiffs conceded they could not satisfy that provision.
The Plaintiffs' explanation for the omission (late decision to proceed and limited time to prepare particulars) was not an adequate explanation amounting to oversight by prior advisers; the Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and insufficient to justify amendment.
Applying the authorities (notably Keegan, North Westmeath Turbine Action Group, Sherwin, Copymoore and BW v. RAT), the Court emphasised the need for arguability, explanation and absence of irremediable prejudice but distinguished the higher threshold necessary where leave had not been granted and a substantially new case was sought post-time limit.
The interests of justice did not require permitting the amendment given the statutory scheme, the absence of adequate explanation, and the risk of circumventing the statutory eight-week limit.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

The application for liberty to amend the Statement of Grounds in the terms of the proposed Amended Statement of Grounds is refused.
The application for leave to apply for judicial review on the grounds pleaded in the Statement of Grounds filed 20 May 2025 is refused.
Liberty to file the proposed affidavit of Attorney Hastings is refused.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Plaintiffs' proposed expanded grounds are not permitted and the Plaintiffs do not obtain leave to judicially review the Defendant's decision in these proceedings; the proposed affidavit will not be admitted. The opinion does not purport to establish any new binding precedent beyond the application of established principles to these facts.

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